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I. INTRODUCTION
For more than a century, youth crime policies have oscillated between periods
of more lenient treatment and harsher punishment. Justice officials and the public
alternatively attributed high crime rates either to "soft" rehabilitative policies and
advocated "'tougher" .sanctions, or to excessively harsh penalties that failed
adequately to treat youths.' A century ago, Progressive reformers combined a more
modem construction of childhood with a more scientific conception of social
control to create a judicial-welfare alternative and to remove children from the
adult criminal process.2 They used juvenile courts to assimilate, "Americanize,"
and control "other people's" children.3
The Supreme Court in In re Gault in 1967 recognized that delinquents
received neither the rehabilitative treatment Progressives envisioned, nor adult
criminal procedural safeguards, and granted them some due process rights.4 The
Court's due process decisions, in turn, fostered a convergence between the juvenile
and criminal justice systems.5 During the 1980s and 1990s, a sharp increase in
homicides committed by young black men provided political incentives to "get
tough" on youth crime and produced an unprecedented paroxysm of punitiveness.6
States enacted harsher punishment for children in both the criminal and juvenile
justice systems-more youths were tried as adults and exposed to draconian
penalties such as Life Without Parole (LWOP) sentences, and longer terms in
youth prisons for the disproportionate numbers of minority youths sentenced as
delinquents.
See generally THOMAS J. BERNARD, THE CYCLE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE (1992) (arguing that a
cyclical pattern to juvenile justice policy has been evident for the last 200 years and proposing how to
break the cycle).
2 See, e.g., DAVID S. TANENHAUS, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE MAKING 4 (2004) (emphasizing that
juvenile court legislation "asserted state responsibility for both dependent and delinquent children
and thus merged concerns with child welfare with crime control.").
3 See, e.g., BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE
COURT 55-60 (1999); ANTHONY PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 75-83
(2d ed. 1977); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS
ALTERNATIVE IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 221-22 (1980); STEVEN SCHLOSSMAN, LOVE AND THE
AMERICAN DELINQUENT: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PROGRESSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE 58 (1977);
JOHN SUTTON, STUBBORN CHILDREN: CONTROLLING DELINQUENCY IN THE UNITED STATES 122 (1988);
TANENHAUS, supra note 2, at ix. See generally, W. NORTON GRUBB & MARVIN LAZERSON, BROKEN
PROMISES: How AMERICANS FAIL THEIR CHILDREN (1982) (challenging traditional government
assumptions on how to assist children and their families).
4 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 72 (1967).
5 See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691,
718-22 (1991) (summarizing the procedural and substantive convergence between juvenile and
criminal courts); Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court-Part II Race and the
"Crack Down" on Youth Crime, 84 MINN. L. REV. 327, 347-69 (1999) (arguing that social structural
changes and race account for adoption of more punitive juvenile justice policies).
6 See, e.g., FELD, supra note 3, at 189 (describing politics of war on juveniles); DAVID
GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 3
(2001) (analyzing repudiation of "penal welfarism" since the 1970s); MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN
NEGLECT 81-123 (1995) (analyzing political backdrop of war on drugs).
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Within the past decade, researchers, scholars, policy makers, the public, and
even some state officials have recognized that many legislatures overreacted in
adopting excessively harsh and counter-productive policies. Despite political
"sound-bites" that equate even young children with adults-"old enough to do the
crime, old enough to do the time"--developmental psychological research
identifies the many ways in which youths differ from adults. The neuroscience of
adolescent brain development provides a deeper understanding of why children's
decisions and judgment differ from adults. More recently, the Supreme Court and a
few states have taken tentative steps to adopt policies to reverse the punitive trend
and to restore a semblance of rationality to youth crime policies. The Court in
Roper v. Simmons barred the death penalty for children.7 A few states have
mitigated the harshest penalties imposed on youths, such as life without parole
(LWOP).8 Others have considered increasing the ages of juvenile court jurisdiction
and waiver to criminal court.9 Despite these hopeful signs, states must do much
more to formally recognize youthfulness as a mitigating factor.
This article analyzes the role of race in shaping punitive youth crime policies,
describes the first positive developments in more than two decades, and proposes a
way to incorporate developmental differences into youth sentencing policies. Part
II provides an overview of the juvenile court and its historic mission to
discriminate between "our children" and "other people's children." Part III places
the Supreme Court's juvenile court due process decisions in the broader context of
the quest for civil rights and racial equality. Part IV attributes the "get tough"
policies of the 1980s and 1990s to the politics of race and crime, and examines
their impact on disproportionate minority confinement, waiver of juveniles to
criminal court, and their sentencing as adults, which generated a punitive
paroxysm. Part V examines adolescent criminal responsibility and the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Roper v. Simmons to abolish the death penalty for
juveniles. The developmental psychological research that underlay Roper's
assessment of juveniles' diminished responsibility has wider implications for youth
sentencing policy. I argue that Roper's proportionality rationale precludes
sentencing juveniles to Life Without Parole (LWOP) and propose giving a "youth
discount" to formally recognize youthfulness as a mitigating factor.
II. THE JUVENILE COURT
For more than a century after the founding of the United States, no separate
court or justice system existed for young offenders. 10 States tried youths who
7 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
8 See infra notes 371-76 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 377-90 and accompanying text.10 See, e.g., FELD, supra note 3, at 17-22 (describing prosecution and sentencing of children
prior to the creation of the juvenile court); cf Hillary J. Massey, Disposing of Children: The Eighth
Amendment and Juvenile Life Without Parole After Roper, 47 B.C. L. REv. 1083, 1086 (2006) ("[11n
the early days of the American justice system, children were tried as adults and could be put to
death.").
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committed crimes as adults and the common law infancy defense provided the only
substantive protection for very young offenders." Prior to the creation of juvenile
courts, "adult crime" meant "adult time," therefore states tried and sentenced
children as adults, and imprisoned and executed them for crimes committed as
young as ten, eleven, or twelve years of age.12
A century ago, industrialization and modernization transformed America from
a country of rural, agricultural communities into an urban, ethnically diverse
society with a growing manufacturing base.' 3 Industrialization attracted hordes of
southern and eastern European immigrants who crowded into urban ghettos that
sprung-up around factories and transportation hubs. 14 Industrialization shifted work
from farms and family shops to large factories, and these economic changes altered
how women and children fit in the larger social order.
15
The common law infancy defense recognized that young people may lack criminal capacity.
It recognized and excused or mitigated the punishments of actors who lacked the requisite moral and
criminal responsibility, for example, the very young and immature. Sanford J. Fox, Responsibility in
the Juvenile Court, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 659 (1970). It conclusively presumed that children less
than seven years old lacked criminal capacity, and treated those fourteen years of age and older as
fully responsible. It created a rebuttable presumption that youth between the ages of seven and
fourteen years lacked criminal capacity. Francis Barry McCarthy, The Role of the Concept of
Responsibility in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings, 10 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 181, 184-85 (1977);
Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L. REv. 503, 5110-11
(1984); see also Lara A. Bazelon, Exploding the Superpredator Myth: Why Infancy is the
Preadolescent's Best Defense in Juvenile Court, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 159, 168-70 (2000)
(summarizing role of infancy defense prior to adoption of juvenile court legislation); Andrew M.
Carter, Age Matters: The Case for a Constitutionalized Infancy Defense, 54 U. KANSAS L. REV. 687,
710 (2006) (arguing to reinvigorate the infancy defense. to protect the youngest juveniles tried as
adults); James C. Weissman, Toward an Integrated Theory of Delinquency Responsibility, 60 DENy.
L.J. 485, 490 (1983).
12 VICTOR STREIB, DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILES 57 (1987).
13 MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE POLITICS OF
ANTI-POVERTY POLICY 14 (1999) ("In the span of seventy years, an economy dominated by
agriculture was transformed into a modern industrial economy in which a majority of workers were
employed in manufacturing, mining, construction, trade, finance, and transportation."). See generally
ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 1877-1920 (1967) (impact of industrialization on growth
of bureaucracy).
14 See, e.g., FELD, supra note 3, at 27 ("Industrial growth spurred population increases and
altered the urban landscape. The immigrant poor crowded into the urban center surrounding the
industrial core...."); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 26 (1993) ("Debse clusters of tenements and
row houses were constructed... to house the burgeoning work force."). On the impact of immigration
on Progressive American society, see generally JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS
OF AMERICAN NATIVISM 1860-1925 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that the southern and eastern European
immigrants differed in language, religion, and culture from the Anglo-Protestant American who
preceded them and these differences hindered their assimilation); RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF
REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 178-86 (1955).
15 See, e.g., CARL DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 178-209 (1980); JOSEPH KETT, RITES OF PASSAGE: ADOLESCENCE IN
AMERICAN 1790 TO THE PRESENT 114-16 (1977) (noting that modernization modified the roles of
women and children); TANENHAUS, supra note 2, at 58 ("Progressive reformers were concerned about
whether the family could survive in the modern world. The expansion of the wage economy and the
spread of market processes, the rise of large-scale industrialization, rapid urbanization, and mass
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The idea of childhood is socially constructed and reflects its cultural context. 16
During the late-nineteenth century, upper- and middle-class women promoted a
more modem vision of children as vulnerable and innocent people who required
close attention and control during their transition to adulthood.' 7 Progressives
created and expanded public agencies and private organizations to "Americanize"
immigrants and their children. They assumed that children were malleable and
established programs-juvenile courts, child labor laws, social welfare laws, and
compulsory school attendance laws-that reflected the new social construction of
childhood.18 Progressives found the presence of children in police stations, jails,
immigration were all radically transforming American life. The family, symbolized by the image of
the home, appeared to be fracturing under these new pressures.").
16 Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case
for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1091, 1093 (1991) ("[T]he life-stage we call
'childhood' is likewise a culturally and historically situated social construction.... The definition of
childhood-who is classified as a child, and what emotional, intellectual, and moral properties
children are assumed to possess-has changed over time in response to changes in other facets of
society."); cf DAVID ARCHARD, CHILDREN: RIGHTS AND CHILDHOOD 16-17 (1993). The modem
construction of childhood views the period between infancy and adulthood as a separate stage of
development and does not perceive children as miniature adults. See generally PHILLIPPE ARIES,
CENTURY OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE FAMILY 365-404 (Robert Baldick trans., Vintage
Books 1962) (tracing the modernizing conception of childhood to the upper classes in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries).
17 By the end of the nineteenth century, urban upper and middle-class parents restricted
children's autonomy to prepare them for adult roles. DEGLER, supra note 15, at 66 (1980).
[C]hildren began to be seen as different from adults; among other things they were
considered now more innocent; childhood itself was perceived as it is today, as a period
of life not only worth recognizing and cherishing but extending. Moreover, simply
because children were being seen for the first time as special, the family's reason for
being, its justification as it were, was increasingly related to the proper rearing of
children.
Id. Middle and upper class women assumed a greater role in supervising children's moral and social
development. Id.; David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Juvenile Courts in the Early Twentieth
Century: Beyond the Myth of Immaculate Construction, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 42, 46
(Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002) ("The inventors of the juvenile court considered
themselves part of a humanitarian movement which, in the nineteenth century, had transformed the
status of children from the sole property of their fathers into a dependent class in need of state
protection.").
18 See, e.g., LAWRENCE CREMIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SCHOOL: PROGRESSIVISM IN
AMERICAN EDUCATION 1876-1957 (1961) (attributing compulsory school attendance laws to
changing social construction of childhood); ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 5-7 (creating juvenile justice
to reform young offenders); SUSAN TIFFIN, IN WHOSE BEST INTEREST? CHILD WELFARE REFORM IN
THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 141-61 (1982); WALTER TRATrNER, CRUSADE FOR THE CHILDREN: A HISTORY
OF THE NATIONAL CHILD LABOR COMMITEE AND CHILD LABOR REFORM IN NEW YORK STATE, 108-54
(1965) (attributing child labor laws to protection of children); WIEBE, supra note 13, at 169 ("The
child was the carrier of tomorrow's hope whose innocence and freedom made him singularly
receptive to education in rational, humane behavior. Protect him, nurture him, and in his manhood he
would create the bright new world of the progressives' vision.").
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criminal courts and prisons appalling and fashioned an alternative justice system
for misbehaving youths. 19
Positive criminology provided a rationale to treat children differently from
adults. Positivism attributed crime to deterministic forces for which the individual
was not responsible and suggested a more scientific approach to social control.2 °
Progressives used medical analogies to treat rather than to punish offenders. 21 The
"Rehabilitative Ideal" that underlies the juvenile court viewed children as objects
to be shaped, molded and formed.22 The new ideologies of childhood and positive
criminology combined to create "an institution that would intervene forcefully in
the lives of all children at risk to effect a rescue.,
23
Despite standard historical accounts, 24 the juvenile court did not emerge fully-
formed in Cook County, Illinois, in 1899, but rather constituted a "work-in-
progress., 25 The ideology, structure, and practices of juvenile justice evolved over
19 TANENHAUS, supra note 2, at 6; Franklin E. Zimring, The Common Thread: Diversion in
Juvenile Justice, 88 CAL. L. REv. 2477, 2481 (2000) (arguing that diversion from the criminal process
constituted an improvement per se in the handling of children).
20 Progressives adopted new theories about human behavior and criminality, reformulated the
ideology of crime, and modified criminal justice administration. See, e.g., ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at
50-52; Francis A. Allen, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, in THE BORDERLAND OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY 26 (1964). Positivism tried to discover the causes
of crime-structural and deterministic forces that compelled offenders to act as they did. Because
larger forces controlled their behavior, offenders were less responsible for their crimes and justice
system agencies tried to reform them. KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS 8 (1997) ("[D]eviant behavior is at least partially caused (rather
than freely chosen). Progressive reformers therefore identified rehabilitation-operationally defined
as the use of 'individualized corrective measures adapted to the specific case or the particular
problem;-as the appropriate response to deviant behavior.").
21 ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 50-52; ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID PLANS: AMERICA'S
JUVENILE COURT EXPERIMENT 22 (1978).
22 Francis Allen describes the diagnostic and treatment implications of positivism and the
'Rehabilitative Ideal':
The rehabilitative ideal... assumed, first, that human behavior is the product of
antecedent causes. These causes can be identified... Knowledge of the antecedents of
human behavior makes possible an approach to the scientific control of human behavior.
Finally, it is assumed that measures employed to treat the convicted offender should serve
a therapeutic function; that such measures should be designed to effect changes in the
behavior of the convicted person in the interest of his own happiness, health, and
satisfaction and in the interest of social defense.
Allen, supra note 20, at 26.
23 Zimring, supra note 19, at 2480.
24 See, e.g., PLATT, supra note 3, at 101-36 (discussing role of women child-savers in
promoting first juvenile court in Cook County, Illinois in 1899). See generally ROTHMAN, supra note
3 (discussing social structural changes associated with modernization); RYERSON, supra note 21
(analyzing the influence of social science on juvenile courts' treatment ideology).
25 See, e.g., Tanenhaus, supra note 17, at 42-43.
Illinois's pioneering juvenile court act read like a rough blueprint. Most of the
features that later became the hallmarks of progressive juvenile justice-private hearings,
confidential records, the complaint system, detention homes, and probation officers-
were either omitted entirely from the initial law or were included without any provisions
for public funding. As a result, the world's first juvenile court opened on July 3, 1899,
with an open hearing, a public record, no means to control its calendar (i.e. no complaint
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time in a politically contested context. 26 From its inception, political interests have
contended over juvenile court's structure, functions, and jurisdiction.2 7 Gault's
"due process revolution" in the 1960s and the "get tough" policies of the 1990s
reflect continuing political disputes about the juvenile courts' jurisdiction, role, and
functions.
The juvenile court provided a judicial-welfare alternative to the criminal
justice system and embodied the state as parens patriae.28 Juvenile courts'
jurisdiction over both delinquent and dependent children melded child welfare and
crime control and buttressed its depiction as a benign, non-punitive, and
therapeutic agency. 29 Juvenile courts extended child-welfare proceedings to
encompass "status offenses"-non-criminal behavior such as "sexual precocity,"
"truancy," and "immorality."
30
As a judicial-welfare alternative to the criminal justice system, juvenile courts
rejected criminal procedures, employed informal methods, excluded lawyers and
juries, and used euphemisms to disavow any suggestion of a criminal
proceedings.31 Judges acted in offenders' "best interests" and imposed
indeterminate and non-proportional dispositions to enhance their future well-being
rather than to punish them for past offenses.32 Child-savers medicalized deviance,
system), and without public funds to pay either the salaries of probation officers or to
maintain a detention home for children.
Id. 26 TANENHAUS, supra note 2, at xxvii.
27 See id. at xxix.
28 FELD, supra note 3, at 55-57; ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 212-20.
29 FELD, supra note 3, at 62-63; PLATT, supra note 3, at 176; TANENHAUS, supra note 2; at 22.
Tanenhaus argues that "progressive child savers conceived of all children as being different from
adults and, accordingly, did not draw sharp distinctions between dependents and delinquents and
believed that a unified children's court could serve both." Id. at 59; SCHLOSSMAN, supra note 3, at 58;
SUTTON, supra note 3, at 232-58.
30 Reformers viewed juvenile courts as a social welfare system to control problem behaviors
that criminal courts ignored. PLATT, supra note 3, at 46-74; SuTTON, supra note 3, at 121-53. Status
jurisdiction reflected the newer conception of childhood. TANENHAUS, supra note 2, at 61 ("Through
truancy, compulsory education, and child labor laws aimed to keep children off the streets, in school,
and out of the labor market, progressives attempted to prolong youth dependency."); see also
RYERSON, supra note 21, at 47; SCHLOSSMAN, supra note 3, 151-53.
31 See, e.g., JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE 154 (Joan McCord et al. eds., 2001). JUVENILE
CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE summarizes the Progressive's conception ofjuvenile court procedures:
It was to focus on the child or adolescent as a.person in need of assistance, not on
the act that brought him or her before the court. The proceedings were informal, with
much discretion left to the juvenile court judge. Because the judge was to act in the best
interests of the child, procedural safeguards available to adults, such as the right to an
attorney, the right to know the charges brought against one, the right to trial by jury, and
the right to confront one's accuser, were thought unnecessary. Juvenile court proceedings
were closed to the public and juvenile records were to remain confidential so as not to
interfere with the child's or adolescent's ability to be rehabilitated and reintegrated into
society.
Id; see also FELD, supra note 3, at 60-63; ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 212-20.
32 See BERNARD, supra note 1, at 83.
It was a social welfare agency, the central processing unit of the entire child
welfare system. Children who had needs of any kind could be brought into the juvenile
2007]
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emphasized the determined quality of youthful misconduct, and gave judges wide
latitude to treat the whole child rather than to focus simply on her crime.33
Progressives recognized that children's lives and circumstances differed, and
they expected and intended juvenile courts to exercise greater control over poor
and immigrant children.34 They did not regard racial and ethnic discrimination as
invidious, but rather as an opportunity to make "other peoples' children" more like
"our children." Because poor and immigrant children had greater needs, they
required more control and supervision and quickly filtered through the benevolent
system into its more punitive institutions.35
III. THE JUVENILE COURT "DUE PROCESS REVOLUTION" IN CONTEXT
In the decades before and after World War II, the "Great Migration" of Blacks
from the rural south to the urban north fostered a more assertive civil rights
movement. 36 These racial-demographic and political changes pressured the Warren
Court to address issues of civil rights and criminal procedure during the 1950s and
1960s.37 During the 1960s, the Court's criminal procedure decisions coincided
court, where their troubles would be diagnosed and the services they needed provided by
court workers or obtained from other agencies.
Id. Juvenile court judges imposed indeterminate and non-proportional dispositions that could
continue for the duration of minority. FELD, supra note 3, at 69-74. Each child's circumstances
differed and judges based dispositions on their future "needs" rather than their past "deeds."
RYERSON, supra note 21, at 40; Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107
(1909).
33 ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 238; RYERSON, supra note 21, at 40-41; see also SCHLOSSMAN,
supra note 3, at 157-80.
34 See FELD, supra note 3, at 75-76; GRUBB & LAZERSON, supra note 3, at 69 (describing
selective application ofparens patriae ideology in a class-based society); JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE
JUSTICE, supra note 31, at 154-155 (discussing the tension between social control and social welfare
and balancing the best interest of the child with protection of society); PLATT, supra note 3, at 36-39;
ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 222.
35 ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 71 ("The exercise of judicial discretion helped to effect a dual
system of criminal justice: one brand for the poor, another for the middle and upper classes. Judicial
discretion may well have promoted judicial discrimination."); TANENHAUS, supra note 2, at 37-39
(arguing that the unwillingness of private institutions to accept dependent and delinquent black
children caused juvenile courts to commit them to institutions more quickly and for less serious
offenses than they did their white counterparts); Steven Schlossman & Stephanie Wallach, The Crime
of Sexual Precocity: Female Juvenile Delinquency in the Progressive Era, 48 HARV. ED. REV. 65, 66
(1978).36 See generally NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED LAND: THE GREAT BLACK MIGRATION AND
How IT CHANGED AMERICA (1992) (discussing the flight of African Americans from the South to the
North between 1940 and 1970); THE GREAT MIGRATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: NEW
DIMENSIONS OF RACE, CLASS & GENDER (Joe William Trotter, Jr. ed.,1991) (analyzing the similarities
and differences between Europeans and African Americans as "immigrants").
37 FELD, supra note 3, at 97-106; MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 231-32 (2004); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE
WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLICITICS 437-39 (2000).
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with increases in youth crime and urban racial riots and conservative politicians
began to exploit white voters' apprehensions about race and crime for political
advantage.
A. Racial Demographics and Legal Change
Black migration from the rural South to northern industrial cities in the
decades before and during World War II added urgency to efforts to secure racial
equality and civil rights. Between World Wars I and II, more than one and one-half
million southern Blacks migrated to northern cities. 38 During World War II,
another one and one-half million Blacks moved north to work in defense
industries,39 and during the 1950s, another one and one-half million followed.4 °
When Blacks migrated to northern cities, they experienced segregation in housing,
education, and employment.4' After World War II, public and private policies-
federal mortgage, insurance, housing, tax, and highway construction-enabled
Whites to move to predominantly affluent suburbs and to isolate Blacks in poor,
inner-city ghettos.42
During the 1950s and 1960s, the Civil Rights movement challenged southern
racism and segregation and demanded legal equality and social justice. Until the
1960s, Jim Crow laws and southern sheriffs enforced an apartheid system of racial
inequality. 43 The Warren Court decision in Brown vs. Board of Education
38 See FELD, supra note 3, at 84; MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 14, at 29-38.
39 See, e.g., THOMAS B. EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION THE IMPACT OF RACE,
RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS 31 (1991); GILENS, supra note 13, at 104-05 ("The
average black out-migration from the South between 1910 and 1939 was only 55,000 people per year.
But during the 1940s, it increased to 160,000 per year, during the 1950s it declined slightly (to
146,000 per year), and between 1960 and 1966 it fell to 102,000 per year."); LEMANN, supra note 36,
at 5-7 (noting that manufacturers courted black workers because "[a] shortage of civilian labor forced
employers to offer jobs to workers who previously had been excluded.").
40 MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 14, at 45 (noting that 1,500,000 Blacks moved to northern
cities during the 1950s, and another 1,400,000 moved north during the 1960s); LEMANN, supra note
36, at 6 (noting that between 1940 and 1970, 5 million Blacks moved out of the South and reduced
the proportion of Blacks remaining in the South from three-quarters to half).
41 By 1940, half of Blacks lived in cities, and by 1960, more than three-quarters did. FELD,
supra note 3, at 85. In 1870, 80% of black Americans lived in the rural south; by 1970, 80% of black
Americans resided in urban locales, half in the North and West. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note
14, at 18; see also GILENS, supra note 13, at 105. Although African-Americans comprised only 2% of
northerners in 1910, by 1960, they accounted for 7% of the northern population and 12% of urban
residents. Id.
42 Federal mortgage, housing, and tax policies subsidized construction of privately-owned
single-family homes in almost exclusively white suburbs. The federal interstate highway program
facilitated suburban expansion. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 14, at 44-45; MICHAEL B. KATZ,
UNDESERVING POOR: FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON WELFARE 13 (1989). Interstate
highways and housing projects disrupted many black urban communities and created physical
barriers to contain their expansion. Id. at 135; see also MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 14, at 55-56.
43 POwE, supra note 37, at 490. Powe concludes that the Warren Court explicitly intended to
change southern legal and cultural traditions.
By 1953, the South had created, by law and custom (backed by whatever force
necessary), a caste system based on white supremacy. From laws against miscegenation,
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repudiated separate but equal public schools and required states to begin to
desegregate them. 4 Within a decade, the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 established a national standard of racial equality
to which it required the South to adhere.45 Although most Whites formally
subscribe to legal and social norms of racial equality, American society remains
racially divided and debates over welfare and crime policies often serve as proxies
for matters of race.46 Southern opposition to desegregation in the 1950s and
Republican presidential campaigns of Barry Goldwater in 1964 and Richard Nixon
in .1968 underscored the political value of appeals to white voters' racial
antipathy.47
B. Civil Rights as Impetus for Juvenile Justice Decisions
During the 1960s, the Warren Court expanded its civil rights agenda to
include criminal procedure and juvenile justice because poor, minority, and young
people disproportionately comprised those accused of crimes.48 The Court adopted
constitutional rules to limit police discretion and endorsed adversarial procedures
to laws mandating segregation, to subterfuges maintaining a basically all-white
electorate, to the use of peremptory challenges to ban African-Americans from juries, to
the enforced customs of better jobs for whites, to mandating social deference... the
southerners lived in a society that told all whites, no matter how poor, ignorant, or
illiterate, that they were better than any African-American.
Id.
44 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); see G. Edward White, Warren
Court (1953-1969), in AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 279, 280 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds.,
1986) (The context of the Warren Court's first momentous decisions was decisive in shaping the
Court's character as a branch of government that was not disinclined to resolve difficult social issues,
not hesitant to foster social change, not reluctant to involve itself in controversy).
45 See GILENS, supra note 13, at 108 (noting that passage of the Voting Rights Act led to
increased registration of Blacks nationwide from twenty-nine percent in 1962 to sixty-seven percent
in 1970); TALl MENDELBERG, THE RACE CARD: CAMPAIGN STRATEGY, IMPLICIT MESSAGES, AND THE
NORM OF EQUALITY 18 (2001) (arguing that the norm of racial equality emerged in the United States
during the 1950s and 1960s as cultural leaders and influential elites attacked segregation, lynching
and brutality, and denial of the right to vote); POWE, supra note 37, at 232 (noting that 104 of the 130
congressional votes cast against the Civil Rights Act were by southern Democrats "who fully
understood that this bill was aimed directly at the white South.").
46 MENDELBERG, supra note 45, at 19 ("Because the civil rights era came and went without
fully resolving the problems of racial inequality, individuals and institutions are forced to continue to
reach decisions about racial matter, matters that count among the most difficult of our national
problems.").
47 See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 39, at 76; POwE, supra note 37, at 60-62 (describing
southern congressional Democrats drafting the "Southern Manifesto," which denounced Brown as an
abuse of judicial power and advocated non-compliance with an unlawful decision). In the aftermath
of Brown, Southern racial moderates virtually disappeared under the pressure of more hard-line
racists. Id. at 62.
48 See, e.g., POwE, supra note 37, at 386 ("African-Americans were disproportionately affected
by whatever abuses or inequities there were in the criminal justice system."); Francis A. Allen, The
Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L. FORUM
518 passim (1975) (discussing the Warren Court's contributions to the criminal justice system).
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to protect defendants' rights.49 The Court broadly interpreted the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Bill of Rights to control criminal justice decision-making, to
protect minorities from state officials, and to expand equality. °
For the first time, the Supreme Court closely scrutinized juvenile justice
administration. 1 In 1966, in Kent v. United States, the Court required procedural
safeguards in judicial waiver proceedings. 52 In 1967, the Court in In re Gaul5 3
emphasized the differences between the procedural safeguards adult defendants
enjoyed and those used for juvenile delinquents. Gault focused on the stigma of
delinquency labels, high recidivism rates, and arbitrary decision-making, and
rejected claims that proceedings were civil, non-adversarial, and rehabilitative. 4
Although Gault viewed delinquents as a subset of criminal defendants, it only
required states to adopt "watered-down" criminal procedures for juveniles charged
49 See, e.g., GARLAND, supra note 6, at 57 ("In effect, the new critique of rehabilitation was the
extension of civil rights claims to the field of criminal justice, a process that had already begun with
the Warren Court of the 1960s and its extension of due process protections to suspects and
.juveniles."); FRED P. GRAHAM, THE DUE PROCESS REVOLUTION: THE WARREN COURT'S IMPACT ON
CRIMINAL LAW 41-66 (1970); Note, Developments in the Law: Race and the Criminal Process, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1472, 1488-94 (1988) (describing the equality principle in reform of criminal
procedures after Brown v. Board of Education); POWE, supra note 37, at 386 ("African-Americans
were disproportionately affected by whatever abuses or inequities there were in the criminal justice
system."); White, supra note 44, at 288 ("By intervening in law enforcement proceedings to protect
the rights of allegedly disadvantaged persons-a high percentage of criminals in the 1960s were poor
and black-the Warren Court Justices were acting as liberal policymakers."); see also Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (protection of privilege against self-incrimination); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(exclusionary rule).
50 See, e.g., GRAHAM, supra note 49, at 41-66 (1970); POWE, supra note 37, at 412 ("[T]he
Court recognized that the Bill of Rights offered national standards for criminal procedure regardless
of how the states wished to conduct trials, and it quickly applied all the relevant provisions of the Bill
of Rights to the states to create minimum national guarantees of fairness in criminal trials."); Jerold
H. Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L.
REV. 1320, 1324-25 (1977) (noting that three themes of the Warren Court's "due process revolution"
were: selective incorporation of Bill of Rights guarantees; equality; and expansive interpretations of
constitutional rights that protect the accused).
51 See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE
REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (1967) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT]; Joel Handler, The
Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function and Form, 1965 WIS. L. REv. 7, 8;
Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79 HARV. L. REV.
775,775-76(1966).
52 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966) (observing critically that that "the child
receives the worst of both worlds: he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous
care and regenerative treatment postulated for children."). Because a waiver decision was a "critically
important" action which could deny a youth the special protections of the juvenile court-closed
proceedings, confidential records, and protection from a criminal conviction-the Court required a
hearing, assistance of counsel, access to social investigations, and written findings and conclusions
that an appellate court could review. Id. at 553-63. See generally, Monrad Paulsen, Kent v. United
States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966 SUP. CT. REv. 167.
53 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
14 See id. at 21-24.
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with crimes.55 These protections included notice,56 a fair hearing,57 assistance of
counsel, 58 opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses, 59 and the privilege
against self-incrimination. 60 The Court grounded delinquents' procedural rights on
generic notions of due process and "fundamental fairness" rather than specific
provisions of the Sixth Amendment. 61 It asserted that "fundamentally fair"
procedures to find facts would not impair juvenile courts' ability to treat
juveniles.62
Gault embodied contradictory cultural conceptions of youths. On the one
hand, granting juveniles rights suggest that they can be autonomous and self-
determining. 63 On the other hand, providing procedural protection from the state
55 See id. at 13 ("We do not in this opinion consider the impact of these constitutional
provisions upon the totality of the relationship of the juvenile and the state. We do not even consider
the entire process relating to juvenile 'delinquents."'); Gault, 387 U.S. at 13, 31 n.48; see also
Frances Barry McCarthy, Pre-Adjudicatory Rights in Juvenile Court: An Historical and
Constitutional Analysis, 42 U. PITT. L. REv. 457, 459-60 (1981) (discussing the limitations on
juveniles' procedural rights). The Court's holding did not address a juvenile's rights in either the pre-
adjudicatory (i.e., intake and detention) or post-adjudicatory (i.e., disposition) stages of the
proceeding, but narrowly confined itself to the actual.adjudication of guilt or innocence in a trial-like
setting.
56 Gault, 387 U.S. at 33.
57 Id. at 36.
58Id. at41.591 Id. at 57.
60 Id. at 31-57; see id. at 22, 24, 27 (discussing whether juveniles should be afforded
constitutional protection through procedural safeguards); Irene Rosenberg, The Constitutional Rights
of Children Charged with Crime: Proposal for a Return to the Not So Distant Past, 27 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 656, 662-63 (1980) (arguing that constitutional protections should attach in proceedings that
may result in the incarceration of a child); see also Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice:
Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court, 69 MINN. L. REv. 141, 154-57 (1984).
61 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Gault made no reference to the Sixth Amendment's provision
for notice; rather, the Court held that "due process of law requires notice of the sort we have
described-that is, notice which would be deemed constitutionally adequate in a civil or criminal
proceeding." Gault, 387 U.S. at 33. Similarly, although the Court described a delinquency proceeding
as "comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution," id. at 36, the Court grounded the right to
counsel in a delinquency proceeding in the "due process clause of the fourteenth amendment" rather
than the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel. Id. at 41. Finally, the Court's analysis of the right to
confront and examine witnesses rested on "our law and constitutional requirements" rather than the
language of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 57.
When the Court granted delinquents the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
however, the majority used an analytical strategy akin to selective incorporation, finding a
"functional equivalence" between a delinquency proceeding and a criminal trial. See id. at 50; see
also Louis Henkin, Selective Incorporation " in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L. J. 74 passim
(1963) (discussing the doctrine of "selective incorporation" and the Supreme Court's use of the
doctrine with the Fourteenth Amendment); Sanford Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due
Process Adjudication-Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L. J. 319, 327-33 (1957) (analyzing historical
constitutional debate between proponents of selective incorporation and proponents of fundamental
fairness and total incorporation of provisions of the Bill of Rights). Gault relied explicitly on the Fifth
Amendment to grant juveniles the privilege against self-incrimination, Gault, 387 U.S. at 49-50, and
effectively rejected claims that delinquency proceedings were "noncriminal" or "nonadversarial." Id.62 See Gault, 387 U.S. at 21.
63 BERNARD, supra note 1, at 132.
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emphasizes their dependency and vulnerability. Many of the Court's due process
decisions of the 1960s viewed offenders as victims of deterministic social forces,
minimized their personal responsibility, and granted procedural safeguards to
protect them from an over'-reaching state. 64
Subsequent decisions further highlighted the quasi-criminal nature of
delinquency proceedings. In re Winship required states to prove a delinquent's
guilt by the criminal standard-"beyond a reasonable doubt"-rather than by the
lower civil standard-"preponderance of evidence. 65 Winship concluded that the
dangers of factually erroneous convictions outweighed concerns that procedural
safeguards would impair juvenile courts' ability to rehabilitate delinquents.66 The
Court in Breed v. Jones posited a functional equivalence between delinquency and
criminal trials and barred criminal prosecution after a delinquency adjudication. 67
The Court in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania relied on the Fourteenth Amendment
rather than the Sixth Amendment to deny juveniles a constitutional right to a jury
trial.68 The Court reasoned that due process and "fundamental fairness" required
only "accurate fact finding," which a judge could do as well as a jury.69 McKeiver
emphasized "rehabilitative rhetoric" rather than the reality of delinquency
"treatment" and ignored juvenile courts' structural impediments to accurate fact-
64 See, e.g., Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1417, 1472 (1985)
(arguing that during the 1960s, the Court's decisions viewed "the criminal as a type of victim; he was
caught in the role assigned to persons in his circumstances, a member of the underclass. . . The idea
of individual guilt and remorse for wrongful deeds was out of fashion. The causal factors of
criminality were thought to lie outside the individual, in the deeper, corrupt foundation of society-
the so-called 'root causes'."); George C. Thomas III & Richard A. Leo, The Effects of Miranda v.
Arizona: "Embedded" in Our National Culture, 29 CRIME & JUST. 203, 218 (2002).
65 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970). Winship first held that the constitution requires
proof beyond a reasonable doubt in adult criminal proceedings as a matter of due process, id. at 361-
64, and then extended the same standard of proof to delinquency proceedings. Id. at 365-67.
66 See id. at 376-77 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). According to the majority, while parens patriae
intervention may be a laudable goal to deal with miscreant youths, "that intervention cannot take the
form of subjecting the child to the stigma of a finding that he violated a criminal law and to the
possibility of institutional confinement on proof insufficient to convict him were he an adult." Id. at
367.
67 Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1975) (holding that double jeopardy precludes
delinquency adjudication and criminal prosecution). With respect to the risks against which double
jeopardy protected, the Court found "no persuasive distinction in that regard between the [juvenile]
proceeding... and a criminal prosecution, each of which is designed to 'vindicate [the] very vital
interest in enforcement of criminal laws."' Id. at 531 (quotations omitted).
68 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 540-41 (1971). See generally Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (right to jury trial). McKeiver relied solely on Fourteenth
Amendment due process and "fundamental fairness." See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 540. The Court
insisted that "the juvenile court proceeding has not yet been held to be a 'criminal prosecution,'
within the meaning and reach of the Sixth Amendment," id. at 541, and cautioned that to
constitutionally require a jury trial "will remake the juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary
process and will put an effective end to what has been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal
protective proceeding." Id. at 545.
69 See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543. In concluding that due process required only accurate fact
finding, however, the Court departed significantly from its prior emphasis on the dual rationales of
accurate fact finding and protection against governmental oppression. Cf In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 364 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1967).
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finding.7 ° In denying procedural parity, the Court emphasized the determined
rather than freely-chosen nature of youthful offending.
The criminal law proceeds on the theory that defendants have a will
and are responsible for their actions... [T]he juvenile justice system
rests on more deterministic assumptions. Reprehensible acts by juveniles
are not deemed the consequence of mature and malevolent choice but of
environmental pressures (or lack of them) or of other forces beyond their
control.71
McKeiver and Gault used deterministic images to depict delinquents and to
justify their holdings. Nevertheless, the Court's decisions transformed juvenile
courts into scaled-down criminal courts. Delinquency trials used adversarial
procedural safeguards-attorneys, cross-examination, privilege against
self-incrimination, and the criminal standard of proof-to decide whether a youth
committed a crime. By making explicit the connection between delinquency and
criminality, the Court placed the sub-group of delinquents within the larger social
problem of criminals. This functional equivalency increased the likelihood that
harsher policies aimed at criminals would spill over onto delinquents as well.
During the 1960s, the Court's criminal and juvenile procedure coincided with
rising youth crime rates and urban race riots. 72 Crime rates rose as "baby boom"
youths reached adolescence 73 and increased even more so in urban areas with a
predominantly black population74 Race riots erupted in urban ghettoes across the
70 McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 547 (criticizing advocates of procedural formality and jury trials).
Reasons exist to question the accuracy of fact-finding made by a single judge in closed and
confidential delinquency proceedings. See FELD, supra note 3, at 153-57 (describing the inherently
prejudicial nature of juvenile court fact-finding); Barry C. Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between
Apprendi and McKeiver: Sentence Enhancements Based on Delinquency Convictions and the Quality
of Justice in Juvenile Courts, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1111, 1140-60 (2003) (analyzing the
differences between judge and jury application of "beyond a reasonable doubt" burden of proof).
71 McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 551 (White, J., concurring).
72 See FELD, supra note 3, at 87-88 (noting that increased crime rates are associated with
increased urbanization of Blacks); GRAHAM, supra note 49, at 26-66 (discussing political reactions to
the Supreme Court's decisions); Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice: The Warren
Court and the Conservative "Backlash, " 87 MINN. L. REv. 1447, 1480-1501 (2003) (analyzing the
political backlash that followed the Supreme Court's criminal procedure and juvenile decisions); see
also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring police to provide suspects with a statement
of rights prior to police interrogation); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (holding that there is
a right to counsel at pre-indictment police interrogation); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(extending the application of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to the states).
73 Changes in the age structure of the population accounted for most of the rise in youth crime
that began in the mid-1960s. See, e.g., FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE
IDEAL 30 (1981) ("Perceptions of increasing crime in the late 1960s. . . were based in part on
demographic realities."); POWE, supra noie 37, at 408 (noting that between 1963 and 1970, the
homicide rate doubled from 4.6 to 9.2 per 100,000); JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 20
(1975).
74 See, e.g., MARK MAUER ET AL., THE MEANING OF "LIFE": LONG PRISON SENTENCES IN
CONTEXT 17, 51-52 (2004), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/lifers.pdf
("[U]rbanization is generally equated with higher rates of crime."); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON
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nation in the mid-1960s.7 5 The National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders-the Kemer Commission-attributed the riots to discrimination in
employment, education, social services, and housing76 and warned that America
was moving "toward two societies, one black, one white-separate and unequal. 77
IV. THE "GET TOUGH" ERA AND THE POLITICS OF RACE AND CRIME
Race and crime policy issues became highly politicized in the 1960s and have
remained so ever since. Liberals attributed crime and riots to deterministic, social-
structural conditions-"root causes"-and advocated policies to reduce racial,
social, and economic inequality.78 Conservatives emphasized individual choices
and personal responsibility for bad behavior and minimized the contributory role
of poverty, unemployment, and limited educational opportunities. 79 Race riots and
crime negatively affected many Whites' perceptions of Blacks' grievances and
inclined Whites to ascribe them to personal choices rather than to structural
forces.80 Conservative politicians exploited the association between increasing
HAWKINS, CRIME Is NOT THE PROBLEM: LETHAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 66 (1997) ("Homicide rates
are highest in the slum neighborhood of big cities that exclusively house the black poor. The race of
the residents, the socioeconomic status of the neighborhood, and city size are all associated with
elevated rates of homicide victimization.").
75 See, e.g., ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS 19 (1992); LEMANN, supra note 36 at 190 ("[I]t
seemed at least possible that a full-scale national race war might break out."); NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS REPORT (1967) [hereinafter KERNER COMMISSION]; POWE, supra
note 37, at 276 (noting that three years of riots left more than 200 dead, thousands wounded, and
property damage in the tens of billions of dollars and that the assassination of Martin Luther King,
Jr., in 1968 provoked hundreds more urban riots)..76 See Introduction to KERNER COMMISSION, supra note 75.
77 See id.; see also id. at ch. 16. (It cautioned that if current policies that contributed to
segregation and poverty continued, then the social divisions would become permanent and American
would become two nations, "one, largely Negro and poor, located in the central cities; the other
predominantly white and affluent, located in the suburbs...").
78 See, e.g., POWE, supra note 37, at 495; see also KATHERINE BECKETr & THEODORE SASSON,
THE POLITICS OF INJUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 53-54 (2000).
79 See, e.g., BECKETT, supra note 20, at 10 ("The conservative view that the causes of crime lie
in the human 'propensity to evil,' rests on a pessimistic vision of human nature, one that clearly calls
for the expansion of the social control apparatus."); BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 78, at 53-54
(2000); POWE, supra note 37, at 495.
80 See, e.g., GARLAND, supra note 6, at 97 ("Televised images of urban race riots, violent civil
rights struggles, anti-war demonstrations, political assassinations, and worsening street crime
reshaped the attitudes of the middle-American public in the late 1960s."); HACKER, supra note 75, at
2 ("As the 1970s started, so came a rise in crime, all too many of them with black perpetrators...
Worsening relations between the races were seen as largely due to the behavior of blacks, who had
abused the invitations to equal citizenship white America had been tendering."); LEMANN, supra note
36, at 200 ("The beginning of the modem rise of conservatism coincides exactly with the country's
beginning to realize the true magnitude and consequences of the black migration, and the
government's response to the migration provided the conservative movement with many of its
issues.").
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crime and urban disorder, blamed both on the Warren Court's criminal procedure
decisions, and appealed to white voters' racial resentments and fears.
81
Positive criminology and the rehabilitative ideal provided the dominant
criminal and juvenile justice paradigm until the late-1960s.82 By the early 1970s,
support for indeterminate sentences and rehabilitation programs declined and, for
different reasons, both liberals and conservatives endorsed principles of classical
criminal law-"just deserts", penal proportionality, and determinate sentences.
83
Liberal critics characterized rehabilitation programs as disguised instruments of
social control and objected that dissimilar treatment of similarly-situated offenders
84discriminated against minorities. Evaluations of correctional programs
81 See, e.g., EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 39, at 74-77 (noting that Richard Nixon's "law and
order" presidential campaign in 1968 focused on Supreme Court decisions that "handcuffed" the
police, and made the racial connections more explicit); GILENS, supra note 13, at 107-10; GRAHAM,
supra note 49, at 71-85; HACKER, supra note 75, at 50-51 ("Conservatives believe that for at least a
generation, black people have been given plenty of opportunities, so they have no one but themselves
to blame for whatever difficulties they face.").
82 From its Progressive foundations until the early 1970s, rehabilitation, welfare and
criminological expertise provided the intellectual framework, cultural vocabulary, and the shared
professional understandings that defined criminal justice policy and practices. See GARLAND, supra
note 6, at 27. The central tenets of the "Rehabilitative Ideal" include a focus on the individual
offender, justice administration by expert professionals, and the use of welfare-oriented,
indeterminate and discretionary decision-making practices. See Allen, supra note 20, at 44-61;
ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 53-61.
83 GARLAND, supra note 6, at 60 ("The movement for determinate sentencing reform created an
unusually broad and influential alliance of forces. The campaign included not only radical supporters
of the prisoners' movement, liberal lawyers and reforming judges, but also retributivist philosophers,
disillusioned criminologists and hard-line conservatives."). During the 1970s, empirical evaluation
studies questioned both the effectiveness of rehabilitative programs and the scientific expertise of
those who administered the enterprise. Allen, supra note 20, at 33-59. In the 1970s, determinate
sentences based on present offense and prior record increasingly supplanted indeterminate sentences
for adults as "just deserts" and retribution displaced rehabilitation as the underlying rationale for
criminal sentencing. AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 83-97 (1971);
ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 31-39 (1976). By the mid-1980s, about half the states enacted
determinate sentencing laws, ten eliminated parole boards, and many more used guidelines to
structure sentence decisions. See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 6-13 (1996).
The just deserts framework spilled-over into juvenile justice and affected the laws and practices
of sentencing delinquents and waiving youths to criminal court. See, e.g., FELD, supra note 3, at 208-
31; Barry C. oFeld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Legislative Changes in
Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 483-87 (1987) [hereinafter Feld,
Juvenile Waiver Statutes]; Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems' Responses to Youth
Violence, 24 CRIME & JUSTICE 189, 220-22 (1998) [hereinafter Feld, Responses to Youth Violence];
Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the
Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 835-36 (1988); Julianne P. Sheffer, Serious and Habitual
Juvenile Offender Statutes: Reconciling Punishment and Rehabilitation within the Juvenile Justice
System, 48 VAND. L. REV. 479, 487-89 (1995).
84 See AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMM., supra note 83 (arguing that no criminal justice
programs or reforms could ameliorate or avoid the consequences of racial inequality and economic
and social injustice in the larger society); FRANCIS T. CULLEN & KAREN E. GILBERT, REAFFIRMING
REHABILITATION 39-40 (1982); GARLAND, supra note 6, at 36, 55; MAUER ET AL., supra note 74, at
44 (noting that rehabilitation is incompatible with coercive institution such as prison because personal
change requires voluntary involvement, which cannot be compelled); Allen, supra note 20, at 87-88.
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disparaged the ability of clinicians to coerce positive changes. s5 Conservatives
attributed youth crime and race riots to a breakdown of "law and order" and
advocated more punitive policies. s6 Increases in serious and violent crimes,
especially by Blacks, pushed public opinion in a markedly more conservative
direction.8 7 The erosion of cultural and criminological support for the
"Rehabilitative Ideal" led to a return to classical principles of criminal law and
shifted sentencing decisions from individualized consideration of each offender to
narrower, offense-based factors. By calling for "law and order," a "war on drugs,"
or a "crack down" on crime, politicians discovered a coded method by which to
discuss legitimate issues of criminal policy and simultaneously to exploit Whites'
racial fears.88
A. De-Industrialization and the Black Underclass
Macro-structural changes in American cities during the 1970s and 1980s
contributed to an escalation in black youth homicide rates in the late 1980s.8 9 The
de-industrialization of the urban core economically devastated black communities.
The "crack cocaine" drug industry that emerged in blighted areas spurred an
increase in violence and homicides 90 Conservative politicians pledged to "get
tough" on youth crime and exploited youth violence as a way to evoke anti-black
animus. 9'
During the post-World War II period, Whites increasingly moved from cities
to the suburbs as Blacks migrated to urban ghettoes.92 Until the early 1970s, urban
85 See, e.g., MAUER ET AL., supra note 74, at 48-49; Allen, supra note 20, at 57-58; Robert
Martison, What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INTEREST 22, 25
(1974) ("[W]ith few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far
have had no appreciable effect on rehabilitation.").
86 Conservatives' efforts to "get tough" have produced a succession of "wars" on crime and
later on drugs, longer criminal sentences, increased prison populations and disproportional
incarceration of racial minority offenders. See TONRY, supra note 6, at 94-94. For conservatives, the
confluence of rising youth crime rates, civil rights marches and civil disobedience, students' protests
against the war in Viet Nam, and urban and campus turmoil indicated an even deeper moral crisis and
breakdown of traditional society. CULLEN & GILBERT, supra note 84, at 4; EDSALL & EDSALL, supra
note 39, at 49-52; HACKER, supra note 75, at 22.
87 See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 39, at 111-12 ("By 1977, the percentage describing court
treatment of criminals as too harsh or about right had fallen to a minimal 11 percent, and those who
said the courts were not harsh enough had risen to 83 percent.").
88 Id. at 69-73; MENDELBERG, supra note 45, at 90-98.
89 See infra notes 101- 10 and accompanying text.
90 Id.
91 See, e.g., FELD, supra note 3, at 206-07; Alfred Blumstein, Youth Violence, Guns, and the
Illicit-Drug Industry, 86 J. OF CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 10, 36 (1995).
92 See supra note 42 and accompanying text; see also GARLAND, supra note 6,.at 84 (noting that
the automobile and the accompanying construction of highways and the large-scale migration of
whites from cities to suburbs constitute major developments in post-War urban social ecology);
KATZ, supra note 42, at 134 ("After 1945, suburbanization accelerated. Massive increases in
automobile ownership, the federal highway program, and federal housing policies that underwrote
suburban mortgages and redlined cities composed one set of factors speeding its development.");
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men with only a high school degree found good jobs in the automobile, steel, and
manufacturing industries. 93 The transition to a post-industrial economy badly
affected workers in the manufacturing sectors.94 The globalizing economy
produced severe losses in the automobile and steel industries and
disproportionately affected minority workers who filled those higher-paying,
lower-skilled manufacturing jobs.95 Within two decades, the economic and racial
reconfiguration of cities produced an urban black underclass living in concentrated
poverty.
96
B. Crack Cocaine, Firearms, and Black Youth Homicide
In the mid-1980s, the crack cocaine drug trade produced a sharp escalation in
homicides in devastated urban areas.97 Youths involved in the drug industry carry
LEMANN, supra note 36, at 118 ("The interstate highway program was encouraging the flight of the
white middle class to the new, sterile, soulless suburbs...").
93 KATZ, supra note 42, at 128-29; WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS 25-34
(1996).
94 The transition to a post-modern society produced a bifurcation of economic opportunities
based on education and training. GARLAND, supra note 6, at 78 (noting that the revolution in
technology "gave rise to the 'information society' that we now inhabit; made possible the cities and
suburbs in which we dwell; linked the four comers of the globe into a single accessible world; and
created new social divisions between those who have access to the high-tech world and those who do
not"); KATZ, supra note 42, at 124-25 (describing the post-industrial city as a study in contrasts-the
shiny towers of revitalized commercial centers near the closed factories of the industrial districts,
wealthy "yuppies" living in gentrified older neighborhoods and impoverished minorities living in
concentrated poverty).
95 See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 39, at 27 (noting that the "political consequences of a
globalized economy provide a case study of how race interacts catalytically with seemingly race-
neutral development to produce a powerful reaction"). The effects of declining industrial productivity
and global competition eroded jobs, wages, and employment security. Id. at 201-02. See, e.g., KATZ,
supra note 42, at 130 ("Economic stagnation, the disproportionate growth of low-wage jobs, the
declining minimum wage, the mismatch between better jobs and the education of the urban poor, and
shifts in occupational structure have worsened poverty within America's cities."); WILSON, supra
note 93, at 25-100.
96 See generally, EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 39, at 244.
The concentration among the black poor of single motherhood, crime and withdrawal
from the labor market--combined with an intensified geographic isolation-has made it
possible to partially segregate this segment of the population from the political, social,
and economic mainstream. The emergence of the underclass and of an expanding body of
the black urban poor has created a growing perception of a society in which the poor are
no longer linked to the larger social network.
Id.; CHRISTOPHER JENCKS & PAUL E. PETERSON, THE URBAN UNDERCLASS passim (1991) (discussing
the truth and myths aboutpoverty, social dislocation, and changes in American family life); MICHAEL
B. KATZ, THE UNDERCLASS DEBATE: VIEWS FROM HISTORY 3 (1993); KATZ, supra note 42, at 199
("Blacks' detachment from 'the standardized institutions' feeding the primary labor market
reinforced their entrapment in the underclass.").
97 See, e.g., BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 78, at 8, 28 (noting that a high homicide rate is
attributable to the interaction of numerous factors-prevalence of guns, economic and racial
inequality reflected in concentrated poverty, traffic in illegal drugs such as crack, and a "code of the
streets" that encourages violent responses to disrespect); Alfred Blumstein, Disaggregating the
Violence Trends in ALFRED BLUMSTEIN & JOEL WALLMAN, THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 13 (2000);
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firearms for self-defense and the presence of guns during illegal transactions
quickly escalates to lethal violence.98 The confluence of crack and guns amplified
racial differences in juvenile arrest rates for violent crimes. Police typically arrest
black youths for violent index crimes-murder, rape, robbery, and assault-about
five times more frequently than they do white juveniles. 99 A sharp spike in juvenile
arrests for violence and homicide occurred between 1986 and 1994. l00 The overall
arrest rates of all youths for violent index crimes increased nearly two-thirds
(66%).101 Arrest rates of youths for homicide rose even more sharply: arrest rates
of white juveniles increased about 65% and those of black youths more than
doubled (233%).102
FELD, supra note 3, at 197-202; MAUER ET AL., supra note 74, at 97 (noting that as many as half of
murders may be drug-related, so changes in drug markets affect homicide rates); HOWARD N. SNYDER
& MELISSA SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: A NATIONAL REPORT 13 (1999);
Blumstein, supra note 91, at 39 (describing the devastating confluence of the "introduction of crack
in the mid-i 980s; recruitment of young minority males to sell the drugs in street markets; arming of
the drug sellers with handguns for self-protection; diffusion of guns to peers; irresponsible and
excessively casual use of guns by young people, leading to a 'contagious' growth in homicide...");
Alfred Blumstein & Daniel Cork, Linking Gun Availability to Youth Gun Violence, 79 LAW AND
CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 9-10 (1996); Phillip J. Cook & John H. Laub, The Role of Youth in Violent
Crime and Victimization, 24 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REV. OF RES. 27, 53-54 (1998) ("The leading
explanation for why youth-homicide rates began increasing in the mid-1980s is the introduction of
crack cocaine and, in particular, the conflict that attended its marketing. .. . [f]or many youths, the
response to the increased threat of violence was to carry a gun or join a gang for self-protection,
while adopting a more aggressive interpersonal style.").
98 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE 256-60
(Albert J. Reiss, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Roth eds., 1993).
99 See, e.g., FELD, supra note 3, at 197-206; NAT'L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE
ARREST RATES BY OFFENSE, SEX, AND RACE (1980-2004), available at http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/ojstatbb/
crime/excel/jar_20060908.xls (showing arrests rates of juveniles age 10 to 17 for various offenses);
ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 74, at 76 (noting that blacks are about seven times as likely as
whites to be arrested for violent crimes and eight times as likely to be arrested for homicide); Cook &
Laub, supra note 97, at 42-43 (noting that "half of all juvenile violence arrests were of blacks,
implying an arrest rate over five times as high as for whites.").10 0 NAT'L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 99.
101 Id.
102 See MELISSA SICKMUND ET AL., JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1997 UPDATE ON
VIOLENCE 13 (1997); see also MAUER ET AL., supra note 74, at 84 (noting that between 1984 and
1993, homicide rate for white males ages 14 to 17 doubled from 6.9 to 14.4 per 100,000, while black
male homicide rate quadrupled from 33.4 to 151.6 per 100,000); NAT'L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE,
supra note 99 (reporting increase in black juvenile homicide arrest rate per 100,000 juveniles ages 10
to 17); ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 74, at 66 ("Homicide rates are highest in the slum
neighborhoods of big cities that exclusively house the black poor. The race of the residents, the
socioeconomic status of the neighborhood, and city size are all associated with elevated rates of
homicide victimization.").
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Source: National Center for Juvenile Justice (2006).
Juvenile Arrest Rates by Offense, Sex, and Race.
Available: htt:/lo'dp.ncjrs.org/ojstatbb/crime/excel/JAR_20070222.xs.
Figure 1 shows the overall arrest rates of juveniles per 100,000 juveniles ages
10 to 17 for violent index crimes and separate arrest rates of white and black
juveniles for violent crimes and homicide. I multiplied homicide arrest rates by 10
to show them on the same scale with violent index arrests. As can be seen, police
arrested black juveniles for violence index offenses at a rate about five times that
of white juveniles and trends for both races followed similar patterns-spiking in
the mid-1990s and then declining sharply by 2004. Although police arrested black
juveniles for homicide at a rate of about five times that of white youths, in the mid-
1990s, that ratio increased to about 8 to 1. Murders committed with hand-guns
accounted for most of the increase as well as for the racial differences in youth
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homicide arrests.' °3 Between 1984 and 1994, the juvenile homicide rate nearly
tripled10 4 and the use of guns by juveniles to kill their victims quadrupled. 105
Because of the nexus between the crack industry and inner cities, almost all of the
increases in homicides involved urban black males.' 
06
C. "Get Tough "Politics and the War on Juveniles
Against a backdrop of escalating youth violence and homicide in the early-
1990s, policies to "get tough" disproportionately affected young black men. Daily
media depictions of gang violence and drive-by shootings shaped public
perceptions that urban black males committed all the violent crime. 107
Conservative politicians warned of a coming generation of "super-predators,"
encouraged and exploited public fears of a juvenile-crime "blood-bath," and
reinforced punitive attitudes with pledges to "get tough," which everyone
understood as a "code word" applying to black males.'08 In the mid-1990s,
virtually all states changed their laws to make it easier to transfer more and
younger youths to criminal court for prosecution as adults.' 09
103 The number of deaths that juveniles caused by means other than firearms averaged about
570 per year and fluctuated within a "normal range" of about 10 percent. See, e.g., FELD, supra note
3, at 207-08; ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 74, at 106-23 (1997); Franklin E. Zimring, Kids,
Guns, and Homicide: Policy Notes on an Age-Specific Epidemic, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 25, 29
(1996).
104 See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 74, at 89 (stating that the rate of homicide arrests for
offenders under eighteen for gun killings more than tripled between 1985 and 1994); Zimring, supra
note 103, at 29.
105 Zimring, supra note 103, at 29; see also ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 74, at 108 (noting
that guns account for more than twice as many murders as all other methods combined); Blumstein,
supra note 91, at 29-30, 32 (noting that weapons involved in adolescent conflict shifted to handguns
and semi-automatic weapons; between 1985 and 1993, juveniles' use of guns nearly quadrupled).
106 See Blumstein, supra note 91, at 16-22; Blumstein & Cork, supra note 97, at 15-16; Cook
& Laub, supra note 97.
107 See Sara Sun Beale, The News Media's Influence on Criminal Justice Policy: How Market-
Driven News Promotes Punitiveness, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 397, 441-461 (2006) (describing how
media depictions reinforce public fear and prime racial animus); Feld, supra note 72, at 1523-38
(describing the role of media in creating a skewed misperception of youth violence and black juvenile
perpetrators).
108 See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BENNETT ET AL., BODY COUNT 13-14 (1996) (characterizing young
offenders as suffering from moral poverty which rendered them "super-predators"); JAMES ALAN
Fox, TRENDS IN JUVENILE VIOLENCE: A REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES ATrORNEY GENERAL ON
CURRENT AND FUTURE RATES OF JUVENILE OFFENDING (1996) (warning of demographic "time-bomb"
of future youth violence); MAUER ET AL., supra note 74, at 12 ("As the image of the criminal as an
urban black male has hardened into public consciousness, so too, has support for punitive approaches
to social problems been enhanced."); JEROME G. MILLER, SEARCH AND DESTROY: AFRICAN-AMERICAN
MALES N THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1996); Zimring, supra note 103, at 63 ("To talk of a
'coming storm' creates a riskless environment for getting tough in advance of the future threat. If the
crime rate rises, the prediction has been validated. If the crime rate does not rise, the policies that the
alarmists put in place can be credited with avoiding the bloodbath. The prediction cannot be falsified,
currently or ever.").
109 See, e.g., FELD, supra note 3, at 192-95; PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME: RESEARCH REPORT 3-9 (1996).
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The politics of crime that led to harsher juvenile waiver and criminal
sentencing laws culminated a process that began decades earlier. In the 1950s,
southern politicians and sheriffs equated political dissent with criminality,
predicated a relationship between race and crime, and described civil rights
protesters as "criminals," "outside agitators," and "mobs."' l During the 1960s,
Republican politicians characterized rising crime rates and urban riots as a
breakdown of "law and order" and attributed the social turmoil to Warren Court
decisions and liberal Democratic policies."'
Political differences about race-related policy issues emerged clearly during
the 1964 presidential race when Democrats' support for civil rights alienated white
southerner voters." 2 By 1968, Republicans used race-related "wedge issues"-
crime, affirmative action, and welfare-to distinguish themselves from Democrats
and Richard Nixon blamed rising crime rates and urban riots on permissive liberal
policies and Court decisions "coddling criminals." ' 1 3 Against this backdrop,
110 See, e.g., BECKETT, supra note 20, at 28 (stating that the "discourse of law and order was
initially mobilized by southern officials in their effort to discredit the civil rights movement.");
BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 78, at 82 (noting that Southern officials called for a crackdown on
"'hoodlums,' 'agitators,' 'street mobs,' and 'lawbreakers' who challenged segregation and Black
disenfranchisement, [and] these officials made rhetoric about crime a key component of political
discourse on race relations."); MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990s 98 (2d ed., 1994); Feld, supra note 72, at 1538-52 (analyzing
the politicization of crime policies and the political exploitation of those differences).
BECKETT, supra note 20, at 87 ("By attributing the very real economic plight of 'taxpayers'
and 'working persons' to the behavior of the 'underclass,' conservatives diminish the likelihood that
these grievances will give rise to policies aimed at redistributing opportunities and resources in a
more egalitarian fashion."); BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 78, at 10 ("In response to the civil rights
movement and the expansion of the War on Poverty programs of the 1960s, conservative politicians
highlighted the problem of 'street crime' and argued that this problem was caused by an excessively
lenient welfare and justice system that encouraged bad people to make bad choices."); EDSALL &
EDSALL, supra note 39, at 51-73; GILENS, supra note 13, at 116-23; HACKER, supra note 75, at 210
("[P]laying on white fears of 'black crime' has moved to the center of political campaigns. Even
though most white Americans do not live in or near areas where violence stalks the streets, the issue
crops up in every poll and has become a conversational staple."); MENDELBERG, supra note 45, at 93-
98.
112 Lyndon Johnson's presidential leadership led to passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which
Barry Goldwater, a staunch conservative, opposed. See BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 78, at 52-58;
EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 39, at 35; GILENS, supra note 13, at 116-22; MENDELBERG, supra note
45, at 81-93. The 1964 Republican party convention rejected a party platform in favor of civil rights
by a two-to-one margin. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 39, at 44.
113 See, e.g., BECKETT, supra note 20, at 30-43; EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 39, at 4 ("[R]ace
has become a powerful wedge, breaking up what had been the majoritarian economic interests of the
poor, working, and lower-middle classes in the traditional liberal coalition."); GILENS, supra note 13,
at 4-8. In the pre-civil rights era, poor southern whites supported liberal policies on a host of
economic issues and a larger governmental role in medical care, education, and employment. Id. at
41-42. Southern populism and economic liberalism foundered on their hostility to blacks and the
perception that federal programs primarily benefited blacks. Id. at 41; see also OMI & WINANT, supra
note 110, at 149 (describing racial politics as a powerful wedge issue that fractured the New Deal
economic coalition of the poor, working, and middle-classes). Nixon exploited crime issues for
partisan advantage. BECKETr, supra note 20, at 38 (noting that as a result of political and media
attention to crime during the 1968 campaign, by 1969, 81 percent of poll respondents asserted a
breakdown in law and order had occurred and attributed it to communists and Negroes who start
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conservatives' calls for "law and order" became "code words" with a racial subtext
that enabled Republican politicians to invoke racial stereotypes without appearing
racist.' 14 Conservative politicians could talk about crime and simultaneously
activate white voters' negative views of Blacks without explicitly playing the "race
card.,"115 Republicans pursued a "southern strategy" and appealed to white southern
and suburban constituencies with code words like "law and order" to realign the
political parties around issues of race.1 6 They conflated race and crime, associated
both with the Democrats, and turned crime policies into partisan issues. "i7 Over the
next two decades, Republicans reinforced the relationship between race and crime
with campaigns that focused on drugs, the death penalty, youth crime, and "Willie
Horton.""'  With the increase in youth violence in the early-1990s, voters
riots); TED GEST, CRIME & POLITICS: BIG GOVERNMENT'S ERRATIC CAMPAIN FOR LAW AND ORDER 14
(2001) (noting that during the 1968 presidential campaign, Nixon gave seventeen speeches on law
and order); POWE, supra note 37, at 399 (asserting that Nixon's domestic policy stump speech
emphasized "crime in the streets" and urban riots).
I14 After three years of urban riots, rising youth crime rates, anti-Vietnam protests, and the
assassinations of Robert F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr., a climate of fear and anger
produced political demands for "law and order." BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 78, at 51 ("The
racial subtext of these arguments was not lost on the public: Those most opposed to social and racial
reform were also most receptive to calls for law and order."). See, e.g., OMI & WINANT, supra note
110, at 123 (explaining that code words are "phrases and symbols which refer indirectly to racial
themes, but do not directly challenge popular democratic or egalitarian ideals"); Richard Dvorak,
Cracking the Code: "De-Coding" Colorblind Slurs During the Congressional Crack Cocaine
Debates, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 611, 615 (2000) ("[L]egislators can appeal to racist sentiments
without appearing racist."); Martin Gilens, 'Race Coding' and White Opposition to Welfare, 90 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 593, 595 (1996), ("Although political elites typically use race-neutral language in
discussion poverty and welfare, it is now widely believed that welfare is a 'race-coded' topic that
evokes racial imagery and attitudes even when racial minorities are note explicitly mentioned.").
115 See OMI & WINANT, supra note 110, at 123 (defining racial "code words" as "phrases and
symbols which refer indirectly to racial themes, but do not directly challenge popular democratic or
egalitarian ideals (e.g., justice, equal opportunity)."); see also ROBERT M. ENTMAN & ANDREW
ROJECKI, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND 20 (2000) ("Whites whose animosity is inflamed-
including ambivalent Whites responding to specific situations and stimuli-become receptive to
coded campaign appeals designed to mobilize them into coalitions with traditional racists."); Dvorak,
supra note 114, at 615; Gilens, supra note 114, at 595.
116 See, e.g., EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 39, at 98 ("Race was central... to the fundamental
conservative strategy of establishing a new, non-economic polarization of the electorate, a
polarization isolating a liberal, activist, culturally-permissive, rights-oriented, and pro-black
Democratic Party against those unwilling to pay the financial and social costs of this reconfigured
social order."); OMI & WINANT, supra note 110, at 124 (noting that Phillips suggested a "coded"
strategy of anti-black rhetoric to appeal to conservative blue-collar and southern voters); KEVIN P.
PHILLIPS, THE EMERGING REPUBLICAN MAJORITY 22 (1969).
117 GARLAND, supra note 6, at 153 (arguing that "anxieties about crime on top of the more
inchoate insecurities prompted by rapid social change and economic recession, paved the way for a
politics of reaction in the late 1970s."); TONRY, supra note 83, at 10.
118 The 1988 Bush campaign used symbols and images-ACLU, Willie Horton, the death
penalty-to appeal to white voters' concerns about race and crime to associate Democratic candidate
Michael Dukakis with criminal defendants' rights and black crime. DAVID C. ANDERSON, CRIME AND
THE POLITICS OF HYSTERIA: -How THE WILLIE HORTON STORY CHANGED AMERICAN JUSTICE 224
(1995); BECKETr & SASSON, supra note 78 at 68 (noting that the Bush campaign director described
Horton as "a wonderful mix of liberalism and a big black rapist"); EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 39,
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understood campaigns to "get tough" as policy to harshly punish young black
males. 19
By the mid-1990s, nearly every state adopted punitive laws to transfer more
and younger offenders to criminal courts and to punish them more severely.120 A
few states actually lowered the age of juvenile court jurisdiction from eighteen to
seventeen years of age and transformed youths into adults on a wholesale basis.
12 1
Changes in juvenile sentencing and waiver laws reflected the cultural and
criminological shift from determinism to responsibility; emphasized punishment
based on present offense and prior record rather than the juvenile courts' previous
rehabilitative mission; and have had a disproportionate impact on minority
offenders.1
22
1. Racial Disparities and Cumulative Disadvantage
From their inception, juvenile courts have discriminated between "our
children" and "other peoples' children."'123 Every state defines juvenile courts'
delinquency jurisdiction based on a youth committing a criminal act. 124 Judges
at 215-16; ENTMAN & ROJECKI, supra note 115, at 92 (arguing that Bush's blatant anti-Black Horton
advertisements deliberately raised the crime issue to arouse Whites' fear of dangerous Blacks).
119 See BECKETT, supra note 20; HACKER, supra note 75, at 57 ("[W]hen crime rates rise,
conservatives do not call for confronting basic causes-unemployment, for example, or inferior
education-but rather invoke a firmer use of force."); MILLER, supra note 108, at 149 ("[W]elfare
and crime have never been far from the reach of any politician who wishes to posture on race without
ever having actually to mention it"). Gilens argues that public officials who use crime and welfare as
"code" to mobilize anti-black sentiments for electoral advantage among white voters practice a
politics of division. GILENS, supra note 13, at 602.
120 See, e.g., JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 31, at 223 (reporting that punitive
policies toward delinquents "include easier waivers to adult court, excluding certain offenses from
juvenile court jurisdiction, blended juvenile and adult sentences, increased authority to prosecutors to
decide to file cases in adult court, and more frequent custodial placement of adjudicated
delinquents."); TORBET ET AL., supra note 109 (documenting changes in juvenile court waiver laws);
Feld, Responses to Youth Violence, supra note 83, at 189-261.
121 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.44 (1996) (lowering the age of juvenile court jurisdiction
from 18 to 17); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 619:B2 (IV) (1995) (defining delinquent as "a person who
has committed an offense before reaching the age of «-18-> +17+ years which would be a
felony or misdemeanor under the criminal code of this state if committed by an adult...").
122 See, e.g., JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 31, at 210 ("State legislative
changes in recent years have moved the court away from its rehabilitative goals and toward
punishment and accountability... include[ing] blended sentences, mandatory minimum sentences,
and extended jurisdiction."); MAUER ET AL., supra note 74, at 137-38 (noting that sentencing
discretion shifted from judges to prosecutors and "judicial discretion is exercised in an open
courtroom subject to public scrutiny, but the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is conducted behind
closed doors with little accountability."); TORBET ET AL., supra note 109; Massey, supra note 10, at 47
(arguing that the impact of waiver changes was to "emphasize punishment and deterrence, rather than
focusing on rehabilitation.").
123 See FELD, supra note 3, at 4. See generally OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN: CONFRONTING
RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE (Darnell F. Hawkins & Kimberly
Kempf-Leonard eds., 2005).
124 HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006
NATIONAL REPORT 93-120 (2006) (describing juvenile court jurisdiction based on the type of crime
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primarily consider the seriousness of the offense and prior record when they
sentence delinquents. 125 Real racial differences in rates of criminal behavior
account for some of the racial disparities in juvenile justice administration. Various
measures of delinquency-arrest data, self-report surveys, and crime victim
surveys-report that black youths commit violent crimes at higher rates than do
white juveniles. 126 We should expect black youths to offend at higher rates than do
white youths because of their differential exposure to multiple risk factors
associated with criminality-for example, poverty, isolation in crime-ridden
neighborhoods, single-parent households, deficient schools, and poor health
care. 127 In addition, other factors such as differences in police practices, location of
committed), available at http://ojj-dp.nc-jrs.org/oj-statbb-/nr-2006/-down-loads-/NR2006.pdf; Feld,
Transformation of Juvenile Court-Pt. II, supra note 5, at 383 ("[Sltates define juvenile court
jurisdiction based on a youth committing a crime, a prerequisite that detracts from a compassionate
response... . Juvenile courts' defining characteristic strengthens public antipathy to 'other people's
children' by emphasizing primarily that they are law violators.").
125 See PETER GREENWOOD ET AL., YOUTH CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA 53
(1983) (comparing juvenile and criminal court sentencing practices and concluding that "juvenile and
criminal courts... are much more alike than statutory language would suggest, in the degree to which
they focus on aggravating circumstances of the charged offense and the defendant's prior record in
determining the degree of confinement that will be imposed."); Donna M. Bishop & Charles Frazier,
Race Effects in Juvenile Justice Decision-making: Findings of a Statewide Analysis, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 392, 409 (1996); Jeffrey Fagan et al., Blind Justice? The Impact of Race on the
Juvenile Justice Process, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 224 passim (1987); Belinda R. McCarthy & Brent L.
Smith, The Conceptualization of Discrimination in the Juvenile Justice Process: The Impact of
Administrative Factors and Screening Decisions on Juvenile Court Dispositions, 24 CRIMINOLOGY 41
passim (1986).
126 See supra notes 74, 97-103 and accompanying text; see also JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE
JUSTICE, supra note 31, at 235-38; Janet L. Lauritsen, Racial and Ethnic Differences in Juvenile
Offending, in OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN
AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 87 (2005) (analyzing arrest data and reporting that "black youth are
disproportionately arrested for violent index crimes and drug and weapons violations...").
127 See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text. See, e.g., JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE
JUSTICE, supra note 31, at 238, reporting that:
from the early days of childhood, black juveniles have more experience with poor
health care and health conditions and with poor economic conditions, and they are more
likely to live in segregated, isolated neighborhoods with concentrated poverty than are
white juveniles. Concentrated disadvantages in poor neighborhoods, with low mobility
and little racial heterogeneity, have been found to be strongly correlated with
[involvement in crimes].
Id.; see also JESSICA SHORT & CHRISTY SHARP, DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONTACT IN THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 14-15 (2005), available at http://www.cwla.org-/programs/juvenile-
justice/disproportionate-.pdf (describing broader exposure of minority youths to "societal risk factors,
such as living below the poverty line; having higher rates of infant mortality, lower birth weights, and
greater exposure to lead; and fewer mothers receiving early prenatal care."); Kimberly Kempf-
Leonard, Minority Youths and Juvenile Justice: Disproportionate Minority Contact After Nearly 20
Years of Reform Efforts, 5 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUVENILE JUSTICE 71, 73 (2006) (identifying
contributions of poverty, "underclass" status, targeted police patrol, and subcultural values to
disproportionate minority involvement in juvenile justice system).
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crime, and differences in victims' reactions also contribute to racial disparities in
arrest rates. 1
28
After researchers control for present offense and prior record, however,
studies consistently report additional racial disparities when judges sentence black
youths. 129 Juvenile courts' parens patriae ideology legitimizes individualized
discretion and. discrimination. In a society in which economic and racial inequality
highly correlate, minority youths have greater needs which exposes them to more
extensive juvenile court intervention.' 30 The structural context of juvenile courts
also puts minority youths at greater risk than white youths of receiving punitive
sentences. Urban courts sentence all delinquents more severely.13' Urban courts
detain all youths at higher rates and detained youths receive more severe
sentences. 132 Most minority youths live in urban settings and their geographic
locale interacts with race to increase disproportionate minority confinement. 133
The juvenile justice system entails successive decisions-intake, petition,
detention, adjudication or waiver, and disposition-and the compound effects of
128 NAT'L COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, AND JUSTICE FOR SOME: DIFFERENTIAL
TREATMENT OF YOUTH OF COLOR IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 6 (2007) (describing other factors besides
differences in rates of offending that contribute to racial differences in arrest rates).
129 See, e.g., FELD, supra note 3, at 267-72; KIMBERLY KEMPF-LEONARD, CARL POPE &
WILLIAM FEYERHERM, MINORITIES IN JUVENILE JUSTICE 23-27 (1995); BARRY KRiSBERG & JAMES
AUSTIN, REINVENTING JUVENILE JUSTICE 116-34 (1993) (arguing that discretionary decisions at
various stages of the juvenile process amplify racial disparities and produce more severe dispositions
for minorities than for white youths); CARL POPE, RICK LOVELL & HEIDI M. HSIA, DISPROPORTIONATE
MINORITY CONFINEMENT: A REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH LITERATURE FROM 1989 THROUGH 2001 5
(2002), available at http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/dmc/pdf/dmc89_01.pdf (reporting that 25 of 34 published
studies reported race effects in processing youths); Donna M. Bishop, The Role of Race and Ethnicity
in Juvenile Justice Process, in OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC
DIFFERENCES IN AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 61 (D. Hawkins & K. Kempf-Leonard eds., 2005)
(reviewing literature and reporting that "disparities that cannot be explained by race differences in
offending are apparent at nearly every stage in the juvenile justice process.").
130 See, e.g., FELD, supra note 3, at 271-72 (arguing that more affluent white parents can
purchase private services for their troubled children, whereas poorer minority juveniles proceed by
default through the juvenile justice system).
131 BARRY C. FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN: THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THE JUVENILE COURT
158-62 (1993); Bishop, supra note 129, at 62-65 (attributing some racial disparities in juvenile
justice administration to class differences and social structural factors that place minority youths at
greater risk of formal processing); Barry C. Feld, Justice By Geography: Urban, Suburban, and
Rural Variations in Juvenile Justice Aministration, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 156, 156 (1991).
132 See, e.g., Steven H. Clarke & Gary G. Koch, Juvenile Court: Therapy or Crime Control,
and Do Lawyers Make a Difference?, 14 LAW AND SOC'Y REV. 263, 294 (1980) (noting that "being
detained before adjudication had an independent effect on the likelihood of commitment, entirely
apart from the facts that both detention and commitment had common antecedents."); Barry C. Feld,
The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1185, 1337-39 (1989)
("[N]egative effects of pretrial detention on subsequent sentencing.").
133 See generally, FELD, supra note 3, at 271-72; SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 97, at 154-
55; EILEEN POE-YAMAGATA & MICHAEL A. JONES, AND JUSTICE FOR SOME 12-14 (2000), available at
http://buildingblocksforyouth.or.g/justiceforsome/jfs.pdf (summarizing racial differences in rates of
detention). The authors report that "[in every offense category, a substantially greater percentage of
African American youth were detained than White youth." Id. at 9.
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even small disparities produce larger cumulative differences. 134 Black youths
comprised about 15% of the population aged ten to seventeen, 26% of juvenile
arrests, 30% of delinquency referrals, one-third of the petitioned delinquency
cases, and 40% of the inmates in long-term public institutions. 135 These cumulative
disparities persist and continue to increase. 136 Although minority youths are
overrepresented at each successive step, the greatest disparities occur in the initial
stages. 137 A recent analysis reported that "at almost every stage in the juvenile
justice process the racial disparity is clear, but not extreme. Because the system
operates cumulatively, however, the risk is compounded and the end result is that
black juveniles are three times as likely as white juveniles to end up in residential
placement."'
' 38
134 NAT'L COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, supra note 128, at 4 (summarizing the
decision points-arrest, intake, detention, adjudication, and disposition-that produce cumulative
disadvantages as black youths move through the juvenile justice system). But see Kempf-Leonard,
supra note 127, at 70-82 (describing the complexity of attributing disproportionate minority
involvement to system bias per se in a multi-stage, cumulative decision-making process).
135 JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 31, at 231; see also POE-YAMAGATA &
JONES, supra note 133 at 1-3.
136 HEIDI M. HsIA, GEORGE S. BRIDGES & ROSALIE MCHALE, DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY
CONFINEMENT: 2002 UPDATE 1 (2004) (reporting growth in proportion of minority offenders in secure
detention and correctional facilities); NAT'L COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, supra note 128,
at 3 (citing cumulating inequality); SHORT & SHARP, supra note 127, at 7-10; Kempf-Leonard, supra
note 127, at 73.
137 MILLER, supra note 108, at 69-72 (reporting that racial disparities occur most often in the
early and latest stages of juvenile justice processing); POE-YAMAGATA & JONES, supra note 133, at 16
(noting that an index constructed by dividing minority youth proportion in pretrial detention by
minority proportion in the youth population at risk indicated that in 43 of 44 states, the proportion of
minority youths in detention was 2.8 times (280%) higher than their makeup in the general
population); SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 97, at 3; Bishop, supra note 129, at 66 (reporting that
race effects are more pronounced at earlier stages of juvenile justice decision-making); Edmund F.
McGarrell, Trends in Racial Disproportionality in Juvenile Court Processing: 1985-1989, 39 CRIME
& DELINQ. 29, 46 (1993) (noting that disproportionate referral of minority youths results in
corresponding increases in pre-trial detention).
Probation officers who decide whether or not to file a formal delinquency petition often
perceive minority juveniles as more threatening and more likely to offend in the future than similarly-
situated white juveniles. See JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 31, at 251 (finding
"pronounced differences in officers' attributions about the causes of crime committed by white and
minority youth"); George S. Bridges and S. Steen, Racial Disparities in Official Assessments of
Juvenile Offenders: Attributional Stereotypes as Mediating Mechanisms, 63 AM. Soc. REV. 554, 555
(1998); see also Bishop & Frazier, supra note 125, at 392; Sara Steen et al., Explaining Assessments
of Future Risk: Race and Attributions of Juvenile Offenders in Presentencing Reports, in OUR
CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN AMERICAN JUVENILE
JUSTICE 245 passim (D. Hawkins & K. Kempf-Leonard.eds., 2005).
138 JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 31, at 257; see also POE-YAMAGATA &
JONES, supra note 133, at 18, 20 (noting that the minority proportion of youths in public correctional
facilities is about double that of whites (66% vs. 34%) black youths with no prior admissions were
six times more likely than white youths to be confined); Robert J. Sampson & Janet L. Lauritsen,
Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Crime and Criminal Justice in the United States, 21 CRIME &
JUST.: A REV. OF RES. 311, 362 (1997) (reporting that minority youths "are more likely to be detained
and receive out-of-home placements than whites regardless of 'legal' considerations" and that these
disparities also contribute to the construction of a prior record that, in turn, affects future processing).
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Recent "get tough" changes have exacerbated disproportionate minority
confinement. The numbers of youths in custody increased almost 40% between
1985 and 1995, and while white juveniles comprised 32% of all incarcerated
delinquents, black youths comprised 43% and Hispanics 21% of all confined
youths. 139 Within the past decade, these disparities have increased further and
minority youth, who make-up 34% of the juvenile population, comprise 62% of
youths in detention and 66% of youths in correctional facilities. 
140
Decades ago, Congress recognized the prevalence of disproportionate
minority confinement and amended the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention (JJDP) Act to require states to identify sources of minority
overrepresentation and to develop mechanisms to assure equality of treatment.
14
'
Twenty five of twenty six states found disproportionate minority
overrepresentation with disparities in some jurisdiction by a factor of three or
more. 42 More recent studies document continuing disparities and the "cumulative
disadvantage" as minority youths penetrate more deeply the justice system. 143
2. Waiver to Criminal Court and Sentencing as Adult
The most severe sanction a state can impose is waiver of a youth to criminal
court for sentencing as an adult. Waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction presents the
stark choice between treating a youth in the juvenile system and punishing him in
the criminal justice system.144 The details of transfer laws vary extensively, but
139 See FELD, supra note 3, at 270-71.
140 NAT'L COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, supra note 128, at 30.
141 See 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(16) (1994); 42 U.S.C § 5633(a)(16) (2004) (encouraging states to
develop prevention programs to reduce disproportionate minority contact with as well as confinement
in the juvenile justice system); JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 31, at 228-29; NAT'L
COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, supra note 128, at 4; Kempf-Leonard, supra note 127, at 71-
72.
142 See, e.g., DONNA HAMPARIAN & MICHAEL LIEBER, DISPROPORTIONATE CONFINEMENT OF
MINORITY JUVENILES IN SECURITY FACILITIES: 1996 NATIONAL REPORT (1997) (constructing index of
disproportionality and reporting overrepresentation of African American youths in 25 of 26 states);
Kempf-Leonard, supra note 127, at 71, 73-74; Carl E. Pope, Racial Disparities in Juvenile Justice
System, 5 OVERCROWDED TIMES 1, 4 (1994) (reporting disproportionate minority over-representation
of juveniles in forty-one of forty-two states in secure detention facilities and in all thirteen states that
analyzed institutional commitments).
143 NAT'L COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, supra note 128, at 4; SHORT & SHARP, supra
note 127; Kempf-Leonard, supra note 127, at 73-74 (reporting that at each successive stage of
juvenile justice administration "the level of over-representation escalates.. . [and] is even more
pronounced among juveniles referrals that are specifically for violent delinquent offenses."). Judges
sentence disproportionately more minority delinquents to out-of-home placements than they do white
youths, and provide white juveniles proportionately more probationary dispositions than they do
black youths. POE-YAMAGATA & JONES, supra note 133, at 14-15. Moreover, incarcerated black
juveniles spend more time in custody than do white youths convicted of similar offenses. Id. at 18-
21.
144 Jurisdictional waiver refers to the process by which states transfer youths to criminal court
for prosecution as an adult. See, e.g., PATRICIA GRIFFIN ET AL., TRYING JUVENILES AS ADULTS IN
CRIMINAL COURT: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER PROVISIONS 3-10 (1998); SNYDER & SICKMUND,
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three generic strategies-judicial waiver, legislative offense exclusion, and
prosecutorial direct-file-represent the approaches that states use. 145 Judicial
waiver is the most common transfer strategy. 146 Juvenile court judges may waive
jurisdiction after conducting a hearing to determine whether a youth is amenable to
treatment or poses a danger to public safety. 14 7 Judicial waiver reflects juvenile
courts' individualized sentencing processes. 148 By contrast, legislatures possess
wide latitude to define juvenile courts' jurisdiction and to exclude youths based on
age and offense. 149 By excluding serious offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction,
these laws eliminate any need for a judicial hearing. 150 A third and increasingly
popular legislative strategy is to allow prosecutors to decide in which justice
system to try some young offenders. In the dozen or more "direct file" states,
juvenile and criminal courts share concurrent jurisdiction over older youths
charged with serious crimes and prosecutors can select either forum.' 5'
supra note 124, at 112-14 (discussing judicial waiver, concurrent jurisdiction, statutory offense
exclusion as three legislative methods to transfer juveniles for criminal prosecution).
145 See generally FELD, supra note 3, at 208-19; GRIFFIN ET AL., supra note 144, at 3-7;
SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 124, at 112-14; Feld, Juvenile Waiver Statutes, supra note 83, at
488.
146 SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 97, at 110; U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, JUVENILE
JUSTICE: JUVENILES PROCESSED IN CRIMINAL COURT AND CASE DISPOSITIONS 7 (1995), available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1995/gg95170.pdf.
147 See Feld, Juvenile Waiver Statutes, supra note 83, at 487-94. See generally Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (discussing procedural due process in judicial waiver hearings).
148 Proponents of judicial waiver endorse the juvenile court's rehabilitative philosophy and
argue that individualized decisions provide an appropriate balance of flexibility and severity. See,
e.g., Franklin E. Zimring, The Punitive Necessity of Waiver, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT 207 passim (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin
E. Zimring ed., 2000) [hereinafter Zimring, Punitive Necessity]; Franklin E. Zimring & Jeffrey Fagan,
Transfer Policy and Law Reform, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF
ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT 407 passim (Jeffrey Fagan and Franklin E. Zimring, eds.
2000). Critics object that judges lack clinical tools with which to assess amenability to treatment or to
predict dangerousness and that their exercise of discretion results in abuses and inequalities. See, e.g.,
Barry C. Feld, Legislative Exclusion of Offenses from Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: A History and
Critique, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE
CRIMINAL COURT 83-98 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring, eds., 2000); Jeffrey Fagan &
Elizabeth Piper Deschenes, Determinates of Judicial Waiver Decisions for Violent Juvenile
Offenders, 81 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 314, 324-28 (1990).
149 See generally Feld, supra note 148.
150 See, e.g., Benjamin Steiner et al., Legislative Waiver Reconsidered: General Deterrent
Effects of Statutory Exclusion Laws Enacted Post-1979, 23 JUSTICE Q. 34, 49-51 (2006) (describing
the deterrent rationale of legislative offense exclusion and reporting that adoption of such laws have
no effects). Proponents of offense exclusion favor "just deserts" sentencing policies. They advocate
sanctions based on relatively objective factors such as seriousness of the crime, culpability, and
criminal history, and they value uniform treatment of similarly situated offenders. See e.g., Feld,
supra note 148, at 102-03. Critics question whether legislators can remove discretion without making
the process excessively rigid and over-inclusive. See generally Zimring, Punitive Necessity, supra
note 148 (discussing the transfer of juvenile offenders into criminal court).
151 See Manduley v. Superior Court of San Diego, 27 Cal. 4th 537, 555 (Cal. 2002); SNYDER &
SICKMUND, supra note 97, at 99; Francis Barry McCarthy, The Serious Offender and Juvenile Court
Reform: The Case for Prosecutorial Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 38 ST. Louis U. L. J. 629,
632-33 (1994); Benjamin Steiner & Emily Wright, Assessing the Relative Effects of State Direct File
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The increase in youth violence and homicide rates in the late 1980s and early
1990s caused almost every state to revise its laws to transfer more juveniles in
criminal court.152 These changes lowered the minimum age for transfer, increased
the number of offenses excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction, and shifted
waiver discretion from the judicial branch-judges in a waiver hearing-to the
executive branch-prosecutors who make charging decisions. 153 The shift of de
facto sentencing discretion from judges to prosecutors has had a major impact on
the numbers and characteristics of youths tried in criminal court.
States try more than 200,000 juveniles as. adults each year simply because
their juvenile court jurisdiction ends at sixteen or fifteen years of age, rather than at
seventeen. 154 States tried an additional 55,000,youths in criminal court who were
within the age jurisdiction of juvenile courts. 155 Even though most states have
judicial waiver statutes, prosecutors transfer the vast majority of these youths
without any hearing. 156 Although we lack good data on the number of juveniles
Waiver Laws on Violence Juvenile Crime: Deterrence or Irrelevance?, 96 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1451, 1467-68 (2006) (reporting states that adopted prosecutorial direct file laws,
analyzing juvenile arrest rates before and after adoption, and concluding that such laws have no
deterrent effect). Proponents of prosecutorial waiver claim that prosecutors can act as more objective
gatekeepers than either "soft" judges or "get tough" legislators. See, e.g., McCarthy, at 656-59.
Critics observe that prosecutors often succumb to political pressures on crime issues, exercise their
discretion just as subjectively and idiosyncratically as judges, and create extensive geographic
variability in the administration of juvenile justice. See, e.g., Donna M. Bishop & Charles S. Frazier,
Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court: A Case Study and Analysis of Prosecutorial Waiver, 5
NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y. 281, 285 (1991); Feld, supra note 148, at 85.
152 See, e.g., JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 31, at 204-09, 214-18; SHORT &
SHARP, supra note 127, at 7 (reporting that "between 1992 and 1999, 49 states and the District of
Columbia passed laws making it easier for juveniles to be tried as adults through statutory exclusion,
mandatory waiver, direct file by prosecutors, or presumptive waiver legislation."); TORBET ET AL.,
supra note 109, at 3-8; Feld, Responses to Youth Violence, supra note 83, at 194; Barry C. Feld,
Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV.
965,966-97 (1995) [hereinafter Feld, Violent Youth].
153 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, AMNESTY INT'L, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT
PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2005), available at http://www.amnestyusa.
org/countries/usa/clwop/report.pdf (arguing that politicians sought electoral advantage by "lowering
the minimum age for criminal court jurisdiction, authorizing automatic transfers from juvenile to
adult courts, and increasing the authority of prosecutors to file charges against children directly in
criminal court rather than proceeding in the juvenile justice system. The United States thus
abandoned its commitment to a juvenile justice system and the youth rehabilitation principles
embedded in it."); JOLANTA JUSZKIEWICZ, YOUTH CRIME/ADULT TIME: IS JUSTICE SERVED I available
at http://www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/ycat/ycat.html; Feld, supra note 148.
154 See NAT'L COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, supra note 128, at 5 (reporting that in
thirteen states, juveniles sixteen and seventeen years of age automatically are in criminal court
because of jurisdictional age thresholds); SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 124 (summarizing states'
age jurisdiction of juvenile courts).
155 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 153 (estimating that states tried 55,000 waived juveniles
as adults in 2000, of whom 7100 had been transferred).
156 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 153 (estimating that of the 55,000 waived juveniles tried
as adults in 1996, about 36% had a judicial transfer hearing compared with only 13% in 2000);




waived, tried or sentenced as adults, the shift of discretion from judges to
prosecutors has had a profoundly negative impact on youths. Two decades ago,
studies reported that prosecutors in some states charged as many as ten percent of
chronological juveniles as adults. 157 Prosecutors in Florida "direct filed" as many
juveniles into criminal courts as judges waived via transfer hearings in the entire
country. 58 A recent study of transfer practices in 18 large counties in eleven states
reported that judicial waiver hearings are the exception rather than the rule. 159
Prosecutors determined the adult status of 85% of the youths tried as adults.' 60 In
45% of cases, they simply direct-filed youths in criminal court, a rate three times
that of judicial waiver.161 In another 40% of cases, prosecutors charged youths with
statutorily excluded offenses.1
62
Even before the recent "crack down," studies consistently reported racial
disparities in waiver decisions by juvenile court judges. 163 As a result of "get
157 See, e.g., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 146; Feld, Responses to Youth
Violence supra note 83, at 208.
158 See, e.g., Bishop & Frazier, supra note 151, at 286-87; Vincent Schiraldi and Jason
Ziedenberg, The Florida Experiment: Transferring Power From Judges to Prosecutors, 15 CRIM.
JUST. 46, 46 (2000) ("Florida is leading the nation in using prosecutors to make the decision to try
children as adults. In 1995 alone, the Urban Institute in Washington, D.C., reported that Florida
prosecutors sent 7,000 cases to adult court, nearly matching the number of cases judges sent to the
criminal justice system nationwide that year."); Charles E. Frazier et al., Juveniles in Criminal Court:
Past and Current Research in Florida, 18 QLR 573, 579 (1999). Frazier reports that
[t]he number of juveniles transferred to criminal court in Florida grew dramatically from
several hundred cases per year prior to the introduction of prosecutor direct file
provisions, to several thousand per year today. Transfers increased from roughly 1.3% of
the total juvenile filings per year prior to 1979 to a high of 9.6% in 1993. However, our
most recent research indicates that statewide rates have leveled off since 1993 to between
7% and 8%. The method by which transfer is accomplished in Florida has moved steadily
from judicial waiver as the primary means to direct file as the almost exclusive means.
Id.
159 JUSZKIEWICZ, supra note 153, at 16-18.
160 Id. at 20 (reporting many significant research findings, including that "85% of
determinations of whether to charge a juvenile as an adult were not made by judges, but by
prosecutors or by legislatures through statutory exclusions from juvenile court.").
161 Id. at 36.
1621 Id. at 37.
163 See, e.g., DONNA M. HAMPARIAN ET AL., YOUTH IN ADULT COURT: BETWEEN Two WORLDS
104-05 (1982) (reporting that nationally, 39% of all youths transferred in 1978 were black, and in
eleven states, minority youths constituted the majority of juveniles waived); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
supra note 153, at 16 (reporting that since 1984, black juveniles have comprised the majority of
juveniles admitted to prison); Joel Eigen, The Determinants and Impact of Jurisdictional Transfer in
Philadelphia, in READINGS IN PUBLIC POLICY 339-40 (John C. Hall et al. eds., 1981) (noting the
interracial effect in transfers in which black youths who murder white victims are significantly more
at risk for waiver). But cf Jeffrey Fagan, Martin Forst & Scott Vivona, Racial Determinants of the
Judicial Transfer Decision: Prosecuting Violent Youth in Criminal Court, 33 CRIME & DELINQUENCY
259, 276 (1987) ("[I]t appears that the effects of race are indirect, but visible nonetheless."). See
generally M. A. Bortner et al., Race and Transfer: Empirical Research and Social Context, in THE
CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT 277,
278 (J. Fagan & F. Zimring, eds., 2000) (analyzing racial disparity in juvenile transfer proceedings);
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 146, at 59 (examining the effects of race on judicial
waiver decisions).
2007]
JOURNAL OF LAW & FAMILY STUDIES
tough" statutory reforms, judges and prosecutors now transfer even more minority
youths to criminal courts and the greatest disparities occur for youths charged with
violent and drug offenses. 164 In nearly every jurisdiction, the proportion of
minority youths transferred to criminal court exceeds their make-up of the youth
population and of felony arrestees. 165 As a result of successive screenings,
differential processing, and cumulative disadvantage, minority youths comprise the
majority of juveniles transferred to criminal court and sentenced to prison.' 66 One
study reported that criminal court judges imprisoned transferred black youths at a
rate eighteen times greater than that of white offenders and Hispanic youth at
seven times the rate of white youths. 167 Another study of waiver practices in
eighteen urban counties in eleven states reported that minority youths comprised
81% of all juveniles tried in criminal courts and white juveniles only 19%. 168
Because of urban demographics, in many of the sites, African-American youths
comprised between three-quarters and 90% of all transferred youths. 169.As a result
of cumulative racial disparities in prosecutorial filings, judicial waivers, and
criminal court sentencing practices, minority offenders comprise three-quarters of
all youths under age eighteen who enter prisons.
170
V. ADOLESCENT CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REDUCED CULPABILITY
Once states convict youths in criminal court, judges sentence them as if they
were adults, send them to prison with adults, and, until the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Roper v. Simmons, executed them for the crimes they committed when
164 JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 31, at 216 ("A high proportion of the
juveniles transferred to adult court are minorities... The preponderance of minorities among
transferred juveniles may be explained in part by the fact that minorities are disproportionately
arrested for serious crimes."); NAT'L COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, supra note 128, at 16-
19; POE-YAMAGATA & JONES, supra note 133 at 13; Bortner et al., supra note 163, at 277.
165 See, e.g., JUSZKIEWICZ, supra note 153, at 37; IKE MALES & DAN MACALLAIR, THE COLOR OF
JUSTICE: AN ANALYSIS OF JUVENILE ADULT COURT TRANSFERS IN CALIFORNIA 7-8 (2000) (studying
juvenile transfer and criminal court sentencing practices in Los .Angeles and reporting that
"[c]ompared to white youths, minority youths are 2.8 times as likely to be arrested for a violent
crime, 6.2 times as likely to wind up in adult court, and 7 times as likely to be sent to prison by adult
courts."), available at www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/colorofjustice/coj.pdf; POE-YAMAGATA &
JONES, supra note 133, at 17 (noting that the minority proportion of youths transferred to criminal
court was five times their makeup of the general population in Connecticut, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania and Rhode Island).
166 See, e.g., JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 31, at 220 ("In 1997, minorities
made up three-quarters of juveniles admitted to adult state prisons, with blacks accounting for 58
percent, Hispanics 15 percent, and Asians and American Indians 2 percent."). See generally Bortner
et al., supra note 163, at 277 (analyzing cumulative consequences of racial disparities in transfer
decisions).
167 MALES & MACALLAIR, supra note 165, at 9.
168 JUSZKIEWICZ, supra note 153, at 21.
169 Id. at 22.
170 POE-YAMAGATA & JONES, supra note 133, at 25-26.
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they were children.' 7' Most states provide no formal recognition of youthfulness as
a mitigating factor in sentencing, some states explicitly deny very young juveniles
the protection of the common law infancy defense, and many states require judges
to impose mandatory sentences of life without parole on children as young as
twelve or thirteen years of age. 1
72
A. Death Penalty for Juveniles.
In several decisions prior to Roper v. Simmons, the Court considered whether
the Eighth Amendment prohibited states from executing offenders for crimes they
committed as juveniles.'73 In 1988, a plurality of justices in Thompson v.
Oklahoma'74 concluded that fifteen-year-old offenders lacked the requisite
culpability to impose the death penalty. 75 The next year, the Court in Stanford v.
Kentucky176 upheld the death penalty for offenders who were sixteen or seventeen
years of age when they committed a capital offense. 177 Although it recognized that
juveniles generally were less culpable than adults, Stanford rejected a categorical
171 See, e.g., MAUER ET AL., supra 74, at 17 ("A life sentence mandated for any' adult defendant
who committed a particular crime applied in full force to juveniles convicted in adult court for that
crime."); Feld, Responses to Youth Violence, supra note 83, at 212-20.172 See infra notes 264-69, 283-310 and accompanying text.
173 The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Earlier decisions
adverted to the importance of considering youthfulness as a mitigating factor in capital sentencing.
See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982) (remanding sixteen-year-old defendant
for resentencing after trial court's failure properly to consider youthfulness as a mitigating factor and
noting that "[y]outh is more than a chronological fact.... [M]inors, especially in their earlier years,
generally are less mature and responsible than adults."); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608-09
(1978) (requiring sentencing jury to consider all relevant mitigating factors including age of
defendant); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 637 (1977) (per curiam).
114 87 U.S. 815, 837 (1988) (plurality opinion).
175 See id. at 822-23. The Tho'mpson plurality's proportionality analysis considered both
objective indicators of "evolving standards of decency"--e.g. state statutes, jury practices, and the
views of national and international organizations-and the Justices' own subjective sense of
"civilized standards of decency." Id. at 830. The Thompson Court emphasized that deserved
punishment must reflect individual culpability and concluded that "[t]here is also broad agreement on
the proposition that adolescents as a class are less mature and responsible than adults." Id. at 834. The
Justices asserted that:
[L]ess culpability should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile than to a comparable
crime committed by an adult .... Inexperience, less education, and less intelligence make
the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct while at the
same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure
than is an adult. The reasons why juveniles are not trusted with the privileges and
responsibilities of an adult also explain why their irresponsible conduct is not as morally
reprehensible as that of an adult.
Id. at 835.
176 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
171 See id. at 371-72.
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ban and instead allowed juries to decide whether a particular youth possessed
sufficient culpability to warrant execution.' 78
In 2005, the Court in Roper v. Simmons overruled Stanford and categorically
barred states from executing youths for crimes committed prior to eighteen years
of age.1 79 Both empirical and normative factors informed the Court's assessment of
"the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society. ' 180 State legislation and jury sentencing decisions provided compelling
evidence of a national consensus against executing juveniles.1 81 For example, after
Stanford allowed states to execute sixteen- and seventeen-year old juveniles, no
capital states lowered the age of death-eligibility and five states raised it.'
82
Similarly, in the decade prior to Roper, only three states had executed offenders for
crimes committed as juveniles.1 83 National and international legal, professional,
religious, and social organizations universally opposed executing juveniles.1 84
The Justices also evaluated adolescents' culpability to decide whether the
death penalty ever could be a proportional punishment for juveniles. Roper offered
three reasons why states could not punish as severely as adults even youths whom
they found criminally responsible, simply because of their age.185 First, states
could not equate juveniles' culpability with adults because their immaturity and
lack of judgment caused them to commit acts impulsively and without full
appreciation of the consequences. 186 Second, juveniles' greater susceptibility than
adults to negative peer influences 187 and dependence on parents and community
diminished their responsibility. 88 Third, juveniles' personalities are more
178 Id. at 375-76 (arguing that juvenile waiver and capital sentencing procedures were adequate
to determine individual culpability unless there was a national consensus "not that 17 or 18 is the age
at which most persons, or even almost all. persons, achieve sufficient maturity to be held fully
responsible for murder; but that 17 or 18 is the age before which no one can reasonably be held fully
responsible").
179 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (prohibiting execution of youths for crimes committed when seventeen
years of age or younger).
18 Id. at 56.1 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-101 (1958)).
181 Id. at 564-66 (noting that legislative trends prohibiting executing children corresponded
with those in Atkins v. Virginia, in which the Court held that the Eighth Amendment barred
execution of defendants with mental retardation); see also Barry C. Feld, Competence, Culpability,
and Punishment, 32 HOFsTRA L. REv. 463, 463-64 (2003) (analogizing between state laws and jury
practices in executing defendants with mental retardation and juveniles).
182 Roper, 543 U.S. at 565.
183 Id. at 564-65.
114 Id. at 575-78.
185 Id. at 569-72.
186 Id. at 569 (finding that a "lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are
found in youth more often that in adults and are more understandable among the young. These
qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions."); Feld, supra note 181,
at 466 (analyzing developmental psychological and neuroscience research on juveniles' diminished
responsibility).
187 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (emphasizing that "juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to
negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.").
188 Id. (noting that juveniles may be more susceptible to negative influences because they "have
less control; or less experience with control, over their own environment."). The Court explained that
"[t]heir own vulnerability and comparative lack of control over their immediate surroundings means
[Vol. 10
ADOLESCENT CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
transitory and less well-formed than those of adults and their crimes provide less
reliable evidence of depraved character.1 89 Juveniles' immature judgment,
susceptibility to negative influence, and transitory character also negated the
retributive and deterrent justifications for the death penalty.' 90
Although Roper's conclusions seem intuitively obvious, 91 the Court provided
surprisingly little scientific evidence to support its assertions. 192 Despite substantial
research summarized in sixteen amicus briefs, the Court neither presented nor
analyzed the social science evidence of juveniles' diminished responsibility and
reduced culpability. 193 We know much more about adolescents' judgment and its
implications for criminal responsibility and sentencing policy than the Court
offered.
B. Adolescent Criminal Responsibility
and the Developmental Psychology of Reduced Culpability
The criminal law proportions punishment to the seriousness of the offense.
194
Two elements define the seriousness of a crime-harm and culpability.' 95 An
juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to escape negative influences in
their whole environment." Id. (citing Stanford, 492 U.S. at 395 (Brennan, dissenting)).
189 Id. at 570 ("[T]he character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult.").
190 Id. at 571. Roper rejected retribution or deterrence as justification for execution and noted
that:
[o]nce the diminished culpability of juveniles is recognized, it is evident that the
penological justifications for the death penalty apply to them with lesser force than to
adults. We have held there are two distinct social purposes served by the death penalty:
'retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders.
Id. The Court asserted that "[rietribution is not proportional if the law's most severe penalty is
imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by
reason of youth and immaturity." Id. at 571 ("Whether viewed as an attempt to express the
community's moral outrage or as an attempt to right the balance for the wrong to the victim, the case
for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an adult."). Similarly, the Court concluded that
juveniles' immaturity of judgment decreased the likelihood that the threat of execution would deter
them. Id. ("the absence of evidence of deterrent effect is of special concern because the same
characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest as well that juveniles will be less
susceptible to deterrence.").
191 Id. at 569 (observing summarily that "as any parent knows," juveniles are immature and
irresponsible).
192 See Deborah W. Denno, The Scientific Shortcomings of Roper v. Simmons, 3 OHIO ST. J.
CRiM. L. 379, 396 (2006) ("[A]lthough Roper was correct in its result, the Court's use of social
science research was, at times, limited and flawed. Even when the Court attempts to examine
research that is widely accepted and highly regarded, the Court does not always appear to have the
tools necessary to provide a sufficiently firm social sciences foundation.").
193 Id. at 381-87 (arguing that the Court's reliance on the "scientific and sociological studies
respondent and his amici cite" fails to identify which studies or data supported its conclusions about
the differences between adolescents and adults).
194 See HIRSCH, supra note 83, at 48 ("[P]unishing someone conveys in dramatic fashion that
his conduct was wrong and that he is blameworthy for having committed it."); see also ANDREW VON
HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS 15 (1993); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES:
DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 31 (1985).
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offender's age has little bearing on the amount of harm caused. 196 Culpability
reflects the actor's ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of her actions and to
control her behavior. 197 Youthfulness and immaturity directly affects culpability
and the seriousness of the crime.198 As Roper noted, youthfulness affects judgment,
reasoning ability, and self-control and diminishes the criminal responsibility of
juveniles who fail to exercise it. 199 Although states may hold youth accountable, a
195 See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 393 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
proportionality principle takes account not only of the 'injury to the person and to the public' caused
by a crime, but also of the 'moral depravity' of the offender."); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 815
(1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the offender's culpability-"the degree of the
defendant's blameworthiness"-is central to determining the penalty); Wayne A. Logan,
Proportionality and Punishment: Imposing Life Without Parole on Juveniles, 33 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 681, 707 (1998) ("[A] sentence must correspond to the crime-not just to the harm caused by
the offense, but also to the culpability of the offender."); Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg,
Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 822 (2003) ("Only a blameworthy moral agent deserves
punishment at all, and blameworthiness (and the amount of punishment deserved) can vary
depending on the attributes of the actor or the circumstances of the offense."); Franklin E. Zimring,
Penal Proportionality for the Young Offender: Notes on Immaturity, Capacity, and Diminished
Responsibility, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVES ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 271
(Thomas Grisso & Robert Schwartz eds., 2000) ("But desert is a measure of fault that will attach very
different punishment to criminal acts that cause similar amounts of harm.").
196 See. e.g., ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS 174 (1975) (arguing that the victim
of a crime is just as victimized, regardless of the age of the perpetrator, and that the need for social
defense is the same).
197 David 0. Brink, Immaturity, Normative Competence and Juvenile Transfer: How (Not) to
Punish Minors for Major Crimes, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1555, 1557 (2004) ("[J]uveniles tend to be less
competent in discriminating right from wrong and in being able to regulate successfully their actions
in accord with these discriminations. If they are less competent, then they are less responsible.");
Zimring, supra note 195, at 389-93.
198 Just deserts theory and criminal law gradiig principles base the degree of deserved
punishment on the actor's culpability. For example, a person may cause the death of another
individual with premeditation and deliberation, intentionally, "in the heat of passion," recklessly,
negligently or accidentally. See JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 105-45 (2d
ed. 1960). The criminal law treats the same objective harm-for example, the death of a person-
quite differently depending on the actor's culpability. It would be unjust to impose the same penalty
on offenders whose culpability differs substantially.
199 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 153, at 113 (arguing that penal proportionality requires
consideration of both the nature of the offense and the culpability of the offender).
Children can commit the same acts as adults, but by virtue of their immaturity, they
cannot be as blameworthy or as culpable. They do not have adults' developed abilities to
think, to weigh consequences, to make sound decisions, to control their impulses, and to
resist group pressures; their brains are anatomically different, still evolving into the
brains of adults.
Id.; Peter Arenella, Character, Choice and Moral Agency: The Relevance of Character to Our Moral
Culpability Judgments, SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y, Spring 1990, at 67-68, argues that the criminal law treats
children differently than adults because it recognizes that they only gradually will
develop the capacity to understand their normative significance and abide by their
dictates. And when they make a rational and voluntary choice to engage in morally
objectionable conduct. . ., we may hold them accountable to some sanction to teach them
the significance of the rule they have broken.
But we do not treat young children as full moral agents, despite their capacity for
practical reason and their freedom to act on the basis of their reasoned choices....
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youth sentencing policy also should recognize adolescents' diminished
responsibility. 200 Young offenders deserve less severe penalties than adults because
of their diminished responsibility. 20 1 Even youth who can distinguish right from
wrong lack the moral capacity and self-control to equate their criminal
responsibility with that of adults.20 2
Developmental psychology studies physical, social, intellectual, and
emotional changes across the life-cycle. 20 3 By mid-adolescence, most youths'
See also Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental
Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 176 (1997) (arguing that
adolescents' "criminal choices are presumed less to express individual preferences and more to
reflect the behavioral influences characteristic of a transitory developmental stage that are generally
shared with others in the age cohort. This difference supports drawing a line based on age, and
subjecting adolescents to a categorical presumption of reduced responsibility."); Laurence Steinberg
& Elizabeth Cauffman, The Elephant in the Courtroom: A Developmental Perspective on the
Adjudication of Youthful Offenders, 6 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 389, 407-09 (1999) (arguing that
youths lack "ability to control [their] impulses, to manage [their] behavior in the face of pressure
from others to violate the law, or to extricate [themselves] from a potentially problematic situation,"
and that these deficiencies render them less blameworthy).
200 See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 195, at 830.
[Y]ouths are likely to act more impulsively and to weigh the consequences of their options
differently from adults, discounting risks and future consequences, and over-valuing (by
adult standards) peer approval, immediate consequences, and the excitement of risk
taking. These influences are predictable, systematic and developmental in nature (rather
than simply an expression of personal values and preferences), and they undermine
decision-making capacity in ways that are accepted as mitigating culpability.
Id.
201 Zimring uses the term "diminished responsibility" to refer to adolescents who possess "the
minimum abilities for blameworthiness and thus for punishment... [whose immaturity] still suggests
that less punishment is justified." Zimring, supra note 195, at 273.
202 Brink, supra note 197, at 1570 (2004). Brink emphasizes both cognitive and volitional
aspects of responsibility: "Normative competence involves the cognitive ability to discriminate right
from wrong, but also the affective and cognitive abilities to regulate one's emotions, appetites, and
actions in accordance with this normative knowledge. One central ingredient in normative
competence is impulse control . ." Id.
203 Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 199, at 391.
Developmental psychology, broadly defined, concerns the scientific study of
changes in physical, intellectual, emotional, and social development over the life cycle.
Developmental psychologists are mainly interested in the study of 'normative'
development (i.e., patterns of behavior, cognition, and emotion that are regular and
predictable within the vast majority of the population of individuals of a given
chronological age), but they are also interested in understanding normal individual
differences in development (i.e., common variations within the range of what is
considered normative for a given chronological age) as well as the causes and
consequences of atypical or pathological development (i.e., development that departs
significantly from accepted norms).
Id.; see also JEAN PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD 26-28 (Marjorie Gabain trans., First
Free Press 1965) (1932) (describing four stages of development); JEAN PIAGET & BARBEL INHELDER,
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CHILD 152 (Helen Weaver trans., 1969) (1966) ("[T]he mental development
of the child appears as a succession of three great periods."); Lawrence Kohlberg, Development of
Moral Character and Moral Ideology, in I REVIEW OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 383, 394-409
(Martin L. Hoffman & Lois Wladis Hoffman eds., 1964); Lawrence Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence:
The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIALIZATION THEORY
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possess basic reasoning ability comparable with adults.2°4 For example, youths and
adults use similar information and employ comparable reasoning processes when
they make informed consent medical decisions.0 5 But the ability to make
appropriate decisions when provided with complete information under structured
conditions differs significantly from the ability to exercise judgment under
stressful conditions and with incomplete information.20 6 Because emotions play a
AND RESEARCH 347, 347-472 (David A. Goslin ed., 1969); Lawrence Kohlberg, The Development of
Children's Orientations Toward a Moral Order, 6 VITA HUMANA 11, 11-14 (1963); June Louin Tapp
& Lawrence Kohlberg, Developing Senses of Law and Legal Justice, in LAW, JUSTICE, AND THE
INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY 89, 90 (June Louin Tapp & Felice J. Levine eds., 1977); June Louin Tapp &
Felice J. Levine, Legal Socialization: Strategies for an Ethical Legality, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1, 12-15
(1974). But see Elizabeth S. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning in Adolescent Decision Making, 37 VILL.
L. REV. 1607, 1632 (1992) (summarizing criticisms of the early research on stage and sequence of
development and arguing that "recent research has revealed that similar skills develop at different
rates in different task domains").
204 Developmental psychological research on adolescents' cognitive decisionmaking ability
suggests that "for most purposes, adolescents cannot be distinguished from adults on the ground of
competence in decisionmaking alone." Gary B. Melton, Toward "Personhood" for Adolescents:
Autonomy and Privacy as Values in Public Policy, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 99, 100 (1983). When
youths solve problems or make informed consent decisions, social psychologists find the quality of
judgments made by adolescents fourteen years of age or older comparable to that of adults'
judgments. See id. at 100-01; see also Gary B. Melton, Children's Competence to Consent: A
Problem in Law and Social Science, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 1, 15 (Gary B. Melton
et al. eds., 1983). But see Elizabeth Cauffman et al., Justice for Juveniles: New Perspectives on
Adolescents' Competence and Culpability, 18 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 403, 406-07 (1999) (criticizing
cognitive studies as methodologically limited and relying on "small, unrepresentative, usually white,
middle class samples of youth taking part in laboratory studies rather than in studies that compare
adolescent and adult performance under conditions that adequately resemble daily life"); Scott, supra
note 203, at 1609 (criticizing researchers who contend that "no differences distinguish adults and
adolescents in their capacity for rational decisionmaking" and arguing that they focus too narrowly
on cognitive as opposed to judgmental factors); Cynthia V. Ward, Punishing Children in the
Criminal Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 429, 434-36 (2006) (arguing that the cognitive competence
of adolescents enables them to form the mens rea to commit a crime and essentially refutes claims
that the criminal law should treat them differently than adults).
205 Stephen J. Morse, Immaturity and Irresponsibility, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 52-53
(1998) (concluding that cognitive capacity and formal reasoning ability of mid-adolescents does not
differ significantly from that of adults). Research on young peoples' ability to make informed
medical decisions tends to support equating adolescents' and adults' cognitive abilities. See Thomas
Grisso & Linda Vierling, Minors' Consent to Treatment: A Developmental Perspective, 9 PROF.
PSYCHOL. 412, 423 (1978) (finding that little evidence exists that adolescents aged fifteen or older
possess less competence than adults to provide knowing, intelligent, and voluntary informed
consent); Lois A. Weithom & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of Children and Adolescents to
Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEV. 1589, 1595 (1982) (reporting that fourteen-
year-olds' choices did not differ significantly from those of adults in terms of "evidence of choice,
reasonable[ness of] outcome, rational[ity of] reason[ing], and understanding" when responding to
medical and psychological treatment hypotheticals). A review of several psychological studies of
adolescents' reasoning processes, and understanding and use of medical information about their
conditions and treatment options, found that adolescents and adults generally made qualitatively
comparable decisions. See Scott, supra note 203, at 1627-30.
206 See Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, The Cognitive and Affective Influences on
Adolescent Decision-Making, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1763, 1770 (1995) [hereinafter Cauffman &
Steinberg, Cognitive and Affective Influences]; Scott & Steinberg, supra note 195, at 812-13 ("These
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significant role in decision-making, researchers distinguish between "cold
cognition" and "hot cognition." 207 For adolescents, in particular, physiological
changes and mood volatility adversely affect judgment and decision-making. 08
For the past decade, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
sponsored a network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice (ADJJ) to
conduct research on juveniles' competence and culpability. This research
culminated in the publication of a series of books, articles, and a conference that
addressed the "state of knowledge" on adolescent development and the
implications of developmental characteristics for juvenile and criminal system
findings from laboratory studies are only modestly useful, however, in understanding how youths
compare to adults in making choices that have salience to their lives or that are presented in stressful
unstructured settings (such as the street) in which decisionmakers must rely on personal experience
and knowledge."); L.P. Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-Related Behavioral Manifestations, 24
NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REvs. 417, 423 (2000).
Given the only small differences in decision making capacity between individuals
from mid-adolescence onward, the question arises as to why the decision making efforts
of adolescents result in substantially more risk-taking behavior than is characteristics of
adults... . [O]ne little explored possibility is that the decision making capacity of
adolescents may be more vulnerable to disruption by the stresses and stains of everyday
living than that of adults. That is, unlike adults, adolescents may exhibit considerably
poorer cognitive performance under circumstances involving everyday stress and time-
limited situations than under optimal test conditions.
Id.; Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Psychosocial
Factors in Adolescent Decision Making, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 249, 250 (1996) [hereinafter
Steinberg & Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment].
[T]he informed consent model is too narrow in scope to adequately illuminate differences
between adolescents' and adults' decision making, because it overemphasizes cognitive
functioning. (e.g., capacity for thinking, reasoning, understanding) and minimizes the
importance of noncognitive, psychosocial, [sic] variables that influence the decision-
making process (i.e., aspects of development and behavior that involve personality traits,
interpersonal relations, and affective experience).
Id. (citation omitted).
207 Ronald E. Dahl, Affect Regulation, Brain Development, and Behavioral/Emotional Health in
Adolescence, 6 CNS SPECTRUMS 60, 61 (2001) (distinguishing cold and hot cognition and arguing
that "[clold cognition refers to thinking under conditions of low emotion and/or arousal, whereas hot
cognition refers to thinking under conditions of strong feelings or high arousal. The cognitive
processes involved in hot cognition may, in fact, be much more important for understanding why
people [especially youths] make risky choices in real-life situations.").
208 See, e.g., Cauffman & Steinberg, Cognitive and Affective Influences, supra note 206, at
1780; Dahl, supra note 207, at 62 ("[D]ecision-making sequences regarding risky behavior in
adolescence cannot be fully understood without considering the role of emotions, with key aspects of
these 'decision' processes involving interactions between thinking and feeling processes."); Scott,
supra note 203, at 1645 (suggesting that youths' impulsiveness "might affect decisionmaking
competence, if impulsiveness disables the young individual from considering alternatives or
weighing and comparing consequences according to his or her subjective utility. More likely,
impulsiveness might simply affect the care with which actual decisions are made .. "); Steinberg &
Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment, supra note 206, at 259 (suggesting that "sensation seeking
increases during adolescence, leading to increased risk taking as a means of achieving excitement.
Another viewpoint posits that hormonal and physiological changes that accompany puberty result in
higher levels of impulsivity and recklessness. Finally, a third perspective emphasizes the influence of
emotion and mood on decision making.").
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policies.20 9 The MacArthur ADJJ research reports a disjunction between youths'
cognitive abilities and qualities of judgment. 210 Even though adolescents, by age
sixteen, exhibit intellectual abilities comparable with adults,21' they do not develop
the psycho-social maturity, ability to exercise self-control, and competence to
make adult-quality choices until their early-twenties.2 12 The ADJJ research
identified an "Immaturity Gap"-a disjunction between adolescents' intellectual
maturity, which reaches near-adult levels by age sixteen, and psycho-social
maturity ofjudgment that does not emerge for nearly another decade.2 13
209 See generally THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E.
Zimring eds., 2000) (analyzing culpability of juveniles and transfer to criminal court); PETER W.
GREENWOOD, DELINQUENCY PREVENTION AS CRIME-CONTROL POLICY (2006) (describing successful
intervention programs to reduce delinquency); THOMAS GRISSO, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: ADOLESCENT
OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL DISORDERS (2004) (examining the extent of mental disorders among
delinquent populations and its implications for competency, court processing, and dispositions);
THOMAS GRisso & ROBERT G. SCHWARTZ, YOUTH ON TRIAL (2000) (analyzing adjudicative
competencies of adolescents and their implications for juvenile justice administration); DARNELL F.
HAWKINS & KIMBERLY KEMPF-LEONARD, OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN (2005) (examining racial
disparities in juvenile justice administration); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AN AMERICAN TRAVESTY:
LEGAL RESPONSES TO ADOLESCENT SEXUAL OFFENDING (2004) (describing irrationality of criminal
justice policies that treat adult and adolescent sexual offenses the same); MACARTHUR FOUNDATION
RESEARCH NETWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT & JUVENILE JUSTICE, available at http:www.ad
jj.org/downloads/552network-overview.pdf.
210 MACARTHUR FOUNDATION RESEARCH NETWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT &
JUVENILE JUSTICE 27, available at http://www.adjj.org/downloads/3030PPT-%20Adolescent%2ODev
elopment%20and%20Criminal%20Blameworthiness.pdf (reporting inconsistency between cognitive
ability and mature judgment: "By age 16, individuals show adult levels of performance on tasks of
basic information processing and logical reasoning. Yet in the real world, adolescents show poorer
judgment than adults.").
211 Id. at 28 (summarizing results of graph on "Basic Intellectual Abilities Are Mature By Age
16").
212 Many developmental psychologists question the appropriateness of advocating for legal
equality based on adolescents' cognitive parity with adults to make informed medical decisions. See
William Gardner et al., Asserting Scientific Authority: Cognitive Development and Adolescent Legal
Rights, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 895, 897-98 (1989); Scott, supra note 203, at 1631-36; Elizabeth
Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 221,
224 (1995); Scott & Steinberg, supra note 195, at 813 ("Psycho-social development proceeds more
slowly than cognitive development. As a consequence, even when adolescent cognitive capacities
approximate those of adults, youthful decisionmaking may still differ due to. immature judgment.");
Kim Taylor-Thompson, States of Mind/States of Development, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 143, 152
(2003) ("[F]or all the importance of cognitive development, aspects of behavior that involve
interpersonal and affective experience may offer even more information about an adolescent's
decision-making processes."). But see Ward, supra note 204, at 446-56 (arguing that even very
young children possess sufficient rationality to act instrumentally and therefore no reasons exist to
punish them differently than adults).
213 MACARTHUR FOUNDATION RESEARCH NETWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT &





Roper attributed youths' and adolescents' diminished culpability to a "lack of
maturity and...underdeveloped sense of responsibility... [that] often result in
impetuous and ill considered actions and decisions. 2 1 4 Focusing on maturity of
judgment, rather than simple cognitive ability, provides a more appropriate
framework through which to assess adolescents' culpability.21 5 Youths' immature
judgment occurs across several domains-perceptions of risk, appreciation of
future consequences, capacity for self-management, and ability to make
autonomous choices-and distinguishes them from adults.21 6 Youths differ in
214 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
215 See Cauffman & Steinberg, Cognitive and Affective Influences, supra note 206, at 1765;
Scott et al., supra note 212, at 227; Scott & Grisso, supra note 199, at 157 (arguing that psycho-
social factors affecting adolescents' decisions to engage in crime include "peer influence, temporal
perspective (a tendency to focus on short-term versus long-term consequences), and risk perception
and preference. . . . We designate these psychosocial influences as 'judgment' factors, and argue that
immature judgment in adolescence may contribute to choices about involvement in crime.");
Steinberg & Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment, supra note 206, at 252; Steinberg & Cauffman, supra
note 199, at 407-08 (explaining that the quality of adolescent decision-making subsumes three
categories of psycho-social factors: "responsibility (the capacity to make a decision in an
independent, self-reliant fashion), perspective (the capacity to place a decision within a broader
temporal and interpersonal context), and temperance (the capacity to exercise self-restraint and
control one's impulses).").
216 See, e.g., Morse, supra note 205, at 53 (describing characteristics of youth that distinguish
their decision-making capabilities from those of adults); Scott et al., supra note 212, at 229-35
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breadth of experience, short-term versus long-term time perspective, attitude
toward risk, impulsivity, and vulnerability to peer influence reflect normal
developmental processes that make the quality of their choices less
blameworthy. 17
1. Immature Judgment, Risk, and Impulsivity
A person must be able to think ahead, delay gratification, and restrain
impulses in order to exercise self-control. Young people act more impulsively, fail
adequately to calculate long-term consequences, and engage in risky behavior
more commonly than do adults.2a 8 For example, when adolescents and adults
confront problems, the amount of time they required to solve simple problems did
not differ, but increased with age as they ponder solutions to complex problems.21 9
The ADJJ research measured juveniles' ability to plan, delay gratification, process
risks, and exercise self-control and when they . acquired adult-level
(describing psycho-social and developmental factors that contribute to juveniles' immature
judgment); Steinberg & Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment, supra note 206, at 252 (emphasizing
temperance, perspective and judgment as ways in which adolescents' thinking diverges from adults);
Taylor-Thompson, supra note 212, at 144.
[A]dolescents think differently than mature adults. Adolescents may, for example,
perceive and calculate the probability of risk differently than adults do, or be less aware
of-and less alert to-information. In any event, adolescents use what information they
have less effectively in making choices: They fixate on an initial possibility in the
decision-making process and fail to adjust as new information becomes available.
Id.; Scott & Steinberg, supra note 195, at 813.
Even when adolescent cognitive capacities approximate those of adults, youthful
decisionmaking may still differ due to immature judgment. The psycho-social factors
most relevant to differences in judgment include: (a) peer orientation, (b) attitudes toward
and perception of risk, (c ) temporal perspectives, and (d) capacity for self-management.
While cognitive capacities shape the process of decisionmaking, immature judgment can
affect outcomes because these developmental factors influence adolescent values and
preferences that drive the cost-benefit calculus in the making of choices.
Id.
217 See Scott, supra note 212, at 1610; Scott & Grisso, supra note 199, at 160-61 (noting that
psycho-social developmental factors affecting judgment and criminal responsibility in adolescents
include "(1) conformity and compliance in relation to peers, (2) attitude toward and perception of
risk, and (3) temporal pdrspective"); Scott et al., supra note 212, at 227 (proposing "judgment"
framework to evaluate quality of adolescent decisionmaking that includes not only cognitive
capacity, but also the influence of factors such as "conformity and compliance in relation to peers and
parents, attitude toward and perception of risk, and temporal perspective"); Scott & Steinberg, supra
note 195, at 813; Steinberg & Cauffian, Maturity of Judgment, supra note 206, at 258-62.
218 See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 195, at 814 ("Future orientation, the capacity and
inclination to project events into the future, may also influence judgment, since it will affect the
extent to which individuals consider the long-term consequences of their actions in making choices.
Over an extended period between childhood and young adulthood, individuals become more future-
oriented.").
219 MACARTHUR FOUNDATION RESEARCH NETWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT AND




220competencies. It reported that juveniles fifteen years of age and younger were
more impulsive than older adolescents, but even youths sixteen and seventeen
years of age fell far short of adult self-control.22'
To calculate risk, one must identify possible outcomes, evaluate the positive
or negative consequences of each option, estimate their likelihood, and make a
choice to optimize outcomes.222 Compared with adults, adolescents underestimate
the magnitude or probability of risks, use a shorter time-frame, and focus more on
potential gains rather than losses.223 The higher prevalence of accidents, suicides,
and homicides reflect youths' greater involvement in risky behavior.224 By virtue
of youth and inexperience, adolescents simply may possess less information225 or
220 See generally id.
221 Id. at 15 (reporting results from graph "Impulsivity Declines With Age").
222 See generally GRISSO, supra note 209, at 241 ("We need to examine the extent to which
midadolescents typically might not yet have achieved adultlike ways of framing problems... and
generating alternative responses to stressful situations or weighing the potential consequences of their
alternatives."); Lita Furby & Ruth Beyth-Marom, Risk Taking in Adolescence: A Decision-Making
Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 1, 3-4 (1992).
223 Lita Furby and Ruth Beyth-Marom speculate that "adolescents [may] judge some negative
consequences in the distant future to be of lower probability than do adults or to be of less importance
than adults do." Furby & Beyth-Marom, supra note 222, at 19; see also GRISSO, supra note 209, at
161 ("[A]dolescents on average may differ from adults in the weights that they give to potential
positive and negative outcomes... [and] are more likely than adults to give greater weight to
anticipated gains than to possible losses or negative risks."); Scott, supra note 212, at 305-06
("[Aldolescents, for developmental reasons, could differ from adults in the subjective value that is
assigned to perceived consequences... [and] may weigh costs and benefits differently, sometimes
even viewing as a benefit what adults would consider to be a cost."); Spear, supra note 206, at 446
("In terms of their expectations for'future rewards, adolescents (12-18 years of age) are less
optimistically biased when compared with either college students or adults (18-65 years of age).").
224 See William Gardner, A Life-Span Rational-Choice Theory of Risk Taking, in ADOLESCENT
RISK TAKING 66, 67 (Nancy J. Bell & Robert W. Bell eds., 1993). Teenagers' greater proclivity to
engage in unprotected sex and to speed and drive recklessly reflect various forms of risk taking with
respect to health and safety. See Scott et al., supra note 212, at 230; Spear, supra note 206, at 421
("[W]ith half or more of adolescents exhibiting drunk driving, sex without contraception, use of
illegal drugs, and minor criminal activities, 'reckless behavior becomes virtually a normative
characteristic of adolescent development."') (citations omitted).
Criminal behavior is a particularly risky form of behavior, and every theory of crime attempts
to account for its greater prevalence during adolescence. See, e.g., MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON &
TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME 123-44 (1990); John H. Laub & Robert J. Sampson,
Understanding Desistance from Crime, 28 CRIME & JUST. 1, 38-48 (2001) (summarizing
criminological research reporting peak of criminal involvement in mid-to-late adolescence with sharp
desistance thereafter and attributing youthful involvement to normal developmental transition to
adulthood); Scott, supra note 212, at 300-01 ("Many adolescents become involved in criminal
activity in their teens and desist by the time they reach young adulthood... leading criminologists to
conclude that participation in delinquency is 'a normal part of teen life.' For most adolescent
delinquents, desistance from antisocial behavior also seems to be a predictable part of the maturation
process.").
225 See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) ("Inexperience, less education, and
less intelligence make the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct while
at the same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure than is
an adult."); Scott, supra note 212, at 304 ("Adolescents, perhaps because they have less knowledge
and experience, are. less aware of risks than are adults." (citation omitted)); id. at 305 ("[T]he fact that
adolescents have less experience and knowledge than adults seems likely to affect their decision
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they may consider fewer alternatives than adults when they make decisions.2 6 The
ADJJ research reported that perceptions of risks decline during mid-adolescence
and then gradually increase into adulthood and that sixteen and seventeen year old
youths perceive fewer risks than do either their younger or older counterparts.
227
Similarly, future orientation increases gradually with age into the early twenties
and mid-adolescents are the most "present-oriented" of any age group. 228 The
widest gap between preference for risk and perception of risk occurs during mid-
adolescence. Youths engage in risky behavior because they seek novel sensations,
excitement, and an "adrenaline rush., 229 Adolescents' preference for risk2 30 and
sensation-seeking 231 peaks at sixteen and seventeen-years of age and then sharply
declines with adulthood.
Even when adolescents have the same information as adults, they may weigh
costs and benefits differently or assign different subjective values to consequences
in ways that skew the quality of their choices.232 An ADJJ study of ability to delay
making in tangible and intangible ways."); Taylor-Thompson, supra note 212, at 153 (arguing that
adolescents approach risky decisions differently than adults because of youths "being unaware of
risks that adults typically perceive, having incorrect information about risks, or calculating the
probability or magnitude of the risk in ways that adults would not");
226 See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 212, at 153 ("In situations where adults will likely
perceive and weigh multiple alternatives as part of rational decision-making, adolescents typically see
only one option. This inflexible 'either-or-mentality' becomes especially acute under stressful
conditions.").
227 MACARTHUR FOUNDATION RESEARCH NETWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT AND
JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 210, at 22 (summarizing results of graph on "Risk Perception Declines
and Then Increases After Mid-Adolescence").228 id.
229 See Grisso, supra note 209, at 163 (arguing that adolescents are "more willing to take
physical and social risks for the sake of experiencing novel and complex sensations."); Spear, supra
note 206, at 422.
Individuals engaging in' risk taking may do so to attain the positive arousal
produced by the sensations of novelty, complexity, change or intensity of experience....
Perceived risks of risk taking decline with age during adolescence, so it is possible that
the level of risk taking necessary to attain an 'adrenaline rush' of danger may rise as well,
perhaps leading to an escalation of risk-taking behaviors in certain individuals,
particularly those with poor prospects for attaining other reinforcers.
Id.; Taylor-Thompson, supra note 212, at 153 (arguing that sensation-seeking activity increases for
youths between sixteen and nineteen years of age).
230 MACARTHUR FOUNDATION RESEARCH NETWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT AND
JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 210, at 17 (summarizing results of graph depicting "Preference for Risk
Peaks in Mid-Adolescence").
231 Id. at 16 (summarizing graph reporting that "Sensation-Seeking Declines With Age").
232 See also Scott, supra note 212, at 1645-47 (discussing how youths' perceptions of and
preferences for risk differ from those of adults). Rational choice theory helps to explain adolescents'
greater propensity for risk-taking. People make utility-maximizing choices within a context of
constraints, and people at different stages of their lives assign different valuations to uncertain future
events. Knowledge about one's self, social environment, and life-course trajectory increase with age
and affect a person's short-term versus long-term calculus. Youths' "focus on the immediate rather
than the long-term consequences of a decision is a rational response to uncertainty about the future."
Gardner, supra note 224, at 77. As a result, young people may discount the negative value of future
consequences because they have more difficulty than adults in integrating a future consequence into
their more limited experiential baseline. Thus, adolescents may discount the cost of longer-term
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gratification gave subjects the option to receive $1,000 in one year or a discounted
sum the next day. Adolescents more often opted for an immediate, but much
smaller payout, whereas adults delayed gratification and only chose an immediate
reward if it was discounted slightly.233 The subjective values youth assign to risks
and outcomes and the consequences of not engaging in risky behaviors
consequences may produce different choices than adults make.234 Youths' feelings
of "invulnerability" and "immortality" may also contribute to risk-taking.235
2. Peer Group and Community Influences
Roper ascribed juveniles' diminished responsibility, in part, to adolescents' greater
susceptibility than adults to negative peer group influences. 6 Adolescents commit
their crimes in groups to a greater extent than do adults and group-offending
increases the risks of accessorial criminal liability for normally law-abiding
youths.2 37 Adolescents' inclination to take risks and their susceptibility to peer
future consequences and weigh shorter-term benefits more heavily than adults. See William Gardner
& Janna Herman, Adolescents' AIDS Risk Taking: A Rational Choice Perspective, in ADOLESCENTS
AND THE AIDS EPIDEMIC 17, 17-19 (William Gardner et al. eds., 1990); Taylor-Thompson, supra
note 212, at 154 ("Adolescents, more than adults, tend to discount the future and to afford greater
weight to short-term consequences of decisions.").
233 MACARTHUR FOUNDATION RESEARCH NETWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT AND
JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 210, at 21 (summarizing results of graph "Older Individuals Are More
Willing to Delay Gratification.").
234 See Scott & Grisso, supra note 199, at 163; Scott & Steinberg, supra note 195, at 815
("[A]dolescents are less risk-averse than adults, generally weighing rewards more heavily than risks
in making choices. In part, this may be due to limits on youthful time perspective; taking risks is
more costly for those who focus on the future."); Taylor-Thompson, supra note 212, at 153
("[A]dolescents experience greater concem-and anxiety-over the consequences of refusing to
engage in risky conduct than adults do, thanks to greater fear of being socially ostracized.").
235 See Lawrence D. Cohn et al., Risk-Perception: Differences Between Adolescents and Adults,
14 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 217, 221 (1995) (arguing that adolescents engage in "health-threatening
activities" because they "do not regard [such] behavior as extremely risky or unsafe," rather than
because of "unique feelings of invulnerability"); Furby & Beyth-Marom, supra note 222, at 19-21.
236 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005) (noting adolescent susceptibility to
negative peer influences). Scott, supra note 212, at 1643-44 (describing adolescent responsiveness to
peer influences); Scott & Steinberg, supra note 195, at 813 ("[T]eens are more responsive to peer
influence than are adults. Susceptibility to peer influence increases between childhood and early
adolescence as adolescehts begin to individuate from parental control. This susceptibility peaks
around age fourteen and declines slowly during the high-school years."); Steinberg & Cauffinan,
Maturity ofJudgment, supra note 206, at 253-54.
237 See, e.g., FRANICIS ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE 152 (1998) ("Accessorial liability
can interact with the vulnerability of adolescents to group pressure to create very marginal conditions
for extensive criminal sanctions."). Youths adjust their behavior and attitudes to conform to those of
their contemporaries to garner greater acceptance and approval. See Scott & Grisso, supra note 199,
at 162 ("Peer influence seems to operate through two means: social comparison and conformity.
Through social comparison, adolescents measure their own behavior by comparing it to others. Social
conformity... influences adolescents to adapt their behavior and attitudes to that [sic] of their
peers."); Scott et al., supra note 212, at 230; Taylor-Thompson, supra note 212, at 153-54 ("The
choice to engage in antisocial conduct is often linked to the adolescent's desire for peer approval.
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influences interact and produce riskier behavior when youths are in groups than
they would engage in alone.238 Subcultural norms in some urban areas locales
expose minority youths to much more powerful pressures to engage in criminal
activity than most youths confront.2 39 Adolescents' ability to resist negative peer
influences emerges gradually and does not approach adult-levels until the late-
teens and early-twenties.240 While succumbing to peer pressure does not excuse
criminal liability, youths who fail to resist are not as responsible for their behavior
as we expect adults to be.24'
Prodding by peers can substitute for, and even overwhelm, an adolescent's own 'better' judgment
about whether to engage in certain conduct.").
Police arrest a larger proportion of two or more juveniles for involvement in a single criminal
event than they do adults. See, e.g., SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 97, at 77 (showing percentages
of various crimes committed by juveniles that were committed in groups from 1973 to 1997);
Franklin E. Zimring, Kids, Groups and Crime: Some Implications of a Well-Known Secret, 72 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 867, 870 tbl.1 (1981) (noting that 64% of robberies committed by people
under age twenty-one were committed in groups while only 39% of robberies committed by people
twenty-one and older were committed in groups); see also id. at 867 (arguing that young people
"commit crimes, as they live their lives, in groups.").
238 See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 195, at 815 ("[A] synergy likely exists between
adolescent peer orientation and risk-taking; considerable evidence indicates that people generally
make riskier decisions in groups than they do alone."); Zimring, supra note 195, at 282 ("That social
settings account for the majority of all youth crime suggests that the capacity to deflect or resist peer
pressure is a crucially necessary dimension of being law-abiding in adolescence.... Kids who do not
know how to deal with such pressure lack effective control of the situations that place them most at
risk of crime in their teens.").
239 See, e.g., Elijah Anderson, The Social Ecology of Youth Violence, 24 CRIME & JUST. 65, 82-
85 (1998) (describing the "code of the street" that requires youths to respond violently to disrespect,
or suffer loss of face); Jeffrey Fagan, Context and Culpability of Adolescent Crime, 6 VA. J. Soc.
POL'Y & L. 507, 537-40 (1999) [hereinafter Fagan, Context and Culpability]; Jeffrey Fagan, Contexts
of Choice by Adolescents in Criminal Events, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE
ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 371, 374 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) [hereinafter Fagan,
Choices by Adolescents] (using a social context framework "to show how the unique demands of
adolescence interact with social contexts to motivate decisions to engage in crime and violence");
Jeffrey Fagan & Deanna Wilkinson, Guns, Youth Violence and Social Identity, 24 CRIME & JUST.
105, 124 (1998) ("Violence 'scripts,' developed in a neighborhood context that values toughness and
displays of violence,. . . may limit the behavioral and strategic options for resolving disputes...").
See generally ELIJAH ANDERSON, STREETWISE (1990) (describing subcultural norms sustaining
violence).
240 MACARTHUR FOUNDATION RESEARCH NETWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT &
JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 210, at 25 (summarizing results of graph on "With Age, Individuals
Become More Resistant to Peer Influence."); Ziming, supra note 195, at 280 ("A teen may know
right from wrong and may even have developed the capacity to control his or her impulses while
alone, but resisting temptation while alone is a different task than resisting the pressure to commit an
offense when adolescent peers are pushing for misbehavior and waiting to see whether or not the
outcome they desire will occur.").
241 See, e.g., Zimring, supra note 195, at 282 ("But if social experience in matters such as anger
and impulse-management also counts, and a fair opportunity to learn to deal with peer pressures is
regarded as important, expecting the experienced-based ability to resist impulses and peers to be fully
formed prior to age eighteen or nineteen would seem on present evidence to be wishful thinking.").
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Children depend on their families, schools, and communities to learn positive
behavior and to develop the ability to exercise self-control.242 Successful
development is socially constructed and the communities in which children live
affect their life chances and their risks of criminal involvement. 243 Community
structure affects youths' opportunities to learn and practice responsible behavior
244
and contributes to higher crime rates in impoverished urban centers. 245 Unlike
adults, juveniles' dependency on their family prevents them from escaping
246criminogenic environments.
In summary, Roper correctly identified the characteristics of adolescents that
impair their judgment, reduce their culpability, and diminish their criminal
responsibility. Youths are more impulsive and seek novel and exciting experiences.
They are short-sighted and prefer immediate rewards to delayed gratification. They
misperceive and miscalculate risks and discount the likelihood of adverse
consequences. They are more vulnerable and susceptible to negative peer and
environmental influences. Although adolescents' cognitive abilities compare
242 See Arenella, supra note 199, at 82 (emphasizing that children depend on others to develop
and exercise their moral capacities and that "[t]he capacities of critical self-reflection and self-
revision are not simply some individual properties that some individuals have the moral luck to
possess. Their acquisition and development depend on an interpersonal process between the agent
and other human beings. The ability to control one's character is a process that often requires some
form of socially created transformational opportunity being made available to an individual who has
the capacity to take advantage of it."); David E. Arredondo, Child Development, Children's Mental
Health and the Juvenile Justice System: Principles for Effective Decision-Making, 14 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 13, 16-17 (2003) (arguing that children require attention as part of normal brain
development and that if they become attention-deprived, they will engage in both positive and
negative behaviors to satisfy their needs).
243 See, e.g., Fagan, Choices by Adolescents, supra note 239, at 376-77 (noting that social
context contributes to adolescents' violent behavior); Fagan, Context and Culpability, supra note 239,
at 535-39 (suggesting that criminogenic social context contributes to young gang members' criminal
behavior); Deanna L. Wilkinson & Jeffrey Fagan, The Role of Firearms in Violence "Scripts": The
Dynamics of Gun Events Among Adolescent Males, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 63-66 (1996)
(describing how peer interactions create "scripts" that prescribe how youths should respond to
disrespect and that lead to violent confrontations).
244 See Arredondo, supra note 242, at 16 (arguing that delinquent youths typically come from
chaotic homes and unresponsive neighborhoods and that as a result "he has not had the necessary
developmental opportunity of internalizing [lessons learned from] consistently benevolent, reliable,
and fair adult authority figures").
245 See ROBERT J. BURSIK, JR. & HAROLD G. GRASMICK, NEIGHBORHOODS AND CRIME 29-59
(1993) ("[L]ow levels of systemic control increase the likelihood of crime, high levels of crime
decrease the effectiveness of systemic control, and the entire process spirals onward"); Cook & Laub,
supra note 97, at 51, 53-58 (1998) (attributing increase in adolescent homicide rates to increased gun
use associated with crack cocaine industry in urban, inner-city neighborhoods).
246 See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 195, at 818.
[A]dolescents are subject to legal and practical restrictions on their ability to escape these
criminogenic settings. Financially dependent on their parents or guardians and subject to
their legal authority, adolescents cannot escape their homes, schools, and
neighborhoods. .. . Because adolescents lack legal and practical autonomy, they are in a
real sense trapped in whatever social setting they occupy and are more restricted in their
capacity to avoid coercive criminogenic influences than are adults.
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favorably with adults', they do not develop mature judgment and self-control until
early adulthood.
3. Neuroscience, the Adolescent Brain, and Impulse Control
Neuroscience research suggests that the differences in thinking and behavior
between adolescents and adults reflect basic biological differences in brain
development and neuro-physiological maturation.247 The human brain does not
achieve physiological maturity until the early twenties. 248 As a result, adolescents
simply do not have the same biological ability as adults to make mature decisions,
to regulate emotions, or to control impulsive behavior.249 In short, the problem is
one of hardware, as well as software.
The prefrontal cortex (PFC) of the frontal lobe of the brain functions as the
"chief executive officer" and controls most advanced cerebral functions.25°
247 See NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, TEENAGE BRAIN: A WORK IN PROGRESS 2 (2001),
available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/publicat/teen-brain.cfm; Tomd§ Paus et al., Structural
Maturation of Neural Pathways in Children and Adolescents: In Vivo Study, 283 SCIENCE 1908, 1908
(1999); Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., In Vivo Evidence for Post-Adolescent Brain Maturation in Frontal
and Striatal Regions, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 859, 859 (1999) [hereinafter Sowell et al., In Vivo
Evidence]; Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., Mapping Continued Brain Growth and Gray Matter Density
Reduction in Dorsal Frontal Cortex: Inverse Relationships During Postadolescent Brain Maturation,
21 J. NEUROSCIENCE. 8819, 8819 (2001) [hereinafter Sowell et al., Mapping Continued Brain
Growth] (discussing significant changes in brain structure prior to adulthood); Spear, supra note 206,
at 438 ("[T]he adolescent brain is a brain in flux, undergoing numerous regressive and progressive
changes in mesocorticolimbic regions.").
248 Scott & Steinberg, supra note 195, at 816 summarizes some of the preliminary research on
brain development and its implications for adolescent self-control.
[R]egions of the brain implicated in processes of long-term planning, regulation of
emotion, impulse control, and the evaluation of risk and reward continue to mature over the
course of adolescence, and perhaps well into young adulthood. At puberty, changes in the
limbic system-a part of the brain that is central in the processing and regulation of
emotion-may stimulate adolescents to seek higher levels of novelty and to take more
risks; these changes also may contribute to increased emotionality and vulnerability to
stress. At the same time, patterns of development in the prefrontal cortex, which is active
during the performance of complicated tasks involving planning and decisionmaking,
suggest that these higher-order cognitive capacities may be immature well into middle
adolescence.
Id.; see also Dahl, supra note 207, at 69 ("Regions in the PFC [prefrontal cortex] that underpin higher
cognitive-executive functions mature slowly, showing functional changes that continue well into late
adolescence/adulthood.").
249 See Dahl, supra note 207, at 60 (arguing that affect regulation relates to the control of
feelings and behavior and "involves some inhibition, delay, or intentional change of emotional
expression or behavior to conform with learned social rules, to meet long-term goals, or to avoid
future negative consequences."); Staci A. Gruber & Deborah A. Yurgelun-Todd, Neurobiology and
the Law: A Role in Juvenile Justice?, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 321, 330 (2006) ("An adolescent's level
of cortical development may therefore be directly related to her or his ability to perform well in
situations requiring executive cognitive skills. Younger, less cortically mature adolescents may be
more at risk for engaging in impulsive behavior than their older peers...").
250 PRINCIPLES OF NEURAL SCIENCE 9 (Eric R. Kandel et al. eds., 4th ed. 2000) (describing
specialized functions of lobes of the brain and reporting that "[t]he frontal lobe is largely concerned
with planning future action and with the control of movement"); Sowell et al., Mapping Continued
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Executive functions include impulse control, reasoning, abstract thinking,
imagining, planning behavior, and anticipating consequences. 251 The brain
transmits electrochemical impulses, and myelin252-a white, fatty sheath-
functions like the insulation of a wire to increase the speed of electro-
conductivity.253 In early childhood, the portions of the brain associated with
Brain Growth, supra note 247, at 8819 (mapping the distribution of cortical gray matter in post-
adolescents and reporting "an inverse relationship between cortical gray matter density reduction and
brain growth primarily in the superior frontal regions that control executive cognitive functioning.");
Gruber & Yurgelun-Todd, supra note 249, at 323 ("[T]he frontal cortex has been shown to play a
major role in the performance of executive functions including short term or working memory, motor
set and planning, attention, inhibitory control and decision making."); Frontline: Inside the Teenage
Brain (PBS television broadcast 2002), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
teenbrain/interviews/giedd.html ("The frontal lobe is often called the CEO, or the executive of the
brain. It's involved in things like planning and strategizing and organizing, initiating attention and
stopping and starting and shifting attention.").
251 See Sarah Spinks, Frontline: Inside the Teenage Brain, Adolescent Brains Are Works in
Progress (PBS television broadcast 2000), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/sho
s/teenbrain/work/adolescent.html ("The prefrontal cortex sits just behind the forehead. It is
particularly interesting to scientists because it acts as the CEO of the brain, controlling planning,
working memory, organization, and modulating mood. As the prefrontal cortex matures, teenagers
can reason better, develop more control over impulses and make judgments better. In fact, this part of
the brain has been dubbed 'the area of sober second thought."').
252 A process of myelination occurs in which the myelin, a fatty white substance, forms a sheath
that surrounds and insulates the axons of certain neurons, gives it a white appearance, and allows for
more rapid and efficient neurotransmission. The organic changes in brain maturation and function
during adolescence include a density reduction in the gray matter and an increase in myelination and
brain growth in the frontal cortex. See NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 247, at 2 ("Unlike
gray matter, the brain's white matter-wire-like fibers that establish neurons' long-distance
connections between brain regions-thickens progressively from birth in humans. A layer of
insulation called myelin progressively envelops these nerve fibers, making them more efficient, just
like insulation on electric wires improves their conductivity."); Sowell et al., Mapping Continued
Brain Growth, supra note 247, at 8826 ("The strong correspondence in the age effects for gray matter
density reduction and increased brain growth in frontal cortex may provide new insight for making
inferences about the cellular processes contributing to postadolescent brain maturation. Regressive
(i.e., synaptic pruning) and progressive (i.e. myelination) cellular events are known to occur
simultaneously in the brain during childhood, adolescence, and young adulthood ... ").
253 See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF NEURAL SCIENCE, supra note 250, at 18-34; Paus et al., supra note
247, at 1908.
Structural maturation of individual brain regions and their connecting pathways is a
condition sine qua non for the successful development of cognitive, motor, and sensory
functions. The smooth flow of neural impulses throughout the brain allows for
information to be integrated across the many spatially segregated brain regions involved
in these functions. The speed of neural transmission depends not only on the synapse, but
also on structural properties of the connecting fibers, including the axon diameter and the
thickness of the insulating myelin sheath.
Id.; Gruber & Yurgelun-Todd, supra note 249, at 325.
The significant correlation between white matter volume and processing speed are
consistent with evidence suggesting that increased myelination of axons produces faster
conduction velocity of neural signals and more efficient processing of information, and
further suggest that some of the increased cognitive abilities characteristic of adult
maturation may be associated with developmental increases in relative white matter
volume.
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perception-the occipital and parietal lobes-myelinate first to transmit sensory
information more efficiently.254 During adolescence, further myelination of the
PFC improves cognitive function, reasoning ability, and the rapidity of brain
activity.255 Myelination proceeds approximately from the back of the brain to the
front and neurobiological maturity does not occur before the late-teens or early-
twenties. 256 Thus, adolescents do not have the same biological ability as adults to
process information quickly, to control behavior, and to suppress impulses.
The part of the brain called the amygdala-the lymbic system located at the
base of the brain-controls instinctual behavior or "gut reactions," such as the
254 See NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 247, at 1; PRINCIPLES OF NEURAL SCIENCE,
supra note 250, at 349-66 (describing location and functional specialization of sensory, motor, and
cognitive capabilities in the brain); Jay N. Giedd et al., Brain Development During Childhood and
Adolescence: A Longitudinal MRI Study, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 861, 862 (1999) ("[C]hanges in
primary visual and auditory cortex occur[] before those in frontal cortex").
255 See PRINCIPLES OF NEURAL SCIENCE, supra note 250, at 147-48 (describing the role of
myclination of axons in speeding conduction velocity and noting that "conduction in myclinated
axons is typically faster than in nonmyelinated axons of the same diameter"); Paus et al., supra note
247, at 1908 ("[S]peed of neural transmission depends... on structural properties of the connecting
fibers, including.., the thickness of the insulating myelin sheath."); Sowell et al., Mapping
Continued Brain Growth, supra note 247, at 8828.
[I]t is likely that the visuospatial functions typically associated with parietal lobes are
operating at a more mature level earlier than the executive functions typically associated
with frontal brain regions. The new findings described here may suggest that cortical
thinning or reduction in gray matter density is first accompanied by growth (as seen in
the frontal lobes in the postadolescent years) and later by brain shrinkage as the
regressive changes overtake the progressive changes (as seen earlier on in the parietal
lobes). Perhaps gray matter density reduction associated with growth (presumably
increased myelination) is associated with different aspects of improved cognitive
functioning than the cortical thinning associated with brain surface contraction
(presumably synaptic pruning). It may not be unreasonable to hypothesize that improved
accuracy (i.e., improved cognitive task performance) may result from regressive changes
such as synaptic pruning, given that unused or less efficient synaptic connections are
being pruned away during this age range. On the other hand, increased efficiency (i.e.,
reduced reaction times) might result from increased myelination observed as brain
growth, given that myelinated fibers improve the conduction speed of electrical impulses
between various brain regions.
Id.
256 See NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 247, at 2 (noting that MRI image analyses
of brain development "suggest[] a wave of brain white matter development that flows from front to
back, [while] animal, functional brain imaging and postmortem studies have suggested that gray
matter maturation flows in the opposite direction, with the frontal lobes not fully maturing until
young adulthood"); Adolf Pfefferbaum et al., A Quantitative Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study of
Changes in Brain Morphology from Infancy to Late Adulthood, 511 ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY 874,
884-85 (1994) (reporting steady rise in myelination from birth to about twenty years of age); Sowell
et al., In Vivo Evidence, supra note 247, at 859.
Post-mortem studies show that myelination, a cellular maturational event, begins near the
end of the second trimester of fetal development and extends well into the third decade of
life and beyond. Such autopsy studies reveal a temporally and spatially systematic
sequence of myelination, progressing from inferior to superior and from posterior to
anterior; that is brain stem and cerebellar regions myelinate before cerebral hemispheres,
and frontal lobes myelinate last.
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"fight or flight" response. 2 7 Teenagers rely more heavily on the amygdala and less
heavily on the prefrontal cortex than do adults when they respond to stressful
stimuli. 258 Many adolescents' reckless or impulsive behavior reflects more
instinctual, "gut reactions" reactions to fear-evoking stimuli than their "rational"
thought processes.259 Youths simply do not have all the neural hardware necessary
to make adult-quality decisions or to exhibit adult-like behavior.260 Novel
situations and emotional arousal especially challenge adolescents' ability to
exercise judgment and self-control and contribute to short-sighted, impulsive
decisions and risky behavior. In short, the neuroscience of the brain provides a
"hard-science" explanation for the "soft-science" observations that social scientists
have made for generations about adolescents' behavior. 61
C. Adolescent Culpability and Life without Parole (L WOP) Sentences
Roper categorically barred the death penalty for juveniles because of their
diminished responsibility. However, Roper's rationale of reduced culpability has
much broader applicability for sentencing youths. The reduced criminal
responsibility of adolescents is equally diminished when states sentence juveniles
to Life Without Parole (LWOP) and the functional equivalents of "virtual life."
Although the Supreme Court's capital punishment jurisprudence insists that "death
257 See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF NEURAL SCIENCE supra note 250, at 986-93 (describing role of
amygdala in mediating between emotions and cognition).
258 See NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 247, at 2 (noting that processing of
emotions shifted from the amygdala to the frontal lobe over the course of the teenage years and that
"areas of the frontal lobe showed the largest differences between young adults and teens. This
increased myelination in the adult frontal cortex likely relates to the maturation of cognitive
processing and other 'executive' functions."); Abigail A. Baird et al., Functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging of Facial Affect Recognition in Children and Adolescents, 38 J. AM. ACAD.
CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 195, 198 (1999).
259 See Arredondo, supra note 242, at 15 ("Adolescents tend to process emotionally charged
decisions in the limbic system, the part of the brain charged with instinctive (and often impulsive)
reactions. Most adults use more of their frontal cortex, the part of the brain responsible for reasoned
and thoughtful responses. This is one reason why adolescents tend to be more intensely emotional,
impulsive, and wiling to take risks than their adult counterparts." (footnote omitted)); Dahl, supra
note 207, at 64.
These affective influences are relevant... to many day-to-day 'decisions' that are
made at the level of gut feelings about what to do in a particular situation (rather than any
conscious computation of probabilities and risk value). These gut feelings appear to be
the products of affective systems in the brain that are performing computations that are
largely outside conscious awareness (except for the feelings they evoke).
Id. 260 See Spear, supra note 206, at 447 ("To the extent that transformations occurring in
adolescent brain contribute to the characteristic behavioral predispositions of adolescence, adolescent
behavior is in part biologically determined.").
261 But see Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A
Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397, 405-06 (2006) (arguing that the simple fact of neuron-
anatomical differences between adolescent and adult brains does not compel differences in how the
law responds to them); Ward, supra note 204, at 460-65 (arguing that neurobiological explanations
for adolescent behavior do not provide a basis for punishing them differently than adults).
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is different, '2 62 no principled bases exist by which to distinguish the diminished
responsibility that bars the death penalty from adolescents equally reduced
culpability that warrants shorter sentences for all serious crimes. 263
Lionel Tate graphically illustrates the hazards of disproportionate sentences
when states try young offenders in criminal court. A grand jury indicted twelve-
year-old Tate for first-degree murder for brutal injuries he inflicted on a six-year-
old girl.2 4 Once Tate was indicted for a capital crime, Florida law required the
state to prosecute him as an adult.265 Moreover Florida, like several other states,
barred Tate from asserting the common law infancy defense.266 After conviction of
first-degree murder, Florida law required the judge to impose a mandatory
sentence of life without parole.267 Although the Court of Appeals subsequently
reversed his conviction because he was not competent to stand trial,268 it rejected
his argument that imposing a mandatory LWOP sentence on a twelve-year-old
child was disproportionate or "cruel and unusual punishment. 269
For decades, the Court has vacillated about whether the Eighth Amendment
contains a "narrow proportionality principle" that "applies to non-capital
262 See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991) ("Proportionality review is one of
several respects in which we have held that 'death is different,' and have imposed protections that the
Constitution nowhere else provides."); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982); Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
263 Professor Zimring argues that:
[d]octrines of diminished responsibility have their greatest impact when large
injuries have been caused by actors not fully capable of understanding and self-control.
The visible importance of diminished responsibility in these cases arises because the
punishments provided for the fully culpable are quite severe, and the reductive impact of
mitigating punishment is correspondingly large. But if the doctrine of diminished
responsibility means anything in relation to the punishment of immature offenders, its
impact cannot be limited to trivial cases. Diminished responsibility is either generally
applicable or generally unpersuasive as a mitigating principle.
ZIMRING, supra note 237, at 84 (1998).
264 See Tate v. State, 864 So.2d 44, 47 (Fla. Ct. App. 2003).
265 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.225 (LexisNexis 2001 & 2004).
266 Tate, 864 So.2d at 53; see also Carter, supra note 11, at 688-89 (reporting that several
jurisdictions, including Florida, abrogated the common law infancy defense and required criminal
courts to sentence twelve and thirteen year old defendants as if they were thirty-five year olds).267 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.225(1) (LexisNexis 2001 &2004 Supp.); see also Tate, 864 So.2d. at
48; David S. Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin, "Owing to the Extreme Youth of the Accused": The
Changing Legal Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 641, 678-81 (2002)
(summarizing waiver procedures, rejected plea offers, and failed defense strategy that ultimately led
both the prosecutor and judge to recommend that Governor Jeb Bush commute Tate's mandatory
LWOP sentence imposed following conviction for murder as manifestly unjust for a twelve-year-
old).
261 See Tate, 864 So.2d at 48 ("[A] competency evaluation was constitutionally mandated to
determine whether Tate had sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding and whether he had a rational, as well as factual, understanding of
the proceedings against him.").
269 See id. at 54 (discussing other Florida cases affirming sentences of life without parole
imposed on defendants convicted of murder at ages thirteen and fourteen years).
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sentences. '270 Rummel v. Estelle,271 held that the Eighth Amendment does not
prevent a state from sentencing a three-time property offender to life in prison with
the possibility of parole.272 Solem v. Helms273 held that a sentence of life without
possibility of parole for a recidivist convicted of a minor property crime violated
the Eighth Amendment.274 Subsequently, in Harmelin v. Michigan275 a fractured
Court rejected a proportionality challenge and upheld a sentence of life without
parole for a first-time drug offender.276
Justice Kennedy's Harmelin concurrence asserted that "[t]he Eighth
Amendment proportionality principle also applies to non-capital sentences, 277 and
provided the operative test for disproportionate sentence.278 Four factors determine
whether a penalty is "grossly disproportionate"--the primacy of legislative
judgments about penalties, the multiplicity of legitimate penal goals, the limited
federal judicial role to oversee state criminal sentences, and the importance of
objective factors to inform proportionality review. 279 The Court applied those
270 See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996-97 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment).
271 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
272 See id. at 284-85 (approving Rummel's sentence under a recidivism statute for his third
conviction for relatively minor property crimes).
273 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
274 See id. at 303. The Court noted that the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishments "prohibits... sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed," and that the
"constitutional principle of proportionality has been recognized explicitly in this Court for almost a
century." Id. at 284, 286. Solem identified three factors that a court must consider to determine
whether a sentence is so disproportionate that it violates the Eighth Amendment: "(i) the gravity of
the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same
jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions."
Id. at 292. Despite the elements of recidivism, the distinguishing factor in Solem was the imposition
of an LWOP sentence for a minor property crime. See id. at 296-97.
275 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
276 Cf id. at 994 (Scalia., J.) (announcing opinion of the Court and arguing that proportionality
principle only limited application of death penalty but did not constitute a general feature of Eighth
Amendment analysis), with id. at 997, 1009 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (upholding sentence by finding
it proportional under an Eighth Amendment analysis). Neither Scalia's nor Kennedy's legal reasoning
was agreed to by a majority of the Court.
277 Id. at 997.
278 Id. at 1001 (arguing that the Eighth Amendment prohibits "only extreme sentences that are
'grossly disproportionate' to the crime").
279 See id. at 998-1001 (Kennedy J., concurring). According to Justice Kennedy,
[a]ll of these principles-the primacy of the legislature, the variety of legitimate
penological schemes, the nature of our federal system, and the requirement that
proportionality review be guided by objective factors-inform the final one: The Eighth
Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it
forbids only extreme sentences that are "grossly disproportionate" to the crime.
Id. at 1001.
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factors in Ewing v. California280 and upheld a sentence of twenty-five years to life
for the theft of three golf clubs under California's "three-strike" sentencing law.281
Although Roper barred the death penalty juveniles, the Court has never
addressed the constitutional question of a minimum age for imposing LWOP
sentences on children.282 As a result, lower courts consistently refuse to apply
proportionality principles to juvenile LWOP sentences.283 Although penal
proportionality requires a principled relationship between the seriousness of a
crime-harm and culpability-and the sentence imposed, courts focus exclusively
on the gravity of the crime-harm-rather than the culpability of the actor when
they conduct proportionality analyses.284 A serious crime is serious because of the
harm caused, regardless of the culpability of the actor. The Ninth Circuit court in
Harris v. Wright2 85 rejected a constitutional challenge to a mandatory LWOP
sentence imposed on a fifteen-year-old convicted of murder.286 Harris held that the
Eighth Amendment bars only grossly disproportionate sentences287 and insisted
that:
Youth has no obvious bearing on this problem: If we can discern no
clear line for adults, neither can we for youths. Accordingly, while
capital punishment is unique and must be treated specially, mandatory
life imprisonment without parole is, for young and old alike, only an
outlying point on the continuum of prison sentences. Like any other
280 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
28 See id. at 30-31 ("We hold that Ewing's sentence of 25 years to life in prison, imposed for
the offense of felony grand theft under the three strikes law, is not grossly disproportionate and
therefore does not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments.").
282 But cf Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 947 (Nev. 1989) (questioning the constitutionality
of imposing an LWOP sentence on any thirteen-year-old, but overturning sentence on more narrow
grounds).
283 See generally Logan, supra note 195, at 703-09 (reviewing cases upholding LWOP
sentences on juveniles).
284 See, for example, State v. Massey, 803 P.2d 340 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991), where the court
upheld a mandatory sentence of life without parole imposed on a thirteen-year-old juvenile convicted
of aggravated murder:
The test is whether in view of contemporary standards of elemental decency, the
punishment is of such disproportionate character to the offense as to shock the general
conscience and violate principles of fundamental fairness. That test does not embody an
element or consideration of the defendant's age, only a balance between the crime and
the sentence imposed. Therefore, there is no cause to create a distinction between a
juvenile and an adult who are sentenced to life without parole for first degree aggravated
murder.
Id. at 348 (citation omitted); see also State v. Stinnett, 497 S.E.2d 696, 701-02 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998)
(upholding mandatory LWOP sentence imposed on fifteen-year-old convicted of murder and noting
that "when a punishment does not exceed the limits fixed by statute, the punishment cannot be
classified as cruel and unusual in a constitutional sense").
285 93 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 1996).
286 See id. at 584-85.
287 See id. at 584 ("Disproportion analysis, however, is strictly circumscribed; we conduct a
detailed analysis only in the 'rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and
the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality."' (citation omitted)).
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prison sentence, it raises no inference of disproportionality when
imposed on a murderer.
2 88
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit court in Rice v. Cooper affirmed a mandatory
LWOP sentence imposed on an illiterate, mildly retarded sixteen-year-old
murderer, even though the statute excluded consideration of any mitigating factors,
including youthfulness. 289 The court found no constitutional barrier to imposing a
mandatory LWOP sentence as long as the youth possessed the capacity to intend to
commit the crime.290 Defining the seriousness of an offense solely by the harm that
was caused excludes any meaningful consideration of reduced culpability or
diminished responsibility from a proportionality inquiry.29'
The adoption of mandatory LWOP statutes in many states precludes any
consideration of youthfulness as a mitigating factor at sentencing. Several states
have abrogated the common-law infancy defense for very young children and
removed the only substantive consideration of youthfulness prior to conviction.292
288 Id. at 585 (citation omitted).
289 Rice v. Cooper, 148 F.3d 747, 752 (7th Cir. 1998).
A sentence of natural life in prison.., is exceptionally severe when the defendant is a
minor and suffers from deficits of understanding, even if they are not such deficits as
would preclude him from being forced to stand trial and from being convicted. But we
cannot find any basis in decisions interpreting the Eighth Amendment, or in any other
sources of guidance to the meaning of 'cruel and unusual punishments,' for concluding
that the sentence in this case was unconstitutionally severe.
Id.
290 Id.
Rice was morally responsible in the further sense of having sufficient mental capacity to
form the intent required to be found guilty of the crime. When the severity of the
sentence is not disproportionate to the gravity of the crime, and... the defendant is fully
responsible in both the moral and the legal sense for the crime, there is no basis for
deeming the sentence unconstitutionally severe.
Id. Even though the sentencing judge indicated that he would have preferred to impose a less severe
sentence: "The Supreme Court has rejected the argument that mandatory penalties, including life
imprisonment without parole... are unconstitutional just because... they prevent the consideration of
mitigating factors." Id.
291 See Logan, supra note 195, at 703 ("By divorcing 'crime' from offender culpability in
proportionality analysis, these courts subscribe to an essentially circular inquiry: because murder, for
instance, is a very 'serious' crime in the eyes of the legislature, it can be met with a very 'serious'
statutory punishment."); Brink, supra note 197, at 1576 ("[E]ven if juveniles cause the same harm as
their adult counterparts, they are less culpable, because less responsible, because less normatively
competent."). Advocating proportionality analyses that include an evaluation of culpability, Justice
Stevens has argued that:
Proportionality analysis requires that we compare "the gravity of the offense,"
understood to include not only the injury caused, but also the defendant's culpability,
with the "harshness of the penalty."... [J]uveniles so generally lack the degree of
responsibility for their crimes that is a predicate for the constitutional imposition of the
death penalty that the Eighth Amendment forbids that they receive that punishment.
In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968, 969 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
292 Carter, supra note 11, at 689-92, 696 (reporting that several states-Washington, Florida,
North Carolina, Illinois, and Colorado-expressly bar consideration of infancy defense and deem
twelve- and thirteen-year old defendants the moral and legal equivalents of adults). Carter reports that
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Appellate courts routinely uphold LWOP sentences,193 reject juveniles' pleas to
consider youthfulness as a mitigating factor, and very rarely find such sentences
disproportional.294 The Florida appellate court in Tate v. State "reject[ed] the
argument that a life sentence without the possibility of parole is cruel or unusual
punishment on a twelve-year-old child."'2 95 The North Carolina Supreme Court in
State v. Green 296 approved a mandatory LWOP sentence imposed on a thirteen-
in four of these states; sentencing statutes require judges to impose mandatory sentences without
regard to the age of the defendant even if the child was less than fourteen years of age at the time of
the crime. Id. at 740-41.
293 See Hawkins v. Hargett, 200 F.3d 1279, 1284 (10th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that "age is a
relevant factor to consider in a proportionality analysis."); State v. Green, 502 S.E.2d 819, 832 (N.C.
1998) (upholding a life imprisonment sentence for a thirteen-year-old convicted of rape, recognizing
that "the chronological age of a defendant is a factor that can be considered in determining whether a
punishment is grossly disproportionate to the crime," but emphasizing that Green was morally
responsible for the crime because he possess sufficient mental capacity to form criminal intent); State
v. Pilcher, 655 So.2d 636, 644 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding a LWOP sentence imposed on a
fifteen-year-old); Swinford v. State, 653 So.2d 912, 918 (Miss. 1995) (upholding a LWOP sentence
imposed on a fourteen-year-old convicted of aiding and abetting murder); State v. Foley, 456 So.2d
979, 984 (La. 1984) (affirming a LWOP sentence imposed on a fifteen-year-old juvenile convicted of
rape); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 153 (noting that when courts sentence children as adults,
"the punishment is all too often no different from that given to adults."); Massey, supra note 10, at
1089 (decrying that "once children are prosecuted as adults, they become subject to the same
penalties as adults, including life without the possibility of parole.").
294 See Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Ky. 1968) (holding that a life
sentence for a fourteen-year-old convicted of rape violated the Eighth Amendment); Naovarath v.
State, 779 P.2d 944 (Nev. 1989) (finding that a LWOP sentence imposed on a thirteen-year-old
convicted of murder constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and granting the right to be
considered for parole eligibility at some point). The Court in Naovarath did not necessarily endorse a
categorical prohibition and emphasized the youth's mental and emotional disabilities as well:
To say that a thirteen-year-old deserves a fifty or sixty year long sentence,
imprisonment until he dies, is a grave judgment indeed if not Draconian. To make the
judgment that a thirteen-year-old must be punished with this severity and that he can
never be reformed, is the kind of judgment that, if it can be made at all, must be made
rarely and only on the surest and soundest of grounds.
Id. at 947. A few courts have reduced youths' lengthy sentences because of their age or immaturity.
See People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 726-27 (Cal. 1983) (reducing life sentence imposed on
seventeen-year-old convicted of felony murder because he "was an unusually immature youth");
People v. Miller, 781 N.E.2d 300, 308 (I11. 2002) (rejecting as disproportional an LWOP sentencing
imposed on a fifteen-year-old, passive accessory to a felony-murder and holding that "a mandatory
sentence of natural life in prison with no possibility of parole grossly distorts the factual realities of
the case and does not accurately represent defendant's personal culpability such that it shocks the
moral sense of the community.").
295 Tate, 864 So.2d 44, 54-55 (Fla. Ct. App. 2003). Tate cited other recent Florida cases
approving LWOP sentences imposed on young offenders, including Phillips v. State, 807 So.2d 713,
717-18 (Fla. Ct. App. 2002) (approving LWOP sentence imposed on fourteen-year-old convicted of
murder and rejecting the idea that an LWOP sentence for first-degree murder could ever be so
"grossly disproportionate" as to require a finding of unconstitutionality) and Blackshear v. State, 771
So.2d 1199, 1200-02 (Fla. Ct. App. 2000) (approving three consecutive life sentences imposed for
three robberies committed when Blackshear was thirteen years of age and noting that "[slentences
imposed on juveniles of life imprisonment are not uncommon in Florida Courts").
296 502 S.E.2d 819 (N.C. 1998).
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year-old convicted of a first-degree sexual offense.297 Green reasoned that many
states transfer young offenders to criminal court,298 that age and reduced
culpability do not bear on "whether a punishment is grossly disproportionate to the
crime, 299 and that the penal purposes of retribution and incapacitation apply even
to young offenders. 300 The Mississippi Court of Appeals in Edmonds v. State
upheld a LWOP sentence imposed on a child for a crime he committed at thirteen
years of age.30' Courts point to the increased use of LWOP sentences for children
as evidence that they do "not offend evolving standards of decency so as to
constitute cruel and unusual punishment.,
30 2
Even states that do not formally impose LWOP sentences on juveniles allow
judges to accomplish the functional equivalent and create "virtual lifers." After the
California Court of Appeal overturned a fifteen-year-old juvenile's invalid LWOP
sentence, the trial judge in People v. Demirdjian simply resentenced him to two
consecutive life sentences. 30 3 The Tenth Circuit Court in Hawkins v. Hargett
upheld a sentence totaling 100 years for burglary, rape, and robbery committed by
a thirteen year old juvenile.30 4
Courts regularly uphold LWOP sentences and extremely long terms of
imprisonment imposed on twelve-, thirteen-, fourteen-, or fifteen-year-old
youths.30 5 Sixteen percent of juveniles were fifteen years of age or younger when
297 See id. at 827-28, 831; see also Paul G. Morrissey, Do the Adult Crime, Do the Adult Time:
Due Process and Cruel and Unusual Implications for a 13-Year-Old Sex Offender Sentenced to Life
Imprisonment in State v. Green, 44 VILL. L. REv. 707, 738 (1999) ("Green's young age does not lend
itself to a per se ruling of unconstitutionality. Once a juvenile of any age is transferred to superior
court, charged with a violation of state law and convicted, the juvenile must be 'handled in every
respect as an adult."' (footnote omitted)).
298 See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 831 (finding that because at least 18 other states permit waiver of
offenders thirteen or younger to criminal court, the North Carolina practice did not violate "evolving
standards of decency").
299 Id. at 832.
300 See id. at 833 (emphasizing judicial deference to legislative sentencing policy judgments
and concluding that "the adult justice system, with its primary goals of incapacitation and retribution,
is the appropriate place for violent youthful offenders, such as defendant.").
Edmonds v. Mississippi, 955 So. 2d 864, 895 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (rejecting juvenile's
request for jury instruction as to sentencing consequences if convicted and finding that LWOP
sentence does not need to take account of the degree,of culpability of the actor).
302 State v. Standard, 569 S.E.2d 325, 329 (S.C. 2002); Hawkins v. Hargett, 200 F.3d at 1285
(arguing that "sentencing a thirteen-year-old defendant to mandatory life imprisonment.., is within
the bounds of society's current and evolving standards of decency" and concluding that "modem
society apparently condones the severe punishment of individuals who commit serious crimes at
young ages.").
303 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 184, 186-89 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (noting that California law prohibits
sentencing juveniles under sixteen years of age to Life Without Parole, but dismissing the juvenile's
reliance on Roper v. Simmons and emphasizing the clear difference between death and lesser
sentences).
'04 See 200 F.3d 1279, 1285 (10th Cir. 1999) (rejecting, on habeas appeal of state conviction,
the argument that imposing consecutive sentences for crimes committed as a thirteen-year-old
constituted cruel and unusual punishment).
305 HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 153, at 1, 7 (criticizing states for incarcerating at least
2,225 youths with LWOP sentences for crimes committed prior to their 18 th birthday and advocating
abolition of LWOP sentences for juveniles and legislative changes to allow states retroactively to
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they committed the crimes for which they received LWOP sentences; among these
juveniles, more than half (59%) received an LWOP sentence for their first-ever
criminal convictions, and more than one quarter (26%) received an LWOP
sentence for a felony murder in which they were a participant, but not the
principal.3 °6 In contrast with the Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence,
which treats youthfulness as a mitigating factor, trial judges perversely treat
youthfulness as an aggravating factor and sentence juveniles more severely than
their adult counterparts. 30 7 Youths convicted of murder are more likely to enter
prison with LWOP sentences than are adults convicted of murder.30 8
resentence them); see, e.g., People v. Moya, 899 P.2d 212, 219-20 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (holding
that sentence of life imprisonment with possibility of parole after forty years was not cruel and
unusual punishment when imposed on juvenile who did not directly cause the death of another, but
was convicted of robbery and murder); Brennan v. State, 754 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1999) (vacating death
penalty imposed on sixteen-year-old convicted of murder and reducing sentence to life imprisonment
without a possibility of parole); State v. Broadhead, 814 P.2d 401, 402-11 (Idaho 1991) (overruled
on other grounds) (affirming life sentence with fixed minimum of fifteen years imposed on fourteen-
year-old convicted of murdering his father); State v. Shanahan, 994 P.2d 1059, 1063 (Idaho Ct. App.
1999) (holding that life sentence for murder imposed on fifteen-year-old did not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment); State v. Mitchell, 577 N.W.2d 481, 490 (Minn. 1998) (holding that mandatory
life imprisonment for fifteen-year-old convicted of first-degree murder was not cruel and unusual
punishment); State v. Ira, 43 P.3d 359, 368 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002) (approving sentence of ninety-one
and one-half years imposed on fifteen-year-old for rape); State v. Jensen, 579 N.W.2d 613, 624-25
(S.D. 1998) (holding that life imprisonment without possibility of parole for fourteen-year-old
convicted of murder is not cruel and unusual punishment); State v. Massey, 803 P.2d 340, 348
(Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (overruled on other grounds) (approving LWOP sentence imposed on youth
convicted of committing murder at thirteen years of age).
306 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 153, at 2-3.
307 For example, in Roper v. Simmons, defense counsel urged the jury to consider his client's
youthfulness as a mitigating factor "in deciding just exactly what sort of punishment to make." 543
U.S. 551, 556-58 (2005). In rebuttal, the prosecutor responded: "Age, he says. Think about age.
Seventeen years old. Isn't that scary? Doesn't that scare you? Mitigating?.Quite the contrary I submit.
Quite the contrary." Id. The prosecutors' view of youthfulness as an aggravating factor is reflected in
sentencing practices. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 97, at 178 ("[Jluvenile transfers convicted
of murder received longer sentences than their adult counterparts. On average, the maximum prison
sentence imposed on transferred juveniles convicted of murder in 1994 was 23 years 11 months. This
was 2 years and 5 months longer than the average maximum prison sentence for adults age 18 or
older, and 8 months longer than the average maximum sentence for under-18 adults convicted of
murder."); Donna Bishop & Charles Frazier, Consequences of Transfer, in THE CHANGING BORDERS
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT 227,237 (Jeffrey Fagan &
Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000) (comparing the sentences imposed on youths transferred to criminal
courts with those of adults and reporting that "transferred youths are sentenced more harshly, both in
terms of the probability of receiving a prison sentence and the length of the sentences they receive. In
other words, we see no evidence that criminal courts recognize a need to mitigate sentences based on
considerations of age and immaturity."); Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 267, at 665 (citing the
impact of "get tough" politics and arguing that "[b]y the mid-1990's [sic], youth had ceased to be a
mitigating factor in adult court, and instead had become a liability").
308 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 153, at 33 (reporting that judges imposed LWOP
sentences on juveniles convicted of murder more frequently than they did adults and concluding that
.'states have often been more punitive toward children who commit murder than adults... [and] age
has not been much of a mitigating factor in the sentencing of youth convicted of murder.").
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Appellate courts' refusal to conduct proportionality analyses of non-capital
sentences poses an even greater challenge than the death penalty for those seeking
justice for children.30 9 Prior to the 1970s, virtually no states imposed LWOP
sentences and most used indeterminate sentencing systems.310 The "get tough"
policies that gathered momentum in the 1970s included both the resumption of
capital punishment and the adoption of LWOP sentences. 311 During the 1980s and
1990s, states limited judicial sentencing discretion, imposed mandatory minimum
sentences, restricted parole eligibility, and adopted LWOP sentences. 3 2 By 2005,
forty-eight states and the District of Columbia had enacted LWOP sentences. 313
Ironically, death penalty abolitionists provided bipartisan support for LWOP
statutes as an alternative to capital punishment.31 4 The number of people executed
has remained relatively constant despite the near-universal adoption of LWOP
sentences and judges impose LWOP sentences on many more defendants against
whom prosecutors did not seek the death penalty.3 15 Thus, LWOP statutes have
had a substantial "net-widening" affect that extends well beyond the narrow
category of death-eligible defendants.3 16 Between 1992 and 2003, the number of
inmates on death row increased from 2,575 to 3,374, a thirty-one percent rise,
while the number of prisoners serving life without parole sentences grew from
12,453 to 33,633, a 170% increase.31 7
By 2004, 2,225 people were serving LWOP sentences for crimes they
committed as children and more youths join those ranks every year.31 8 Prior to
309 MAUER ET AL., supra note 74, at 5-8 (arguing that LWOP defendants do not receive close
appellate scrutiny or automatic appointment of counsel on appeal as do those who receive capital
sentences: "Unlike defendants in capital cases, persons sentenced to life have no right to post-
conviction counsel in most cases."); Massey, supra note 10, at 1100-04 (describing courts nearly
universal rejection ofjuveniles' constitutional challenges to LWOP sentences).
310 MAUER ET AL., supra note 74, at 5-8.
311 See supra notes 78-88 and accompanying text (describing politics of "get tough" on crime);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976) (reauthorizing the death penalty after the Court's
earlier decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972), which invalidated state death
penalty statutes).
312 See generally MAUER ET AL., supra note 74, at 1 (attributing the increase in length of
prisoners' sentences since the 1970s to policy changes such as "mandatory sentencing, 'truth in
sentencing' and cutbacks in parole release."); TONRY, supra note 83, at 6-13 (summarizing the
rapidity and enormity of changes in sentencing laws beginning in the early 1970s).
313 Note, A Matter of Life and Death: The Effect of Life- Without-Parole Statutes on Capital
Punishment, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1838, 1842 (2006) [hereinafter Life and Death].
314 Id. at 1838 (arguing that death penalty abolitionists promoted life without parole sentences
as an alternative to executions); see also MAUER ET AL., supra note 74, at 5 (discussing the increased
imposition of LWOP sentences as an alternative to the death penalty).
315 Life and Death, supra note 313, at 1845-51 (attributing the decline in capital sentences to
decreased public and jury support for the death penalty because of greater sense of safety associated
with a reduction in violent crime).
316 Id. at 1839 ("Twenty years of experience with life-without-parole statutes shows that
although they have only a small effect on reducing executions, they have doubled and tripled the
lengths of sentences for offenders who never would have been sentenced to death or even been
eligible for the death penalty.").3 17 Id. at 1839, 1851-52.
318 HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 153, at 1.
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1980, children rarely received LWOP sentences; judges now sentence youths to
LWOP three times as frequently as they did in 1990.319 The average age at which
juveniles committed the crimes for which courts impose LWOP sentences is
sixteen years, but children as young as thirteen years of age receive such
sentences. 320 A much larger, but unknown, number of convicted juveniles serve the
functional equivalent of "virtual life" sentences. The vast majority of juveniles
who received an LWOP sentence had no prior adult or juvenile convictions. 321
Significantly, states may not impose the death penalty on felony-murderers who
did not intend to kill or actually participate in the killing.322 By contrast, states
convicted about one-quarter or more of juveniles who received an LWOP sentence
for felony-murder.323 A survey in Michigan reported that nearly half the juveniles
serving LWOP sentences were convicted for aiding-and-abetting their crimes,
rather than as principals.
324
Judges impose LWOP sentences on black juveniles at a rate about ten times
greater than they do white youths, and Blacks comprise a substantial majority of all
youths serving LWOP sentences.325 In Michigan, more than two-thirds (69%) of all
juveniles serving LWOP sentences are Black, despite comprising only fifteen
percent of the youth population. 326 The racial disparity is the cumulative
consequence of discretionary decisions at every stage of the juvenile and criminal
justice systems that treat black youths more harshly.327
D. Youthfulness as a Mitigating Factor-
A "Youth Discount" at Sentencing
The Constitution does not require state legislators to enact or courts to
formally recognize youthfulness as a mitigating factor in sentencing. But, they
should explicitly adopt and apply such a principle as part of a fair and just youth
319 Id. at 2.
320 Id. at 25 (extrapolating that about 354 youths are serving LWOP sentences for crimes
committed at age fifteen or younger).
321 Id. at 28.
322 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982) (holding the death penalty unconstitutional
when imposed on a felony murder defendant who did not kill, attempt to kill or intend to kill).
323 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 153, at 27-28 (reporting that other studies of juveniles
sentenced to LWOP found that thirty-three to fifty percent were convicted of felony murder).
324 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MICHIGAN, SECOND CHANCES: JUVENILES SERVING LIFE
WITHOUT PAROLE IN MICHIGAN PRISONS 4 (2004), available at http://www.aclumich.org/pubs/juvenile
lifers.pdf [hereinafter ACLU].
325 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 153, at 29 (reporting that sixty percent of youths serving
life without parole sentences are black, twenty-nine percent are white, and "black youth nationwide
are serving life without parole sentences at a rate that is ten times higher than white youth..
326 ACLU, supra note 324, at 10.
327 See supra notes 129-43 and accompanying text; MALES & MACALLAIR, supra note 165, at
7-8 (reporting that judges are eight times more likely to sentence black youths than white youths to
imprisonment); JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 31, at 12-14 (documenting the
cumulative effect of racially disparate decisions at each stage of the juvenile justice system); POE-
YAMAGATA & JONES, supra note 133, at 16-25 (finding disproportionate minority overrepresentation
at each stage of the juvenile justice system).
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sentencing policy. The principle of "youthfulness as a mitigating factor" applies
equally to capital and non-capital sentences. It acknowledges adolescents' reduced
culpability without excusing their criminal conduct.328 It holds adolescents
accountable yet imposes sentences proportional to their diminished responsibility.
Children's crimes ate not the moral equivalents of those of adults, even if they
produce the same harms. 329 A sentencing policy that holds juveniles accountable,
manages the risks they pose to others, and provides them with "room to reform,"
does not irredeemably destroy their lives. 330 As the Supreme Court repeatedly has
recognized,
Youth is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of
life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to
psychological damage. Our history is replete with laws and judicial
recognition that minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are
less mature and responsible than adults. Particularly "during the
formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the
experience, perspective, and judgment" expected of adults.331
Consequently, sentencing policies should recognize this simple, developmental
truism and protect young people from the full penal consequences of their bad
decisions.332
328 Elizabeth S. Scott, Criminal Responsibility in Adolescence: Lessons from Developmental
Psychology, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 291, 309
(Tomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) (arguing that adolescents' choices "reflect
immaturity and inexperience and are driven by developmental factors that will change in predictable
and systemic ways. A legal response that holds young offenders accountable, while recognizing that
they are less culpable than their adult counterparts, serves the purposes of criminal punishment
without violating the underlying principle of proportionality."); Scott & Grisso, supra note 199, at
174 (arguing that youthfulness does not excuse criminal liability, but "the evidence disputes the
conclusion that most delinquents are indistinguishable from adults in any way that is relevant to
culpability, and supports the creation of two distinct culpability categories-although, of course,
there will be outlyers [sic] in both groups. In short, the predispositions and behavioral characteristics
that are associated with the developmental stage of adolescence support a policy of reduced
culpability for this category of offenders."); Zimring, supra note 195, at 278 ("[E]ven after a youth
passes the minimum threshold of competence that leads to a finding of capacity to commit crime, the
barely competent youth is not as culpable and therefore not as deserving of a full measure .of
punishment as a fully qualified adult offender").
329 See ZIMRING, supra note 237, at 144 ("[W]henever a young offender's need for protection,
education, and skill development can be accommodated without frustrating community security, there
is a government obligation to do so."); Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness,
Criminal Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 99 (1997); Scott
& Grisso, supra note 199, at 182 ("Subjecting thirteen-year-old offenders to the same criminal
punishment that is imposed on adults offends the principles that define the boundaries of criminal
responsibility.").
330 See ZIMRING, supra note 237, at 81-83, 142-45; Zimring, supra note 195, at 283-84.
331 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 834 (1988) (citation omitted) (quoting Eddings v.
Oklahoma 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982)).
3h32. See Scott, supra note 212, at 1656 ("[I]f the values that drive risky choices are associated
with youth, and predictably will change with maturity, then our paternalistic inclination is to protect
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Roper decided adolescents' diminished responsibility on a categorical basis
rather than try to assess each juvenile's culpability individually. Despite the
Court's general preference for individualized culpability assessments, Roper
adopted a categorical prohibition because "the differences between juvenile and
adult offenders are too well marked and well understood to risk allowing a




The Court feared that a heinous crime would overwhelm a jury's ability to
consider youthfulness as a mitigating factor.334 Roper also concluded that neither
clinicians nor jurors could reasonably distinguish between the vast majority of
immature juveniles who deserved leniency and the very rare youth who might be
sufficiently culpable to be death-eligible.
335
Accordingly, a bright-line rule that categorically treats youthfulness as a
mitigating factor is preferable to a system of guided discretion. A rule that
occasionally "under-punishes the rare, fully-culpable adolescent still will produce
less aggregate injustice than a discretionary system that improperly and harshly
sentences many more undeserving youths. 3 36 Roper endorsed a categorical bright-
line rule even though it recognized individual variability in culpability:
The qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear
when an individual turns 18. By the same token, some under 18 have
already attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach .... The
age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many purposes
between childhood and adulthood. It is, we conclude the age at which the
line for death eligibility ought to rest.
337
A decision to treat adolescents' reduced criminal responsibility categorically
represents a normative judgment about deserved punishment and rests on a moral
foundation, not a scientific one.338 Immature judgment, impulsiveness, and lack of
the young decisionmaker.. from his or her bad judgment."); see also ZIMRING, supra note 237, at
96; ZIMRING, supra note 195, at 142-45.
333 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 553-54 (2005).
334 Id. at 572-73 (reasoning that "[a]n unacceptable likelihood exists that the brutality or cold-
blooded nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating argument based on youth as a
matter of course, even where the juvenile offender's objective immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of
true depravity should require a sentence less severe than death.").335 Id. at.573 ("It is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile
offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offenders
whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.").
336 Id. ("If trained psychiatrists with the advantage of clinical testing and observation refrain,
despite diagnostic expertise, from assessing any juvenile under 18 as having antisocial personality
disorder, we conclude that States should refrain from asking jurors to issue a far graver
condemnation-that a juvenile offender merits the death penalty.").337 Id. at 574.
338 See, e.g., Scott & Steinberg, supra note 195, at 800-02, 813 (arguing that in contemporary
criminal law theory, penal proportionality may reflect either the quality of an actor's choice or what
that choice indicates about the actor's moral character; the former focuses on the blameworthiness of
the quality of choices made, while the latter focuses on what that choice indicates about the actor's
bad character.); see also R. A. Duff, Choice, Character, and Criminal Liability, 12 LAW & PHIL. 345,
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self-control are normal developmental characteristics of adolescents that reduce
criminal responsibility. Because youthfulness systematically reduces culpability,
all young offenders should receive categorical reductions of adult sentences.
339
Formalizing youthfulness as a mitigating factor represents a social, moral, and
criminal policy judgment about diminished responsibility and asserts that no
adolescent deserves to be sentenced as severely as an adult convicted of a
comparable crime.34°
A categorical bright-line rule for mitigation is preferable to individualized
sentencing decisions for two reasons. 341 The first is the inability either to define or
identify qualities of adult-like culpability among offending youths.342 Development
is highly variable; a few youths may be mature prior to reaching eighteen years of
age while others do not attain maturity even as adults.343 Despite developmental
differences, clinicians lack the tools to assess an offender's impulsivity, foresight,
and preference for risk in ways that relate to maturity of judgment and criminal
367-68 (1993); Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A
Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397, 405 (2006) ("The criteria for responsibility are
behavioral and normative, not empirically demonstrable states of the brain."); MICHAEL MOORE,
Choice, Character, and Excuse, in PLACING BLAME 548, 574-92 (1997); Ward, supra note 204, at
461. 339 See Morse, supra note 338, at 15; Scott & Steinberg, supra note 195, at 801 ("Because these
developmental factors influence their criminal choices, young wrongdoers are less blameworthy than
adults under conventional criminal law conceptions of mitigation.").
340 See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan, Atkins, Adolescence, and the Maturity Heuristic: Rationales for a
Categorical Exemption for Juveniles from Capital Punishment, 33 N.M. L. Rev. 207, 242 (2003)
(arguing that adolescence, per se, is a mitigating status because youths' developmental deficits "are
not the deficits of an atypical adolescent but are 'normal' developmental processes common to all
adolescents. To the degree that there is variation among adolescents, whether offenders or not, these
differences are predictable and subject to a variety of contextual, circumstantial, and intra-individual
factors. In this jurisprudence, the crimes of adolescents are a function of immaturity, compared to the
crimes of adults, which are the acts of morally responsible, yet possibly cognitively and emotionally
deficient, actors.").
341 Brink, supra note 197 at 1578 (arguing that age provides an imperfect boundary marker of
immaturity and proposing the use of age as a rebuttable presumption of incapacity to achieve
individualized justice).
342 See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 396-99 (1989) (overruled on unrelated grounds)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 153, at 48 (summarizing research that
concludes that while "the rate at which the adolescent brain acquires adult capabilities differs from
individual to individual... researchers have identified broad patterns of changes in adolescents that
begin with puberty and continue into young adulthood."); Morse, supra note 338, at 62 (observing
that "there are no reliable and valid measures" of culpability that can accurately distinguish
adolescents from adults).
343 See Brink, supra note 197, at 1570 (2004) (arguing that the development of normative
competence is part of the maturation process from childhood to adulthood and that "[t]hough not all
individuals mature at the same rate, and some individuals never mature, this sort of normative
maturation is strongly correlated with age. The reduced normative competence of juveniles provides
a retributive justification for reduced punishment for juveniles."); Fagan, supra note 340, at 209
("[T]he age at which adolescents realize the developmental competencies that constitute culpability
will vary: a significant number of juveniles will be immature and lacking in the developmental
attributes of culpability well before age eighteen, and some may still lack these competencies after
age eighteen..."); Zimring, supra note 237, at 241 ("[T]he range of individual variation among
youths of the same age is notoriously large.").
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responsibility.344 Because the vast majority of juveniles are less culpable than
adults, the inability to define and measure immaturity or validly identify the few
responsible ones would introduce a systematic bias toward punishing less-culpable
youths.34 5 A categorical approach reduces the risk of error or bias.346 Every other
area of law use age-based lines to approximate the level of maturity required for
particular activities-e.g., voting, driving, and consuming alcohol-and restricts
youths because of their immaturity and inability to make competent decision.347
The second reason to treat youthfulness categorically is the decision-maker's
inability to weigh fairly the abstract consideration of immaturity against the reality
of a horrific crime.348 Roper recognized that "the brutality or cold-blooded nature
344 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005) (emphasizing that "[ilt is difficult even for
expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate
yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.");
Zimring, supra note 237, at 241 (noting that we lack "good data on the social skills and social
experience of adolescdnt offenders. The important elements of penal maturity have yet to be agreed
upon, let alone assessed in large numbers of cases.").
345 See, e.g., Fagan, supra note 340, at 248, 253 ("The difficulties and statistical error rates in
measuring immaturity for juveniles invite complexity in the consistent application of the law").
Fagan contends that:
[e]ven when individualized assessments are conducted using modem scientific and
clinical tools, the risks of error due to measurement and diagnostic limitations suggest
that it is neither reliable nor efficient for each court to assess the competency of each
juvenile individually. The precise conditions of immaturity, incapacity, and
incompetency are difficult to consistently and fairly express in a capital sentencing
context. Further, cognitive and volitional immaturity might be easily concealed by
demeanor or physical appearance and, more importantly, obscured by the gruesome
details of a murder and its emotional impact on the victim's family.
Id. at 253; see also Robin M. A. Weeks, Note, Comparing Children to the Mentally Retarded: How
the Decision in Atkins v. Virginia Will Affect the Execution of Juvenile Offenders, 17 BYU J. PUB. L.
451, 479 (2003) (noting that when the Court requires individualized culpability assessments it raises
difficult definitional questions: "What is the 'normal' adult level of culpability? How do we measure
it?"). 346 Scott & Steinberg, supra note 195, at 836-37 ("[W]e currently lack the diagnostic tools to
evaluate psycho-social maturity reliably on an individualized basis or to distinguish young career
criminals from ordinary adolescents who, as adults, will repudiate their reckless experimentation.
Litigating maturity on a case-by-case basis is likely to be an error-prone undertaking, with the
outcomes determined by factors other than immaturity.").
347 See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 581-86 (providing statutory appendices listing limits on
juveniles' rights to drink, drive, vote, marry, and contract as. a result of immaturity); FRANKLIN
Z1MRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENTS 35-36 (1982); Donald L. Beschle, The
Juvenile Justice Counterrevolution: Responding to Cognitive Dissonance in the Law's View of the
Decision-Making Capacity of Minors, 48 EMORY L.J. 65, 89-91 (1999) (analyzing the inconsistency
between punishing adolescents like adults while denying their autonomy claims in areas outside of
the criminal law); Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying An Ageless Conundrum,
51 HASTINGS L.J. 1265, 1268 (2000) (arguing that presumption of decisional incapacity pervades
most areas of law and conflicts with model of adolescent autonomy); Elizabeth S. Scott, Judgment
and Reasoning in Adolescent Decisionmaking, 37 VILL. L. REv. 1607, 1608, 1611 (1992); Zimring,
supra note 195 at 287.
348 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. at 398 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[iut is thus
unsurprising that individualized consideration at transfer and sentencing has not in fact ensured that
juvenile offenders lacking an adult's culpability are not sentenced to die.").
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of any particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments based on youth as a
matter of course, even where the juvenile offender's objective immaturity,
vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should require a sentence less severe than
death., 349 The Court rightly feared that jurors could not adequately distinguish
between causing harm and the moral responsibility of the person for causing the
harm and they would not weigh diminished responsibility sufficiently.35 ° In
surveys of jurors, the heinousness of a crime almost invariably trumped a youth's
immaturity when they decided whether to impose the death penalty.35'
We can construct a categorical response to youths' diminished responsibility
by offering a "youth discount"-"fractional reductions of sentences based on age-
as-a-proxy-for culpability."352 Eligibility for the "youth discount" can be
established with only a birth certificate. A "youth discount" enables young
offenders to survive serious mistakes with their life chances intact.353 It recognizes
that same-length sentences exact a greater "penal bite" from younger offenders
than older ones.
354
A "youth discount" is a sliding scale of diminished responsibility that
recognizes the greatest immaturity among the youngest offenders.355 Discounts are
349 Roper, 543 U.S. at 573.
350 Id. at 572-73.
351 Brink, supra note 197, at 1581; Simona Ghetti & Allison Redlich, Reactions to Youth
Crime: Perceptions ofAccountability and Competency, 19 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 33, 45-47 (2001).
352 See Feld, supra note 329, at 121-23 (1997) (providing rationales for a categorical "youth
discount"); Joseph L. Hoffman, On the Perils of Line-Drawing: Juveniles and the Death Penalty, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 229, 233 (1989) (describing age as an imperfect proxy for a complex of factors,
"includ[ing] maturity, judgment, responsibility, and the capability to assess the possible
consequences of one's conduct," that constitute culpability). But see ZIMRING, supra note 195, at
149-50 (objecting to categorical youth discount because "age is an incomplete proxy for levels of
maturity during the years from age 12 to 18. The variation among individuals of the same age is
great, and individualized determinations of immaturity are thus superior to averages based on
aggregate patterns.").
353 See ZIMRING, supra note 195, at 89-96; Franklin E. Zimring, Background Paper, in
CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON
SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG OFFENDERS 27, 66-69 (1978).
354 See Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionate Sentences for Juveniles: How Different than Jbr
Adults?, 3 PUNISHMENT & Soc'Y 221, 227 (2001) ("A given penalty is said to be more onerous when
suffered by a child than by an adult. Young people, assertedly, are psychologically less resilient, and
the punishments they suffer interfere more with opportunities for education and personal
development."(citation omitted)); see also Arredondo, supra note 242, at 19 ("Because of differences
in the experience of time, any given duration of sanction will be experienced subjectively as longer
by younger children"); Jeffrey Fagan, This Will Hurt Me More Than It Hurts You: Social and Legal
Consequences of Criminalizing Delinquency, 16 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 1, 21-22
(2002) (describing the substantive quality of punishment adolescents experience in adult
incarceration as far harsher than the sanctions they experience as delinquents); Feld, supra note 352,
at 112-13 (contending that "youths experience objectively equal punishment subjectively as more
severe").
355 Feld, supra note 329, at 119-21; see also Scott & Steinberg, supra note 195, at 837 ("[A]
systematic sentencing discount for young offenders in adult court[] might satisfy the demands of
proportionality."); Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 267, at 698 ("We endorse Feld's proposals [for a
youth discount] because they respect the notion that juveniles are developmentally different than
adults and that these differences make juveniles both less culpable for their crimes and less deserving
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taken from the appropriate sentence an adult offender otherwise would receive. On
a sliding scale of diminished responsibility, a fourteen-year-old offender, for
example, might receive a maximum sentence that is less than twenty-five percent
of the adult sentence and a sixteen-year-old defendant might receive a maximum
sentence no more than half the adult length. Deeper discounts for younger
offenders correspond with their greater developmental differences in judgment and
self-control.356 And, of course, the rationale for a "youth discount" precludes
LWOP and other "virtual life" sentences. 357 Apart from adolescents' diminished
responsibility, the likelihood of recidivism decreases with age and the costs of
confining geriatric inmates increase substantially. 358 States can achieve their penal
goals by sentencing youths to no more than twenty-five or thirty years. Because
young offenders will eventually return to the community, the state has a
responsibility to provide resources for reform for youths to take advantage of as
they mature.
E. Restoring Rationality after Legislative Over-Reaction
The Supreme Court's narrow proportionality review and the limits of
federalism doom to failure juveniles' constitutional challenges to LWOP
sentences. Legislators experienced the paroxysms of punitiveness, wrote the
current harsh juvenile waiver and criminal sentencing laws, and they can change
them. Public officials must restore rationality to the justice system and enact a
youth discount as part of broader juvenile sentencing reforms. Public opinion
of the harsh sanctions, which now must be imposed on serious and violent adult offenders."); von
Hirsch, supra note 354, at 226 (arguing for categorical penalty reductions based on juveniles'
reduced culpability).
While actual appreciation of consequences varies highly among youths of the same age,
the degree of appreciation we should demand depends on age: we may rightly expect
more comprehension and self-control from the 17-year-old than a 14-year-old, so that the
17-year-old's penalty reduction should be smaller. Assessing culpability on the basis of
individualized determinations of a youth's degree of moral development would be neither
feasible nor desirable.
Id.; Zimring, supra note 195, at 288 (arguing that the penal law of youth crime should develop "a
sliding scale of responsibility based on both judgment and the practical experience of impulse
management and peer control").
356 Brink, supra note 197, at 1572 (noting that "a juvenile is less responsible for her crime than
her adult counterpart is for the same crime and that, all else being equal, the younger the juvenile the
less responsible she is for her crime."); Zimring, supra note 195, at 288 ("[A]dolescents learn their
way toward adult levels of responsibility gradually. This notion is also consistent with... long
periods of diminished responsibility that incrementally approach adult standards in the late teens...
[and with] less-than-adult punishments that gradually approach adult levels during the late teen
years.").
357 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 153, at 8 (recommending that states abolish LWOP
sentences for crimes committed by juveniles); MAUER ET AL., supra note 74, at 32 (recommending
categorical exemption of juveniles from life sentences because they "represent an entire rejection of
the longstanding traditions of our treatment of juvenile offenders, which is that rehabilitation should
be considered as a primary objective when sentencing children.").
358 ACLU, supra note 324, at 19; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 153, at 8.
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supports policies to rehabilitate serious young offenders rather than simply to
incarcerate them for longer periods as a strategy to reduce future crime. 359 The
combination of positive public support for less punitive policies and low crime
rates may strengthen progressive legislators' resolve to restore rationality to youth
crime policies.36°
A few state legislatures have taken some initial steps to restore rationality to
youth sentencing policy.36' While some states continue to enact punitive
provisions, 362 more states are encouraging reforms that address sentencing
juveniles as adults, eliminating mandatory LWOPs for juveniles, reducing the
transfer of youths to criminal court, and raising the age of juvenile court
jurisdiction.
1. Sentencing Juveniles as Adults
In 2006, Colorado partially recognized adolescents' diminished responsibility
and eliminated mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles.363 This new law is a step
in the right direction, but it only makes youths eligible for parole consideration
after serving a minimum term of forty years and it does not apply retroactively to
the two dozen juveniles currently serving LWOP sentences, one-third of whom
359 BARRY KRISBERG & SUSAN MARCHIONNA, ATTITUDES OF U.S. VOTERS TOWARD YOUTH
CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE (2007), available at http://www.nccd-crc.org/nccd/pubs/zogby
_feb07.pdf (reporting strong public support for rehabilitation as a strategy to prevent and reduce
juvenile crime); Brink, supra note 197, at 1585 (noting that "there is support for treating youthful
offenders as juveniles and for sentencing that is rehabilitative in nature."); Daniel S. Nagin et al.,
Public Preferences for Rehabilitation versus Incarceration of Juvenile Offenders: Evidence from a
Contingent Valuation Survey, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 627, 644 (2006) (concluding that
"members of the public are concerned about youth crime and want to reduce its incidence, but they
are ready to support effective rehabilitative programs as a means of accomplishing that end-and
indeed favor this response to imposing more punishment through longer sentences.").
360 Donna M. Bishop, Public Opinion and Juvenile Justice Policy: Myths and Misconceptions,
5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 653, 656-57 (2006) (summarizing survey results of public opinion
regarding support for rehabilitation); Francis T. Cullen, It's Time to Reaffirm Rehabilitation, 5
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'y 665, 666-68 (2006) (reporting continuing public support for the idea of
rehabilitation and that rehabilitation provides a cultural and criminological alternative to just locking
up offenders); Nagin et al., supra note 359, at 645-46.
361 See generally NAT'L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., 2006 STATE JUVENILE JUSTICE LEGISLATION
(2007), available at ht-tp-://-www-.nj-dc-.info-/pdf-/2006-%20-State-%20-JJ-%20-Legislation-.pdf
(summarizing juvenile justice legislation introduced in 2006).
362 See, e.g., H.B. 88, 24th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Alaska 2005) (providing for automatic transfer of
juveniles 16 years of age or older charged with first degree weapon offense); H.B. 1372, Reg. Sess.
(La. 2006) (substitute for HB 78) (amending Louisiana Statute Annotated-Children's Code Article
305 to permit prosecutors to indict and "direct file" juveniles fifteen years of age or older in criminal
court and allowing judges to sentence juvenile to any punishment authorized for an adult).
363 H.B. 06-1315, 65th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Colo. 2006) available at http://www.leg.-state.-com.-
us/clics2006a/csl.nsf/fsbillcont3/A2B8131796BF3E39872570F9006 10C87?Open&file= 315_enr.pdf
(findings by the legislature included that "[b]ecause of their level of physical and psychological
development, juveniles who are convicted as adults may, with appropriate counseling, treatment
services, and education, be rehabilitated to a greater extent than may be possible for adults... [and
finding] that it is not in the best interests of the state to condemn juveniles... to a lifetime of
incarceration without the possibility of parole.").
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were convicted for felony-murder. 364 Pennsylvania enacted a law to prohibit courts
from sentencing juveniles convicted of certain felony sex offenses to a term
exceeding forty years. 365 Legislation in Florida, that failed to pass, proposed that
juveniles younger than fifteen years of age who received sentences of life
imprisonment would be eligible for parole release consideration after serving a
minimum of eight years.366 Legislation introduced in Michigan in 2006 would
eliminate LWOP sentences for juveniles, provide for parole eligibility after serving
a minimum of ten years, and require the parole authority to consider the offender's
"age and maturity" and degree of participation in the offense. 367 Washington
eliminated mandatory minimum sentences for youths tried as adults.368
2. Waiver of Jurisdiction
Some states have revised waiver provisions to reduce the scope of
prosecutorial "direct file" or excluded offense laws. For example, Delaware
amended an automatic waiver statute that previously excluded all youths charged
with armed robbery to exclude only youths charged with armed robbery who had
one or more prior felony adjudications.369 Illinois recognized the racially disparate
impact of drug offense exclusion laws, shifted drug crimes from a mandatory to a
presumptive transfer process, and allowed juvenile court judges to make
individualized waiver decisions. 370 The Mississippi house passed a bill to increase
the minimum age at which a youth could be waived from thirteen to fifteen years
364 Id. amending COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-401 (b)(I) (providing that youths tried and
convicted in criminal court shall be sentenced "to a term of life imprisonment with the possibility of
parole after serving a period of forty calendar years" and remain on parole for the rest of the person's
life).
365 S.B. 944, Gen. Sess. (Pa. 2005) (prohibiting courts from sentencing a person convicted of
certain felony sex offenses committed before eighteen years of age for a term of imprisonment
exceeding forty years).
366 S.B. 616, Gen. Sess. (Fla. 2006) (this bill died in the Senate before the committee on
Criminal Justice).
367 H.B. 5512-14, 94th Leg. Gen. Sess. (Mich. 2006) and S.B. 941, 942, 943, 94th Leg. Gen.
Sess. (Mich. 2006). Senate bill 942 prohibits judges from imposing life without parole sentences on
offenders convicted of crimes committed when less than eighteen years of age, providing for parole
review after serving ten years of the sentence, and requiring parole board to consider "[t]he
individual's age and level of maturity... the degree of participation in the offense... [and] prior
juvenile or criminal history."
368 H.B. 1187, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005) (codified as WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9.94A.540 (2007)) (providing that the mandatory 'minimum sentencing provisions "shall not apply to
juveniles tried as adults...").
369 See DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 10, § 921(2)(a) (2005) (amended by S.B. 200, 142nd Leg., Gen.
Sess. (Del. 2005)).
370 See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. (2005) 405/5-805 (amended by S.B. 283, 93rd Leg., Gen. Sess.
(I11. 2005)). The Illinois Juvenile Justice Initiative praised the new law for granting allowing judges to
make individualized waiver decisions for recognizing that minority youths comprised 99 percent of
all "automatic transfers" and that two-thirds of those transfers were for low-level drug offenses.
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of age.371 Washington excludes sixteen- or seventeen-year-old youths charged with
"violent offenses" from juvenile court jurisdiction. 372 A proposed law would
restore juvenile court jurisdiction over youths acquitted of excluded offenses, but
convicted of lesser, non-excluded offenses.373
3. Age of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction
State laws establish the maximum age of juvenile court jurisdiction and the
vast majority extend through seventeen years of age.374 Three states-Connecticut,
New York, and North Carolina-set the maximum age of juvenile court
jurisdiction at fifteen years of age, and an additional ten states set the jurisdictional
maximum at sixteen years of age. 375 Significantly, several states with delinquency
maximum age jurisdiction below the age of majority are considering raising their
juvenile courts' delinquency jurisdiction.376 A decade ago, Wisconsin lowered the
age of jurisdiction from seventeen to sixteen. 377 A bill introduced in the 2005
Wisconsin legislature would undo that change, redefine an "adult" as a person
eighteen years of age or older, and raise the age of juvenile court jurisdiction. 378
Legislation introduced in Illinois in 2005 to raise the age of juvenile court
jurisdiction from sixteen to seventeen years of age passed in the Senate.379
31' H.B. 1090, Gen. Sess. (Miss. 2006) (proposing raising the minimum age of transfer and
adult prosecution from thirteen- to fifteen, enactment of "blended sentencing" provisions, and
eliminating prohibitions against parole eligibility).
372 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.04.030 (excluding sixteen and seventeen year old youths
with certain prior records and charged with "violent offenses" as defined in RCWA 9.94A.030 from
juvenile court jurisdiction).
373 See H.B. 2061, 59th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wash. 2005) (reinstating juvenile court jurisdiction
over excluded youths acquitted of excluded offense or convicted of lesser, non-excluded offense).
This type of legislation provides an important restraint on prosecutor's tendency to "over-charge"
youths with excluded offenses who then are convicted or plead to lesser, non-excluded offenses.
Even though the prosecutor's initial assessment of the seriousness of the youths' crime proved
erroneous, most states do not return youths to juvenile court but require criminal courts to sentence
them as adults. See, e.g., State v. Morales, 694 A.2d 758, 763-64 (Conn. 1997) (retaining criminal
court jurisdiction over excluded youth convicted of non-excluded lesser offense because "conferring
postverdict benefits, such as more lenient sentencing and erasure of records, on a defendant who, in
open court has been tried as an adult and convicted of a serious [albeit non-excluded] crime would
damage society's perception of the fair administration of justice."); State v. Behl, 564 N.W.2d 560,
568-69 (Minn. 1997) (denying equal protection challenge to sentencing as adult after acquittal on
excluded offense even though the state could assert no rational basis for continued exclusion).
374 SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 97, at 103 (listing maximum age for juvenile court
jurisdiction in each state in 2004, as well as minimum agency for delinquency jurisdiction, and
maximum age of dispositional jurisdiction).
375 Id.
376 See infra notes 377-86 and accompanying text.
377 WIS. STAT. § 48.44 (1996).
378 Assemb.B. 82, Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wis. 2005) ("This bill raises from 17 to 18 the age at which
a person who is alleged to have violated a criminal law is subject to the procedures specified in the
Criminal Procedure Code.").
379. S.B. 458, 94th Gen.Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2005) (changing age of juvenile court
jurisdiction from under seventeen to under eighteen).
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Legislators in New Hampshire 380 and Michigan 381 introduced bills to increase the
age of jurisdiction. A Vermont bill would raise the age of dispositional jurisdiction
from nineteen to twenty-one years of age, give juvenile courts a longer time to
treat young offenders, and reduce pressures to waive them.38 2
North Carolina mandated its Sentencing and Policy Advisory Commission to
study "youthful offenders" between sixteen and twenty-one years of age, to submit
a report to the 2007 legislature, and to propose legislative changes.38 3 The Report
recommended to raise the age of juvenile court jurisdiction from those under
sixteen years of age to those under eighteen years of age and to create a "youthful
offender" sentencing system for young adult offenders convicted in criminal courts
of misdemeanors and low-level felonies.384 In recommending that North Carolina
join the other thirty-seven jurisdictions that set the age of jurisdiction at eighteen,
the Commission emphasized that:
the slow maturation process of juveniles and the concomitant need for
society to allow for some second chances for this group while providing
them with a balance of punishment and treatment in a separate and more
rehabilitative system. A significant volume of scientific evidence on
stages of human development points to immaturity and its effect on
reduced criminal culpability in youth up to age 18 and beyond,. well into
their 20's. At least four areas of developmental immaturity may bear
directly on the criminal culpability of youth: impaired risk perception,
foreshortened time perspective, greater susceptibility to peer influence,
and reduced capacity for behavioral controls.
385
Because "kids are different," the Commission proposed that juveniles receive
age-appropriate programs and rehabilitation to enhance "moral reasoning, problem
380 H.B. 627, 159th Sess. (N.H. 2006) (changing age of minority for purposes of delinquency
proceedings from seventeen to eighteen). H.R. 627 was passed and took effect on July 1, 2007. See
N.H. REV. STAT. § 169-B:4(V)(C) (2007).
381 H.B. 4851, 93rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2005) (raising the age of juvenile court jurisdiction
to include persons under eighteen years of age).
382 H.B. 52, Reg. Sess. at § 5504(b)(2) (Vt. 2007) (proposing to raise the age of jurisdiction of a
delinquent "up to the age of 21 if the court finds that retaining jurisdiction would be in the best
interest of the child.").
383 H.B. 1723, Reg. Sess. at §§ 34.1, 34.2 (N.C. 2006) (requesting the North Carolina
Sentencing and Policy Advisory Commission to "study issues related to the conviction and
sentencing of youthful offenders aged 16 to 21 years, to determine whether the State should amend
the laws concerning these offenders".. . and to submit a final report with any recommendations by
March 1, 2007); see N.C. SENT'G AND POL'Y ADVISORY COMM'N, REPORT ON STUDY OF YOUTHFUL
OFFENDERS PURSUANT TO SESSION LAW 2006-248, SECTIONS 34.1 AND 34.2 (2007) [hereinafter
REPORT ON STUDY OF YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS], available at http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/
Councils/spac/Documents/yo_20finalreporttolegislatire.pdf.
384 REPORT ON STUDY OF YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS, supra note 383, at 3.
385 Id. at 8.
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solving, social skills, and impulse control" to enable them successfully to
reintegrate into the community.
386
VI. CONCLUSION
The juvenile court emerged in response to social structural changes a century
ago and spread across the nation during the first two decades of the twentieth
century. Economic modernization, the assimilation of immigrants, and the social
construction of childhood provided the cultural context in which Progressives
created new institutions to control children. During the second half of the twentieth
century, the issue of race has shaped juvenile justice policies and evoked two
contradictory responses. Initially, racial injustice impelled the Warren Court to
enhance civil rights and to protect minority citizens. Gault gave delinquents some
procedural rights but McKeiver forestalled procedural parity with criminal
defendants.
By the 1980s and early 1990s, macro-structural, economic, and racial
demographic changes led to an urban black underclass that lives in concentrated
poverty and social isolation. The crack cocaine epidemic produced a sharp rise in
gun violence and youth homicides among urban black males. Politicians
campaigned to "get tough" on youth crime, which the public understood as a code
word to treat young black males more harshly.387 Punitive transfer laws and harsh
criminal sentences reflect a cultural inversion of Progressives' conception of
youths as innocent and dependent children into our contemporary vision of adult-
like youthful "super-predators." Public officials have .forgotten that delinquents are
children and differ from adults in culpability. For two decades, states have
transferred more and younger children to criminal court for prosecution as adults.
Politicians' sound bites-"adult crime, adult time" or "old enough to do the crime,
old enough to do the time"-characterize youths as criminally responsible, ignore
386 Id. at 8-9. The Commission concluded that:
[t]he programming and rehabilitative needs of juveniles, including those between the ages
of 16 and 18, are better met within a treatment-oriented environment. Age-specific
programming tailored to identify the risk factors faced by adolescents has more evidence-
based success in treating court-involved youth and reintegrating them into the
community, thereby improving individual lives and reducing the future risk to public
safety.
Id. at 8.
387 See BECKETT, supra note 20, at 107 (noting that proponents of "get tough" crime policies
are "fundamentally uninterested in the social causes of criminality or in reintegrating offenders and
assume instead that punishment, surveillance, and control are the best responses to deviant
behavior"); HACKER, supra note 75, at 225.
[Flew white Americans feel any obligation to make any sacrifices on behalf of the
nation's principal minority. They see themselves as already overtaxed, feel that the fault
is not theirs, and have become persuaded that public programs cannot achieve a cure.
Instead, calls are heard for a tougher posture toward what is seen as the misbehavior of
many blacks.
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adolescents' diminished responsibility, and reject youthfulness as a mitigating
factor.388
The Court in Roper finally acknowledged what every parent knows-children
are different. A decade of research by the MacArthur Foundation demonstrates that
adolescents differ in maturity of judgment, self-control, assessments of risk,
appreciation of consequences, and susceptibility to negative peer influences in
ways that reduce their culpability. These developmental differences persist whether
a state tries a youth in juvenile or criminal court. Despite children's diminished
responsibility, politicians enact laws that mandate criminal prosecution, require
judges to sentence children as adults, and impose grossly disproportional LWOP
and "virtual life" sentences on young, immature offenders.
The cumulative consequences of these punitive policies inflict the most severe
sentences on black youths. For a century, juvenile courts have discriminated
between "our children" and "other peoples' children." Progressive reformers had
to choose between altering the social conditions like poverty, inequality, and
discrimination that contribute to crime and applying "band-aids" to the children
those harmful circumstances damaged. They avoided broad changes in political
economy and social structure and chose instead to "save children." A century later,
we face the same choices and continue to evade our responsibilities to "other
peoples' children." Generations of public policy have concentrated poverty,
isolated Blacks, compounded disadvantage, and amplified crime and violence in
inner-city communities. Policy discussions about poverty, welfare benefits,
economic inequality, taxes, and crime serve as a subterranean discourse about
issues of racial and social inequality. Public officials treat concentrated poverty,
unemployment, and crime as a Black condition separate from mainstream America
and evade their responsibility to address them.389 But, public policy and political
economy contribute to both racial inequality and the skewed distribution of crime.
Rather than address both, politicians exploit racial animus and promote punitive
policies with a predictable racially disparate impact. Instead, public officials
should determine the minimum level of well-being people need to lead healthy and
productive lives and then create policies to enable those whose access to
opportunity is blocked to achieve them. Strategies to strengthen families, improve
schools and communities, provide access to health care, and expand job
opportunities will do more to reduce crime and improve the. lives of all of our
children than savagely punishing them.39°
388 See, e.g., Feld, supra note 329, at 68 (arguing that adolescent developmental psychology
supports differences in culpability of juveniles and adults which require formal recognition of
youthfulness as a mitigating factor in sentencing).
389 See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 39, at 243 (arguing that the growth of white suburbs
around the de-industrialized urban core isolates poor blacks and issues of joblessness, criminality,
income inequality, and welfare dependency from the concerns of mainstream voters); HACKER, supra
note 75, at 228-29 (attributing black youth homicide, guns and drugs in the inner city to social
structural inequality and arguing that "[i]t is white America that has made being black so disconsolate
an estate. Legal slavery may be in the past, but segregation and subordination have been allowed to
persist. Even today, America imposes a stigma on every black child at birth.").390 Kempf-Leonard, supra note 209, at 83.
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